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INTRODUCTION
"Bailout" has become an increasingly familiar term in our popular
vocabulary. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989 (FIRREA),' the legislation providing for the bailout of the
nation's savings and loan institutions, is one of the more dramatic, contro-
versial, and expensive pieces of federal legislation in our history. 2 Although
the term bailout is reasonably new, the "bailout phenomenon" is not.
History provides numerous examples, including legislation to assist the
Chrysler Corporation,3 Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, 4 New York City,5
1. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183.
2. A precise estimate on the overall cost of the savings and loan bailout is difficult to
find. Differing estimates have been done by the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), created
under FIRREA, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the General Accounting Office
(GAO). Figures are updated to reflect changing economic conditions, changing real estate
markets, and the number of institutions likely to require assistance. One recent GAO estimate
figured cost through 1999 at $335-370 billion. Resolving Failed Savings and Loan Institutions:
Estimated Costs and Additional Funding Needs: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Charles
Bowsher, U.S. Comptroller General).
3. Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324
(1980).
4. Emergency Loan Guarantee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-70, 85 Stat. 178 (1971). Although
this Act was general in scope, its passage was motivated by the financial problems of the
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. H.R. REP. No. 379, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 1272 (1971).
5. New York City Loan Guarantee Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-339, 92 Stat. 460; New
York City Seasonal Financing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-143, 89 Stat. 797.
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and certain railroads.6 In each case, the government intervened to assist an
industry, individual firm, or municipality in financial distress.
Yet other recent instances of industry or firm failure have not received a
particularly sympathetic hearing from the government. In response to re-
quests for assistance from the airline industry, for example, the Federal
Aviation Administration responded that "direct financial aid is not called
for and would probably do more harm than good to the competitive
process. ' 7 Similarly, requests for government assistance to prevent the
imminent bankruptcy of the Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, a major
securities firm, fell on deaf ears. Going even further than the FAA, Alan
Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, indicated that federal
authorities probably would refuse to rescue even the largest securities firms
threatened with such failure.'
Industries, individual firms, or municipalities will again appear before
Congress to request assistance in times of crisis. Indeed, an emerging crisis
already may exist in the insurance industry. A recent report cautioned that
"the same early warnings of potential disaster are abundantly evident, as
they were 5 years ago in the thrift industry. If such warnings are not
heeded, the insurance industry and the nation could face a solvency crisis
rivaling the present savings and loan situation." 9 Similar concerns have been
raised regarding the nation's pension funds. 10 Assuming that some government
6. United States Railway Association Amendments Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-565, 92
Stat. 2397; Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985
(1974).
7. Hearings Before the House Public Works Comm., 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (March 5,
1991) (testimony by James Busey, Federal Aviation Administration).
8. When asked if the government would have intervened to assist a larger investment
house such as Merrill Lynch or Smith Barney instead of Drexel, Greenspan replied that,
regardless of the institution involved, the government actions would have been the same if the
financial conditions were all the same. Leveraged Buyouts and Bankruptcy: Hearings Before
the House Subcomm. on Econ. and Commercial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1990) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors,
Federal Reserve System). In discussing the controversial "too-big-to-fall" issue as applied to
banks, Chairman Greenspan responded that "setting up a system in which commercial banks
can be too big to fall is not good policy, needless to say. It is not good for the system, it's
not good for the discipline of the system, and ... it's certainly not equitable." Id. at 107.
9. REPORT BY THE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON ENERGY
AND COMMERCE, 101ST CONG., 2 D Sass., FArtED PROmnsEs: INsURANCE COMANY INSOLVENCIES
2 (Comm. Print 1990). Since this report, several large insurance companies have experienced
difficulties necessitating government intervention. See, e.g., New Jersey Is Preparing to Seize
Mutual Benefit, A Large Insurer, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1991, at Al, col. 1. The National
Organization of Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Associations recently coordinated a
private industry effort to protect the customers of the failed Executive Life Insurance Company
of California. Aid Planned for Executive Life Customers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1991, at DI,
col. 2.
10. This concern was raised in a recent Department of Labor report, stating that "an
unknown portion of the $1.6 trillion in assets that are currently in private pension plans may
be at risk. Unless steps are taken now, today's S & L bail-out may become tomorrow's ERISA
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intervention is called for, regulatory efforts to prevent such crises should
be the first priority. If such efforts prove unsuccessful, how should Congress
respond? Why did Chrysler, Lockheed, and others receive government
assistance, while Drexel Burnham Lambert did not?
Given that most bailout scenarios present an impending crisis, responsive
legislation may be enacted without adequate deliberation. One is tempted
to suggest that Congress or some appropriate agency develop general bailout
guidelines or ground rules in a period of more sober reflection."1 Such
guidelines or policies could lead to more carefully designed legislation and
might increase public confidence in difficult economic times. On the other
hand, publication of such guidelines would give notice to players in the
private marketplace, allowing them to take greater risks than they might
otherwise, secure in the knowledge that the government will be there to
protect them.' 2 Some might say that this type of risk-taking behavior is
already taking place. 3 Those in the thrift industry arguably were aware of
the impending crisis. Nevertheless, they continued to take risks on the
assumption that the government would have no choice but to bail them
out. One of the goals of this Article is to address this tension between the
need for bailout guidelines and the potential for increased risk taking and
business failures that such guidelines might produce. More broadly, the goal
is to consider the implications of alternative approaches to legislative policy
for government decisions to provide financial assistance to troubled firms,
municipalities, and industries and the form such assistance should take.
In addition to overt bailouts, numerous illustrations of more subtle
assistance in the form of special tax breaks or special relief from burdensome
nightmare." OFicE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SEMIANN. REPORT 3
(1989). For an in-depth discussion of the pending crisis in the pension area, see Keating,
Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 65.
11. Shortly after the Chrysler bailout, but before the savings and loan crisis, the Comptroller
General's Office appealed to the President and Congress to develop policies governing federal
assistance to failing firms and municipalities. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: GUIDELINES FOR REscuING LARE FAILNG FIRMS AND
MUNirPALrrms 5 (1984) [hereinafter COMPTOrO.LER GENERAL REPORT].
12. Commenting upon the Comptroller General's report, the United States Department of
Commerce responded that "developing policy guidelines ... leaves the impression that such
aid is inevitable and encourages firms and municipalities to look to the government for
assistance. We should not send this type of signal to firms and municipalities." Id. at 79.
13. For example, a recent report on government-sponsored enterprises such as Farm Credit
Banks, Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and others indicated that
enterprise ties with the government have weakened private market discipline to
the point that creditors believe the federal government would be likely to assist
an enterprise through any financial difficulty. While the government has no legal
obligation to protect enterprise creditors, it seems clear that the enterprise's
federal ties cause creditors to behave like insured depositors who believe their
investments to be very safe.
GENERAL AccouNTiNo OFFICE, GOVENMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES: A FRAMEWORK FOR
UNmTiG THE GOmERNT's ExposuRE TO RiSKS 3 (1991).
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regulatory statutes may also be regarded as bailouts of a sort. Little effort
has been made to identify the many different types of bailouts that exist
and to look for unifying principles. With this Article, I hope to bridge that
gap. Part I of this Article develops a definition of bailout, as well as several
generic typologies or classification models. For illustrative purposes, earlier
historical episodes will be fitted into this classification scheme. Part II
discusses issues surrounding the development of a consistent public bailout
policy. How does and how should Congress decide when to rescue a firm
or industry in financial distress? Part III includes a discussion of public
interest, pluralist, and distributive justice theoretical approaches to this
difficult public policy issue. The Article wilf draw heavily upon the literature
of economics, philosophy, and political science as well as the growing legal
literature on the legislative process. 14 Part III provides some suggestions for
substantive and procedural development of bailout policy. Finally, Part IV
considers issues regarding the proper structure of a bailout once a decision
to intervene has been made.
I. DEFINITIONS AND CLASSIFICATION MODELS
A. What Is a Bailout?
The popular press has thrown the term "bailout" about rather loosely.
In a more theoretical setting, however, a workable definition of relevant
terms and parameters is critical. Bailout is a form of government intervention
in another market arena, in most cases, a private market. One level of
government also may intervene in the affairs of another level of government.
The federal government, for example, may bail out a state or local govern-
ment, and a state government may bail out a local government." Most of
the ensuing analyses can be applied to bailouts at other levels of government,
14. In beginning my efforts on this project, I was not conscious of participating in an
emerging field of legal scholarship. Nevertheless, this Article fits within the "New Public
Law" scholarship recently described in Rubin, The Concept of Law and the New Public Law
Scholarship, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 792 (1991). The primary audience I hope to reach with this
Article consists of legislators, policymakers, and interested scholars. See id. at 814. My temporal
orientation is toward the future, see id. at 818, and I use past events not as authority but as
a source of data, see id. at 819.
15. In 1975, the federal government provided assistance to New York City in the form of
direct short-term loans to allow the city to continue essential services and to prevent default.
New York City Seasonal Financing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-143, §§ 2, 4(b), 89 Stat. 797.
In 1978, additional assistance was provided in the form of long-term loan guarantees. New
York City Loan Guarantee Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-339, 92 Stat. 460. In 1991, New
York City was again in financial crisis and requested bailout assistance from the state. It is
also conceivable, albeit unlikely, that a state or local government might be called upon to
assist in "bailing out" the federal government.
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but this Article will focus primarily on federal government bailout of private
industry. 16
1. Bailout as a Form of Government Subsidy
Bailouts and general government subsidies are members of the same
conceptual family and have some overlapping characteristics, but they differ
largely as a matter of degree. Bailouts may include fewer beneficiaries than
do general government subsidies. For example, bailout assistance to a
particular firm provides benefits to a more concentrated group than general
subsidies to assist small businesses. More significantly, though, bailouts
differ from other government subsidies in focus. Whereas general subsidies
tend to encourage a particular desired or favored activity, bailouts are
designed to prevent enterprise failure. The focus of bailout is on saving a
particular private enterprise or industry from collapse. This focus is distinct
from that of three other types of general federal subsidies.
First, "incentive subsidies" are provided to private enterprise to encourage
desired behavior. For example, in the interest of preserving free competition,
the Small Business Administration may provide assistance to encourage and
develop the actual and potential capacity of small businesses. 7 Also, the
Internal Revenue Code provides for a targeted jobs credit 8 and numerous
other such "incentive subsidies," earmarked for or made available to
encourage a specific favored activity. In contrast, bailout subsidies are
designed to support survival of the enterprise. Moreover, although the
decision to provide "incentive subsidies" may be based on need, incentives
are often available without regard to the financial health of a given firm
or enterprise.
Second, "relief subsidies," such as federal disaster assistance, generally
are provided to individuals and businesses that suffer dramatic losses from
natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods. 9 Relief subsidies
resemble bailouts in that they may prevent financial collapse of a business
16. Doctrines of sovereign immunity and other limitations on federal, state, or local liability
might be thought of as reverse bailouts by which private citizens bail out government. Given
its focus on government bailouts, consideration of reverse bailouts is beyond the scope of this
Article.
17. Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 163, 67 Stat. 232 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 631 (1988)).
18. The targeted jobs credit provides employers with a tax credit based upon a percentage
of first-year wages paid to individuals hired from certain targeted groups. 26 U.S.C. § 51(a),
(b) (1988). These groups include economically disadvantaged youths, supplemental security
income recipients, general assistance recipients, and others. Id. § 51(d). The Internal Revenue
Code also provides special deductions and credits to encourage research and experimental
investments. Id. §§ 38, 41, 174.
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5122 (1988). The Small Business Administration also is authorized
to provide some forms of disaster relief to small businesses. 15 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
[Vol. 67:951
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that has suffered loss due to a natural disaster. However, assistance is not
limited to those who would be threatened with imminent bankruptcy without
federal intervention. Rather, the relief subsidy recognizes that natural dis-
asters strike arbitrarily, imposing costs on the victims from which the rest
of us have been spared. When some participants in the private marketplace
arbitrarily incur extraordinary expenses due to circumstances beyond their
control and the private insurance market is unavailable to cover the loss,
communitarian considerations suggest that some type of government assis-
tance should be provided.
Third, "support subsidies," such as price supports for certain agricultural
products, are available to assist certain farmers. 20 The initial impetus for
agricultural price supports in the 1930s was the "acute economic emergency
being in part the consequence of a severe and increasing disparity between
the prices of agricultural and other commodities, which disparity ha[d]
largely destroyed the purchasing power of farmers for industrial commod-
ities. ' 21 Although agricultural support subsidies thus had some bailout
characteristics, the ongoing rationale for subsidies is primarily the regulation
of agricultural markets.? Support subsidies are available to farmers who
comply with program requirements regardless of the financial health of the
particular farming enterprise receiving support. In addition, they are subject
to limits and will not necessarily provide a profit or protect a particular
farmer from financial collapse.23
Any federal assistance to private enterprise, whether through bailout or
general subsidy, involves government intervention in otherwise private mar-
kets. In either case, the interests to be served by government intervention
and assistance must be identified and justified. To be sure, many of the
arguments developed in this Article could be extended more generally to
other types of subsidies. u Despite the similarities between bailouts and other
subsidies, this Article takes the position that bailouts deserve special policy
consideration, for both substantive and procedural reasons.
On a substantive level, bankruptcy-which bailout seeks to prevent-may
well be good for the economy as a way of weeding out inefficient enterprise.
Allowing firms to fail may be best for the overall long-run health of the
20. Price supports are available only for production of specific products. Congress has
made price supports mandatory for some agricultural products and discretionary with the
Secretary of Agriculture for others. 7 U.S.C. § 1421(b) (1988). Price support programs currently
available include government loans, government purchase of commodities, and direct payments
to farmers. For a brief description of these three types of programs and farm policy generally,
see R. KNmrrsoN, J. PENN & W. BomsM, AGRIcULTuRAL AND FAxa POLicY, ch. 10 (1990).
21. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 10, § 1, 48 Stat. 31.
22. Viewed slightly differently, price supports and other indirect subsidies in the form of
tariffs or trade quotas simply may be raw protectionist legislation acquired by industry.
23. Limitations on price support receipts are set in 7 U.S.C. §§ 1307-1308.
24. I will limit myself in this Article to consideration of bailout policy and leave for future
articles the extent to which the arguments developed here can be applied more broadly.
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economy. Moreover, a bailout may protect the "wrong" economic actors.
Although bailouts ostensibly may be designed to protect employees from
unemployment and innocent customers or depositors from losing their
money, the managers and investors or shareholders of the rescued enterprise
are often indirect beneficiaries of a bailout. Normally, investors in a business
enterprise understand that they risk losing their investment, and the price
for stock or other investment takes such risk into account. Bailouts permit
investors and managers to shed some of this risk by shifting loss to the
community funding the bailout effort.
Bailouts also raise distinct "moral hazard" issues. In the context of
accidents and insurance, Dean Guido Calabresi has pointed out that
[i]n a world where accident costs were totally spread, there would be
no financial incentives to avoid accidents other than fear for one's own
safety. Even that incentive would be reduced to the extent that the
injuries one might suffer could be adequately compensated for finan-
cially.... A vague kind of moral sense might cause us occasionally to
be safety-conscious, but where the less safe acts or activities had any
substantial attraction and where the harm to others was not obvious, it
would not be a very effective incentive for the mass of people. '
Tort liability creates a general deterrence effect that "operates in two ways
to reduce accident cost. The first and more obvious one is that it creates
incentives to engage in safer activities .... The second and perhaps more
important way general deterrence reduces accident costs is that it encourages
us to make activities safer." 26
The market generally forces firms to internalize the cost of failure, thus
providing a deterrence effect. Internalization of costs will influence the
behavior of two significant groups. First, and most important, business
managers whose jobs and salaries are affected by business failure will be
deterred from excessively risky behavior. Second, investors demand a higher
rate of return from risky activities, but, at some point, the rate of return
will not be adequate and the investor will be unwilling to take the risk. A
society interested in technological innovation and advancement may wish to
encourage greater levels of risk taking than would otherwise occur in the
25. G. CALABR si, THE CosTs OF AcCIDENTs: A LEOAL AND ECoNoMIc ANALYsis 64-65
(1970). For a more technical economic discussion of moral hazard, see S. SHAvELL, ECONOMC
ANALYsis OF ACCIDENT LAW 186-261 (1987); Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10
BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979); Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. EcoN. 541 (1979).
26. G. CALABREIS, supra note 25, at 73. For a general economic argument that this may
not always be so, see R.H. COASE, Tim FiaM, TmE MAtKET, AND TmE LAW 95-156 (1988)
(originally published as The Problem of Social Cost, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)). For a more
specific critique of Dean Calabresi's approach as applied to motorists, see Blum and Kalven,
The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi: Auto Accidents and General Deterrence, 34 U. Cm. L.
Rsv. 239 (1967).
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market and may thus permit the investor to shed some risk.27 On the other
hand, too broad a policy of risk shifting may encourage managers and
investors to take excessive risks. A general government policy to bailout
failing enterprises would encourage higher levels of risk taking than would
be optimal for society or, even worse, might create incentives to incur
losses. A thoughtful bailout policy must take this moral hazard problem
into account.
On a procedural level, a special bailout policy is necessary to balance the
need for careful consideration of the merits of a particular bailout with the
need for quick action in a crisis setting. Bailout decisions often responded
to a crisis on an ad hoc basis. But, in the heat of crisis, time for deliberation
is short and consideration of larger public policy issues difficult. Policy
makers should develop a general bailout policy in the absence of immediate
crisis. Such a policy should consider the general government or public
interest to be served by public bailout intervention in various sectors of the
private market and establish some general guidelines as to when intervention
would be appropriate. Such guidelines should make it clear that public
rescue of private enterprise will be a rare and extraordinary event. 28
2. A Proposed Definition
a. General Definition
The features distinguishing bailout from the broader class of general
government subsidy provide some useful descriptive limits to the bailout
27. Insurance is an institution developed to permit shifting of risks in the interest of
economic development. The market for common stock is a risk-shifting institution as well.
For one thing, the corporate form offers the advantage of limited liability to shareholders.
The market for shares also permits
the owner of a business [to] divest himself of some of the risks, permitting others
to share in the benefits or losses. Since each individual could now own a diversified
portfolio of common stocks, each with a different set of risks attached, he could
derive the benefits of a reduced aggregate risk through pooling; thus, the stock
market permits a reduction in the social amounts of risk-bearing.
K. ARROW, ESSAYS IN TBE THEoRY oF RISK-BEARiNG 135 (1971). For further discussion of
insurance and moral hazard, see infra notes 146-61 and accompanying text. Special tax breaks
have often been used to encourage greater levels of investment and risk taking. For example,
credits for research and development are designed to encourage investors to develop projects
that otherwise might not be undertaken given the speculative prospects for success. 26 U.S.C.
§ 41 ("Credit for Increasing Research Activities"). For similar reasons, investors in oil and
gas wells are permitted to deduct certain drilling and development costs that would otherwise
be amortized. Id. § 263(c) ("Intangible Drilling and Development Costs in the Case of Oil
and Gas and Geothermal Wells"). Finally, reduced rates for capital gains are often justified
as a stimulus for the economy generally and to encourage risk taking. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT
OF TREAs., GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE P ESIDENT'S BUDGET PROPOSALS AFFECTING REcEIPTs
3-6 (Jan., 1992) (President Bush's proposal for further reducing capital gains rates).
28. For further discussion of general policy guidelines, see infra notes 265-88 and accom-
panying text.
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phenomenon under consideration, but none provides a definition that iden-
tifies the distinct qualities of the bailout phenomenon as a public policy
issue. As a first step toward such a definition, I propose the following:
Bailout is a form of government assistance or intervention specifically
designed or intended to assist enterprises facing financial distress and to
prevent enterprise failure. 29 This definition does not require that the bailout
be successful; the business or industry may fail despite government assis-
tance. The crucial element is that the attempt be a form of government
intervention.30 Although individuals or other private entities may provide
assistance to a failing enterprise, this Article focuses on governmental action.
Bailout, as defined, focuses upon assistance to the enterprise or industry
itself. Some have argued that the popularly described savings and loan
bailout is mislabelled since "moneys are being used to satisfy the govern-
ment's insurance obligations to depositors, not to 'bail out' anyone."'
Under the proposed bailout definition, this argument initially has some
force. On closer examination, however, a bailout surely can be found in
the savings and loan story. A federal insurance program may protect
customers or depositors, but when the program covers a liability to a
customer or depositor for which the business enterprise would otherwise be
liable, the payment does provide assistance to the enterprise.3 2 The "bailout"
in the savings and loan story arguably is not the money now being used to
satisfy the government's insurance obligation, but the federal deposit insur-
ance system itself, established just after the Great Depression in order to
restore consumer confidence, prevent bank runs, and keep the banks op-
erating.
In some sense, the savings and loan episode can be viewed as a failed
bailout. Earlier attempts to prevent enterprise failure through a federal
insurance system were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the terms of the earlier
bailout now require dramatic payments to satisfy the government obligations
undertaken. Moreover, in some recent bank failure cases, banking regulators
went far beyond government insurance obligations, choosing to protect even
29. Use of the term '"intervention" suggests actions of government that are designed to
have a particular impact. This should be distinguished from other actions of government that
may interfere in some way with private action as an unintentional by-product of government
activity.
30. The appropriate terminology is really "public bailout." Since most of the discussion
in this Article is about government bailouts, bailout will be used as a shorthand for public
bailout.
31. L. WHmrr, THE S & L DEBACLE: PuBLC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND TmuFr
RErGuLATION 5 (1991). Professor White concedes that assistance to savings and loan managers,
investors, and uninsured depositors might legitimately be referred to as a bailout. He argues,
however, that such payments represented a very small percentage of the total "S & L bailout"
cost. Id. at 161-63.
32. For further discussion of federal insurance programs, see infra notes 90-108, 336-38
and accompanying text.
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uninsured depositors and to keep some banks operating. These government
actions protected managers and investors, as well as customers. A bailout
surely is involved when government assistance protects managers and inves-
tors and preserves the enterprise as a going concern.
b. The Concept of Financial Distress
One challenge presented by the bailout definition will be to establish
precisely when an enterprise is facing financial distress or failure. One useful
place to look for a definition is the "failing firm defense" to alleged
violations of section 7 of the Clayton Act.33 First recognized by the Supreme
Court in International Shoe Co. v. F. T.C.,34 the defense allows an otherwise
impermissible anticompetitive merger if one of the merging firms is failing.
The failing firm defense has two basic elements. First, one company to the
merger must be facing "grave probability of a business failure"35 and there
must be "no other prospective purchaser."3 6 Some courts have added as a
third element the requirement that prospects for a reorganization in
33. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914). The current version provides
that
no person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital ... where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (Supp. 1991).
34. 280 U.S. 291 (1930). The Court upheld the acquisition of a failing company by the
nation's largest shoe manufacturer, concluding that
[i]n the light of the case thus disclosed of a corporation with resources so depleted
and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that it faced the grave probability
of a business failure with resulting loss to its stockholders and injury to the
communities where its plants were operated, we hold that the purchase of its
capital stock by a competitor (there being no other prospective purchaser), not
with a purpose to lessen competition, but to facilitate the accumulated business
of the purchaser and with the effect of mitigating seriously injurious consequences
otherwise probable, is not in contemplation of law prejudicial to the public and
does not substantially lessen competition or restrain commerce within the intent
of the Clayton Act.
Id. at 302-03.
Over the years, some controversy has developed concerning the Court's rationale for the
failing firm defense. One rationale reflected in the language quoted in text is that merger of
a truly failing firm is not anticompetitive since the firm is about to go out of business anyway.
A second rationale also reflected in the Court's language is recognition of the hardship faced
by stockholders, employees, and the communities in which firm was operating. For an excellent
discussion of these two strands of the failing firm defense, see Friedman, Untangling the
Failing Company Doctrine, 64 TEX. L. REv. 1375 (1986). For further discussion of the "failing
firm defense" as a type of bailout, see infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
35. Int'l Shoe Co., 280 U.S. at 302.
36. Id.
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bankruptcy be "dim or nonexistent. ' 37 The Justice Department has included
this third element in its Merger Guidelines, announcing that it is
unlikely to challenge an anticompetitive merger in which one of the
merging firms is allegedly failing when: 1) The allegedly failing firm
probably would be unable to meet its financial obligations in the near
future; 2) it probably would not be able to reorganize successfully under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act; and 3) it has made unsuccessful
good faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative offers of acquisition
of the failing firm that would both keep it in the market and pose a
less severe danger to competition than does the proposed merger.3"
While the common law failing firm defense requires a grave probability of
business failure, the Justice Department's standard is a bit looser, requiring
only that the firm "probably would be unable to meet its financial obli-
gations in the near future." 39
For purposes of this Article, I will adopt the Justice Department notion
of a failing firm as one unlikely to meet its financial demands in the near
future.A Adoption of the looser standard will subject more proposals for
government intervention to careful scrutiny under strict bailout guidelines
developed later. 4' Also, as will be developed further, the requirement that
the firm would probably be unable to successfully reorganize in bankruptcy
will prove useful in the bailout context.
42
3. Clarifying Misconceptions: Bailout Costs
Although bailouts provide assistance to troubled enterprises, they do not
necessarily involve expenditures of general tax revenue. With regard to cost,
bailouts can be broken into five general categories. First, as in some of the
37. See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969).
38. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,837 (1984) [hereinafter
Merger Guidelines], reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103 (1988).
39. Id. Looser still is a defense available with respect to bank mergers. Under the Bank
Merger Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1988)),
banking regulators were given authority to approve otherwise anticompetitive mergers upon a
finding "that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in
the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and
needs of the community to be served." Id. § 1828(c)(5)(B). 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) is a similar
provision regarding mergers of bank holding companies. The bank merger "floundering firm"
doctrine was described by the Supreme Court as "related although ... remotely, to the failing-
company doctrine." United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 369 (1967).
40. In the bankruptcy context, one commentator recently provided a similar definition for
the term "financial distress": "a corporation is in financial distress when it faces actual or
anticipated payment demands to which its own response is or is likely to be inadequate ....
[A] corporation is in financial distress when its own internal mechanisms for adaptation to
actual or anticipated payment demands are severely impaired." Korobkin, Rehabilitating
Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 717, 764 (1991).
41. See infra notes 257-310 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 62-74 and 258-59 and accompanying text.
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more successful bailout illustrations, no government funds may ultimately
be expended at all. In the Chrysler Corporation bailout, for example, all
government loans to the corporation were repaid in full, and fees charged
the corporation covered most or all administrative costs. 43 In fact, in the
Chrysler case, the government was rewarded with a profit from the sale of
warrants it had taken to secure its risk.44 This category may be referred to
as the "profitable bailout."
One suspects that most bailouts will not be profitable for the government,
however. The second category of "no- or low-cost bailouts" includes those
bailouts that are not profitable but that involve little or no expenditure of
revenues. Loan guarantee programs may fail into this category. In such
cases, the enterprise is obligated to repay a private lender, with the govern-
ment simply acting as guarantor. If administration of the program is covered
by fees charged to the enterprise and the government guarantee is never
called, the bailout is a no-cost or low-cost bailout. 4
In contrast to profitable or no-cost bailouts, many bailouts will involve
substantial government expenditures. Funding for these bailouts may come
from various sources. The third classification of bailouts according to cost
includes those bailouts that are funded from sources other than general
revenue. For example, banking regulators have discretionary authority to
provide assistance to failing banks. Such bailouts are generally funded
through special insurance pools under the federal deposit insurance system.
The funds in these insurance pools are generated by assessments and
contributions from banks participating in the insurance programs, not from
general tax revenues. 46 Although general tax revenues are not used, these
rescues still can be properly regarded as bailouts. In each case, the govern-
ment intervenes to provide assistance to a failing private enterprise. Of
43. Chrysler Corp. Loan Guarantee Board Report to Congress: October 1, 1982 to
September 30, 1983 2 ("Chrysler was able to generate sufficient cash to retire the entire $1.2
billion in guaranteed indebtedness ... approximately two years in advance of the scheduled
repayment and seven years ahead of the time when repayment would have been required.").
44. As part of its effort to protect itself from risk, the Treasury Department received from
Chrysler warrants to purchase stock at $13 per share. As Chrysler recovered financially, the
stock value increased substantially above this warrant price. The government ultimately sold
the warrants to the highest bidder (Chrysler itself) and made a $311.1 million profit. R. REICH
& J. DONAHUE, NEW DEALS: THE CHRYSLER REVIVAL AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 254-57
(1985). A more complete discussion of the Chrysler bailout follows infra notes 63-66 and
accompanying text.
45. One may question whether a government assistance program that ultimately results in
a profit or no cost to the government should still be regarded as a bailout. The answer, I
think, is yes. In the Chrysler, Lockheed, and New York City loan guarantee cases, the
government took a gamble and won. Nevertheless, substantial taxpayer dollars were at risk.
In each case, the government assumed a risk that commercial lenders were unwilling to take
based upon standard lending principles. General tax revenues were at risk in a way that they
would never have been in a private bailout through reorganization in bankruptcy, for example.
46. For a further description of federal deposit insurance bailouts, see infra notes 90-100
and accompanying text.
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course, the cost burdens in such federal insurance cases are more concen-
trated than in the case of bailouts through general tax revenues. I will refer
to cases in this category as "special fund bailouts." In special fund bailouts,
those bearing cost burdens are more closely connected with those receiving
benefits from the federal program. 47
Fourth, bailouts may involve expenditures of general tax revenues. This
category will be referred to as "general revenue bailouts." Cost burdens
are spread broadly among the general tax-paying public. Pure general
revenue bailouts will be rather rare, however. More often, bailouts will be
funded through a combination of sources. For example, FIRREA established
a rather complex mechanism to provide funding for the savings and loan
bailout. Theoretically, funds for the bailout were to come from the sale of
assets taken from banks in receivership, the sale of nonvoting capital stock
to Federal Home Loan Banks, assessments against certain savings and loan
banks, and the issuance of obligations." In each case, however, it was
recognized that the "special fund" might not be sufficient to cover all
bailout costs. Congress authorized supplemental general revenue funding
from the Treasury Department. 49 Thus, the savings and loan expenditure
47. For further discussion of the distribution of bailout costs, see infra notes 339.46 and
accompanying text.
48. Details regarding the jurisdiction over and funding of bank bailouts are quite complex
and beyond the scope of this Article. Generally, however, the savings and loan bailout is being
handled by three entities. First, banks that were insolvent before January 1, 1988, and thus
liabilities of the bankrupt FSLIC are covered by the FSLIC Resolution Fund, which assumed
old FSLIC liabilities. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 215 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (Supp. I
1989)). Second, the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) was established to resolve those banks
placed in receivership between January 1, 1989 and August 9, 1992. Id. § 511 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441(b)). Finally, the FDIC retained authority for subsequent bailouts under revised
and reformed regulatory provisions of the Act. Id. at Titles I and II. Each of these entities
has distinct provisions regarding funding sources. The FSLIC Resolution Fund, for example,
is funded by the Financing Corporation originally established by the Competitive Equality
Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552, § 302 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1441(a)). The RTC is funded by the Resolution Funding Corporation, FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 511 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441(b)). The FDIC is to maintain a Bank Insurance Fund
(BIF) and a Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF). Id. § 211 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1821(a)(5), (6)). For a more comprehensive treatment of the savings and loan bailout structure
and funding mechanisms provided by FIRREA, see J. BARH, Tim GREAT SAVINOs AND LoAN
DEBACLE 79-99 (1991); Lescher and Mace, Financing the Bailout of the Thrift Crisis: Workings
of the Financing Corporation and the Resolution Funding Corporation, 46 Bus. LAw. 507
(1991); Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself. Revising and Reshaping the Enforcement
Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 Omo ST. L.J. 1117 (1989); see also infra note 90.
49. The most dramatic authorization of Treasury payments arises in connection with the
SAIF. Congress authorized annual Treasury payments of up to $2 billion for administrative
expenses through 1999. In addition, the Treasury is to pay additional amounts not to exceed
$16 billion through 1999 when necessary to ensure that SAIF maintains specified minimum
net worths for each year. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 211 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(6)(F),
(J)(ii)). With respect to the RTC and FSLIC Resolution Fund, Congress provided for backup
Treasury funding to permit payment of interest on obligations issued. See, e.g., id. § 511
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441(b), (f)(2)(E)).
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fits within this fifth category of "combination bailouts," funded through
an intricate mix of special funds and general revenues.
4. The Public v. Private Bailout Distinction
a. Reorganization in Bankruptcy as an Alternative
A few important points about the differences between public and private
bailout should be made. First, private parties with an economic stake in a
particular enterprise may agree voluntarily to make concessions in order to
assure survival of the enterprise. Such coordinated efforts often are referred
to as informal workouts and involve little or no government intervention.
A more formal private bailout mechanism is provided through the bank-
ruptcy regime.
Early federal bankruptcy law provided only for liquidation of a failed
enterprise. 50 Beginning with the Chandler Act of 1938, s1 however, federal
bankruptcy laws provided for reorganization or rehabilitation as an alter-
native.Y Congress provided the reorganization option with the view that
rehabilitation of the enterprise might be more productive and better serve
the interests of creditors, shareholders, and others than complete liquidation
of the business. 53 Today, reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code"4 is an important option for the failing business.
Chapter 11 permits the debtor to file a voluntary petition for reorgani-
zation.55 The debtor generally may remain in possession of the business and
continue operations in the ordinary course of business without court ap-
proval. 56 Upon filing the petition, the debtor is entitled to an "automatic
50. National Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 545-46 (1898).
51. Pub. L. No. 696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
52. Id. at 883-905.
53. The House Report on the Bankruptcy Reform Act explained that
the purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to
restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its
employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders.
The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for production
in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable than those same
assets sold for scrap .... If the business can extend or reduce its debts, it often
can be returned to a viable state. It is more economically efficient to reorganize
than to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977).
54. The modern Bankruptcy Code was created by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, which repealed the National Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
supra note 50, and the Chandler Act of 1938, supra note 51.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). Creditors may also file petitions for involuntary reorganizations.
Id. § 303.
56. Id. § 1107. The bankruptcy court may order appointment of a receiver in cases
involving "fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement" or where "such ap-
pointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of
the estate." Id. § 1104.
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stay" against collection of outstanding debts, lawsuits, and lien enforcement57
and for 120 days has the exclusive right to present a plan of reorganization.58
In the meantime, committees of creditors and equity holders are established
to represent the interest of each class of creditors and interest holders.59 All
"parties in interest" are entitled to be heard. 6 A plan of reorganization
must be confirmed either through acceptance by all parties with claims or
interests6' or through a process sometimes referred to as a "cram down."
Under that process, if at least one class of impaired creditors agrees, the
plan of reorganization can be imposed on the others as long as the plan
meets certain requirements and is fair and equitable to the dissenting
creditors. 62 As the plan of reorganization evolves under chapter 11, the
different classes of creditors negotiate with a view toward reaching a
settlement that serves the interests of all classes.
A chapter 11 reorganization, then, may be a private bailout in which
those with an economic stake in the troubled enterprise make concessions
and sacrifices in order to maintain the firm as a going enterprise. There
are limits on the scope of this private bailout, however. Creditors cannot
be required to make concessions that would cause them to receive any less
than they would have if the enterprise had been liquidated. The government's
involvement in this process is limited to judicially assuring a fair and
equitable procedure and result. In contrast, the public bailout envisioned
by the bailout definition described previously requires direct government
involvement in providing assistance to the enterprise. In effect, a public
bailout expands the "parties in interest" to include the tax-paying public,
whose interest may be impaired in order to assure survival of the enterprise.
b. Private Concessions as Part of a Public Bailout
A second important observation about the distinction between public and
private bailout is that certain private concessions may be required as a
57. Id. § 362.
58. Id. § 1121(b). In addition, any party in interest may file a plan of reorganization if
and only if a trustee has been appointed, the debtor has not filed a plan within 120 days of
the date of order for relief, or the debtor has not filed a plan that has been accepted before
180 days after the date of the order for relief. Id. § 1121(c).
59. Id. § 1102.
60. Id. § 1109.
61. Under this procedure, for each impaired class of claims or interests, each holder of
such a claim or interest must accept the reorganization plan. Id. § 1129(a)(7). For other classes,
the class as a group must accept the plan. Id. § 1129(a)(8). For percentages of claimants or
interest holders necessary for approval, see id. § 1126.
62. Most important, each member of the impaired class cannot receive "less than the
amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under chapter
7." Id. § 1129(a)(7)(ii). Thus, the amount that would have been received in liquidation serves
as a floor recovery below which no dissenting creditor will fall.
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component of an otherwise public bailout. For example, the Chrysler
Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979 authorized the Chrysler Loan
Guarantee Board to guarantee Chrysler's payment of principal and interest
on principal amounts up to $1.5 billion, 63 subject to numerous conditions.
Most important, Chrysler was required to submit a plan that included at
least $1.43 billion in nonfederally guaranteed assistance from "financial
commitments or concessions from persons with an existing economic stake
in the health of the Corporation. "64 Congress further specified the propor-
tion of this aggregate amount that was to come from concessions of
particular groups, including United States banks and financial institutions,
foreign banks, union and nonunion employees, suppliers and dealers, and
state and local governments.
6
In many respects, the private concessions made by Chrysler's creditors,
suppliers, and others with an economic stake in the enterprise resemble the
types of concessions that one would expect in a chapter 11 reorganization.
As Reich and Donahue observed in their book on the Chrysler bailout,
[b]ankruptcy codes have been broadened and extended to bias the process
in favor of keeping troubled firms in business, often by compelling a
wide circle of constituents to share the cost of recovery. At the same
time, unconditional public rescues for failing firms have given way in
recent years to more sophisticated interventions that hinge on sacrifice
from creditors, employees, and other constituents. Bankruptcy and bail-
out, at least for large firms, are coming to look much the same. 66
Despite the similarities between the private concessions arranged in the
Chrysler case and those that might be expected in a chapter 11 reorgani-
zation, the Chrysler bailout was fundamentally different in that it involved
direct government intervention or assistance designed to prevent enterprise
failure. Instead of limiting itself to an oversight role, the government became
a direct participant in the Chrysler rescue.
63. Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185, § 8(a), 93
Stat. 1324 (1980).
64. Id. § 4(a)(4)(A). Congress similarly imposed conditions upon its assistance to New
York City, requiring, among other things, that the State provide specified levels of assistance
and that the City create a council to explore ways to increase employee productivity. New
York City Loan Guarantee Act of 1978 § 103.
65. The breakdown of required concessions was specified in detail in the statute itself.
Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act of 1979 § 4(c). Nevertheless, the Chrysler Loan Guarantee Board
was authorized to "modify the amounts of assistance required to be provided by any of the
categories ... so long as the aggregate amount of at least $1,430,000,000 in nonfederally
guaranteed assistance is provided." Id. In the end, the Loan Guarantee Board did modify the
breakdown rather substantially. For an excellent report of the negotiations leading up to the
Chrysler legislation and the subsequent deals regarding private concessions and approval of
guarantees by the Chrysler Loan Guarantee Board, see R. REicH & J. DONAHUE, supra note
44.
66. R. RmcH & J. DONAHUE, supra note 44, at 8.
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B. A Taxonomy of Bailouts
If one adopts the broad definition of bailout as a form of government
intervention designed to prevent enterprise failure, a wide array of govern-
ment activity will fit the definition. Use of such a broad definition will
prove to be an asset in assessing the appropriate public policy approach to
economic failure. As a matter of public policy, a consistent, well-developed,
and thoughtful approach to economic failure is called for. Hidden bailouts
should be exposed ,and subject to the same kinds of scrutiny and attention
given to the more obvious arrangements referred to as bailouts by the
popular press. The sections that immediately follow develop a taxonomy or
classification of different types of bailouts.
1. Overt v. Covert Bailouts
a. Overt Bailouts
By definition, overt bailouts are easy to identify since they are explicit.
They usually take the form of direct assistance, loans, or loan guarantees.
Many of the instances of bailout that come to mind from recent history,
such as the bailouts of Chrysler, Lockheed, and New York City, involved
federal loan guarantees. This approach has many possible variations. A
loan or loan guarantee may be provided with a minimum amount of
government intervention. On the other hand, as illustrated by the Chrysler
case, conditions attached to such loans or guarantees may result in a high
degree of government intervention and oversight.
b. Hidden or Covert Bailouts
Hidden or covert bailouts can be provided in a number of different ways.
Assistance may be provided to a troubled enterprise through special tax
breaks. Covert bailouts may also be provided in the form of relief from
compliance with burdensome regulation. Finally, covert bailouts may be
provided through trade restrictions, tariffs, and quotas on foreign imports.
Such measures reduce competition and provide domestic producers with a
greater share of the market and the power to increase prices.
In the general regulatory setting, tax advantages and subsidies often
provide incentives for taxpayers to engage in desired behavior. Although
they fit within the general subsidy family, tax subsidies designed as incentives
differ slightly from bailouts.67 In the case of a bailout, the entity may not
be in a position to alter behavior in response to incentives. The tax break
67. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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or subsidy operates not as a carrot, but as a lifeline assisting the troubled
entity in its struggle to regain financial strength. In the early stages of the
savings and loan crisis, for example, Congress provided special tax breaks
to encourage the merger of failing thrifts into healthier ones. 68 These special
provisions were later repealed 69 and a far more substantial bailout was
undertaken.70
The safe-harbor leasing provision, enacted in 1981, is another illustration
of tax provisions that operated as a form of bailout.7 1 Under the safe-
harbor leasing rules, a company suffering losses was able to sell its depre-
ciable assets to a buyer that was in a better position to take advantage of
accelerated depreciation deductions and immediately lease back the same
property.7 2 Physical possession of the property did not change hands and
business operations were not interrupted. Tax benefits available to the new
owner would be reflected in reduced rentals paid by the new lessee. Chrysler,
for example, arranged a sale-leaseback transaction with the General Electric
Credit Corporation under the safe-harbor leasing rules and reported $68.3
million in gains from these transactions during the years 1981 through
1983.73
68. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 254, 95 Stat. 172 (adding
I.R.C. § 368(a)(3)(D)(ii)). This provision relaxed the continuity-of-interest requirement ordi-
narily required for tax-free reorganization treatment. Tax-free mergers of savings and loans
were allowed in an effort to encourage healthy thrifts to takeover ailing thrifts. The tax break
here arguably was an indirect bailout benefitting the healthy firm in an effort to provide
incentives to assist in the bailout. In addition, the Act provided that financial assistance
payments made by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) would be
tax-free to the recipient thrift. Id. § 244. The General Explanation of the Act states that
"Congress concluded that the tax laws should be modified to facilitate providing of financial
assistance by the FSLIC and mergers of financially troubled institutions into stronger institu-
tions." STAFF OF THE JOINT Comm. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., IST SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF T=E EcoNoMIc RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 at 152 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter JOINT
CoMM. ON TAxATION]. For a discussion of these and other tax provisions enacted in 1981 to
assist the falling savings and loan industry, see Spragens, Saving the Savings and Loan
Industry: Tax Consequences of Financial Assistance Payments to Troubled Thrifts, 15 J. CORP.
TAX'N 217 (1989).
69. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 903-905, 100 Stat. 2085, 2383-87.
70. See FIRREA, supra note I and discussion supra notes 48-49 and infra notes 224-35
and accompanying text.
71. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, § 201(a). Safe-harbor leasing was part of a
government program specifically designed to assist the failing auto industry. See, e.g., Oversight
Hearing on the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act and the Status of the U.S.
Automobile Industry: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1982) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (statement of Michael
Driggs, Deputy Ass't Sec., U.S. Dep't of Commerce). These provisions were later repealed by
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 209, 96 Stat.
324, 442 (1982).
72. "lU]nder prior law depreciation rules, many corporations were in a loss position and
thus unable to utilize fully the tax benefits of depreciation deductions." JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, supra note 68, at 103.
73. CHRYSLER CORP., 1983 ANiuAL REPORT, cited in R. REICH & J. DONAHruE, supra note
44, at 243 n.16.
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Troubled companies often attribute some portion of their financial prob-
lems to the cost of compliance with government regulations. In hearings on
the Chrysler bailout, for example, company president Lee Iacocca testified
that retooling necessary to comply with new automobile fuel efficiency
requirements had been costing the company an average of $160 million a
month for two years.74 Chrysler officials also lobbied White House officials
for special relief from rigid deadlines for compliance with environmental
regulations. 71 In the end, Chrysler did not receive special relief.76 Neverthe-
less, relief from burdensome regulation has been used as a method of
bailout in other settings.
Relief is often provided to a particular industry by a regulatory statute
itself. For example, Congress in 1981 created specific exemptions for steel
industry compliance with Clean Air Act emissions standards based upon
economic distress within the industry. 77 In other cases, particular industries
or firms obtain relief at the regulatory level. For example, the Environmental
Protection Agency sets particular effluent and emissions standards on an
industry-wide basis, often providing unique standards for industrial sub-
classifications. By carving out a narrow industry subclassification and prom-
ulgating lower standards for that subclass, the agency can provide a form
of bailout relief to a firm in economic distress.7 1
Another significant indirect form of bailout is the "failing firm defense"
to compliance with the antitrust laws. In its Merger Guidelines, the Justice
Department describes this defense as a "long-established, but ambiguous,
doctrine under which an anticompetitive merger may be allowed because
one of the firms is failing." ' 79 The ambiguity referred to reflects the two
rationales offered for the failing firm defense. The "competitive rationale"
suggests that the merger of a failing firm does not raise significant com-
petitive concerns in any event. There has been significant controversy on
74. The Chrysler Corporation Financial Situation: Hearings Before the House Subcomm.
on Econ. Stabilization of the Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 86 (1979) (testimony of Lee Iacocca).
75. R. REIcH & J. DoNAHuE, supra note 44, at 88.
76. Some industry-wide regulatory relief was later provided, however. See, e.g., Oversight
Hearing, supra note 71, at 78-79.
77. Steel Industry Compliance Extension Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-23, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)). The House Report explained that "[the Committee is
proposing that the extension be limited solely to the steel industry since no other industry is
experiencing such unique hardship." H.R. REP. No. 121, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1981).
78. Association of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1980), for example,
illustrates the use of industry subclassifications defined so narrowly that they include a very
small number of businesses. For example, fish processing regulations include subcategories for
Alaskan Hand-Butchered Salmon, Alaskan Mechanized Salmon, West Coast Hand-Butchered
Salmon, and West Coast Mechanized Salmon. Environmental Protection Agency Seafood
Processing Point Source Categories, 40 Fed. Reg. 55,720, 55,778 (1975).
79. Merger Guidelines, supra note 38, at 26,837. See also the earlier use of the failing firm
defense to assist in defining bailouts, supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
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this point. The majority of commentators reject this justification, arguing
that the merger of failing firms might well have anticompetitive effects."0
Under the "hardship rationale," mergers of failing firms are permitted in
order to ease the suffering of employees, shareholders, and others who
would be affected by a firm's collapse. The Justice Department accepts this
hardship justification and concedes in its Merger Guidelines that the failing
firm defense may "immunize significantly anticompetitive mergers." 8' To
the extent that the failing firm defense does significantly immunize anticom-
petitive mergers that would otherwise be challenged by the Justice Depart-
ment, the defense can be regarded as a bailout.
Congress more specifically provided relief from antitrust regulation in the
case of anticompetitive joint operating agreements between newspapers
experiencing economic distress. Congress provided:
In the public interest of maintaining a newspaper press editorially and
reportorially independent and competitive in all parts of the United
States, it is hereby declared to be the public policy of the United States
to preserve the publication of newspapers in any city, community, or
metropolitan area where a joint operating arrangement has been here-
tofore entered into because of economic distress or is hereafter effected
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.2
Technically, this provision meets the definition of bailout as government
intervention specifically designed to assist enterprises facing financial distress
and to prevent enterprise failure. On the other hand, if one accepts Con-
gress's explanation, the government motivation is not bailout, but rather
guaranteeing public access to important news information through an in-
dependent and competitive press. Surely, however, the bailout is not an
unintentional by-product of regulation."'
As another example of potentially hidden bailouts, established procedures
under United States international trade law are available through which a
80. See, e.g., Connor, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The Failing Company Myth, 49 GEo.
L.J. 84 (1960); Dooley, Comment, Failing Company Doctrine: Recent Developments, 47 TEx.
L. REv. 1437, 1439 (1969); Laurenza, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Failing Company:
An Updated Perspective, 65 VA. L. REv. 947, 961 (1979); Note, All the King's Horses and
All the King's Men: The Failing Company Defense as a Conditional Defense to Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 4 HOFSTRA L. REv. 643 (1976). For the case on the other side, see Campbell,
The Efficiency of the Failing Company Defense, 63 Tax. L. Rxv. 251 (1984).
81. Merger Guidelines, supra note 38, at 26,837. In an earlier version of the guidelines,
the Justice Department more explicitly provided that "when the elements of the defense are
satisfied, there is a conclusive presumption that the anticompetitive dangers associated with
the merger are outweighed by the income losses to creditors, stockholders, and communities
associated with the failure of the firm." Id. at 28,493, 28,502 n.54, reprinted in Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 13,102.
82. Newspaper Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-353, § 2, 84 Stat. 466 (1970) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1801 (1988)).
83. For a description of "mixed-motive" bailouts, see infra notes 130-33 and accompanying
text.
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domestic industry faced with serious economic injury can apply for import
relief. The "escape clause" procedure permits relief when "an article is
being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be
a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic
industry producing an article like or directly competitive with the imported
article." 4 The Senate Report to the 1974 Trade Act explains that:
[t]he rationale for the 'escape clause' has been and remains, that as
barriers to international trade are lowered, some industries and workers
inevitably face serious injury, dislocation and perhaps economic extinc-
tion. The 'escape clause' is aimed at providing temporary relief for an
industry suffering from serious injury, or the threat thereof, so that the
industry will have sufficient time to adjust to the freer international
competition.8
To obtain relief under the "escape clause," an entity must file a petition
with the International Trade Commission (ITC), which will determine after
public hearings whether the increased foreign import is a "substantial cause
of serious injury, or the threat thereof."86 If the determination is affirmative,
the ITC will report and make recommendations to the President, who is
authorized to "take all appropriate and feasible action within his power
which . . . [he] determines will facilitate efforts by the domestic industry to
make a positive adjustment to import competition and provide greater
economic and social benefits than costs." 87
The "escape clause" mechanism may operate as a bailout of domestic
private industry. Although the relief granted generally is industry-wide,
narrow conceptions of the relevant industry can result in a firm-specific
bailout. For example, the Reagan Administration in 1983, at the request of
Harley-Davidson, temporarily imposed quotas and increased tariffs on im-
ports of foreign motorcycles with "engines with total piston displacement
over 700 cubic centimeters.""8 Although the firm's name appears nowhere
in the presidential proclamation, Harley-Davidson was the only U.S. com-
pany at the time manufacturing engines of the type described. 9
2. Prospective v. Retrospective Bailouts
Most of the bailouts that receive widespread public attention are after-
the-fact public rescues of firms or industries already in financial distress.
84. Tiade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (as amended by Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107).
85. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 195 (1974) (emphasis added).
86. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b) (1988).
87. Id. § 2251(a). The President is required to report any such action to Congress. Id. §
2253(b).
88. Proclamation No. 5050, 48 Fed. Reg. 16,639 (1983).
89. For a brief discussion of this Harley-Davidson bailout, see R. REICH & J. DoNAHuE,
supra note 44, at 284-85.
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Less obvious, perhaps, are ways in which government may provide bailout
prospectively. The most obvious examples of prospective bailouts are federal
insurance programs, which set aside reserves to provide assistance in times
of future financial distress. Although many federal insurance programs were
designed primarily to protect customers, they generally were implemented
at times of financial crisis and were designed to prevent financial collapse
of industries faced with economic hardship.9 The mission of the FDIC was
not only to insure deposits, but also to "reduce the economic disruptions
caused by bank failures." 9' Although the customer is the direct beneficiary
of many federal insurance programs, the firms or industries saved from
financial collapse are surely indirect beneficiaries. More important, perhaps,
the presence of federal insurance instills consumer confidence and provides
direct and immediate benefits to the industries whose customers are willing
to leave higher deposits or invest more funds than they would if uninsured.
To the extent that insurance programs provide such benefits to private
90. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) providing insurance for depositors
in commercial banks was established by the Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 66, 48 Stat.
162. Shortly thereafter, the Federal Savings and Loan Deposit Insurance Corporation (FSLIC)
was established by the National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 479, 48 Stat. 1246, to
provide similar protection for savings and loan depositors. The bankruptcy of FSLIC led to
the recent savings and loan bailout. The FDIC is currently under similar stress and threatened
with collapse. At the direction of Congress, the General Accounting Office recently released
a report on reforming the deposit insurance system to prevent this pending crisis. U.S.
COM=TRoU.ER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CHi.niAN, HousE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND
URBAN AFFAIRS: DEPOSIT INSURANCE: A STmATEGY FOR REFOm (1991) [hereinafter DEPOsrr
INsuRANCE REFoRm]. Since 1989, the FDIC has administered two separate insurance funds.
The Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) protects commercial bank deposits while the Savings Account
Insurance Fund (SAIF) now protects thrifts. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 211 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1821(a)(4)-(6)). Finally, the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF)
protects credit union depositors. National Credit Union Administration Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-206, 84 Stat. 49. Similarly, the Securities Investment Protection Corporation (SIPC)
provides insurance protection for securities investors. SIPC was established by the Securities
Investment Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636. The House Report
accompanying this legislation stated that "[t]he primary purpose of the reported bill is to
provide protection for investors if the broker-dealer with whom they are doing business
encounters financial troubles." H.R. REP. No. 1613, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970). The
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), established by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, Title IV (1974), provides similar
protection for pension benefits.
91. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., FEDERAL DEPosrr INSURANCE CORPORATION: THE
FIRST FIFTY YErARs-A HISTORY OF TiE FDIC 1933-1983, at 3 (1984) [hereinafter FEDERAL
DEPOSIT INSURANCE HISTORY]. For another good recent discussion of the history of federal
deposit insurance, see U.S. TREAs. DEP'T, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYsTEM: RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITVE BANKS I-1 to 1-45 (1991) [hereinafter MODERNIZING
THE FINANCIAL SYsTEM]. The House Report accompanying the Securities Investment Protection
Act also reported that the "legislation mandates a general upgrading of financial responsibility
requirements of brokers and dealers to eliminate, to the maximum extent possible, the risks
which lead to customer loss." H.R. REP. No. 1613, supra note 90, at 1.
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enterprise managers and owners otherwise threatened with financial diffi-
culty, they should be considered bailouts.92
The Federal Crop Insurance Program is more directly focused on pre-
venting enterprise failure. Established by the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938, 91 the program was designed "to promote the national welfare by
alleviating the economic distress caused by wheat-crop failures due to
drought and other causes, by maintaining the purchasing power of farmers,
and by providing stable supplies of wheat for domestic consumption and
the orderly flow thereof in interstate commerce. '9 4 The primary beneficiary
was the farming enterprise, while the consumer was intended to be a
secondary beneficiary. 95
Most federal insurance programs are funded through contributions made
by industry members themselves and thus fall into the category of "special
fund" prospective bailouts. 96 For example, the Bank Insurance Fund and
the Savings Association Fund, both administered by the FDIC, are funded
through annual assessments on insured depository institutions based upon
a percentage of estimated insured deposits. 9 In contrast, premiums for some
insurance programs are funded only partially through industry contributions
with the remainder coming from general revenues. Given the hardship of
extremely high premiums, farmer expenses for federal crop insurance are
supplemented with a federal premium subsidy,9 making this prospective
program a "combination bailout." 99 However, even insurance pools funded
entirely by industry premiums may be inadequate to cover large losses, thus
requiring ultimate resort to general revenues. A recent report on deposit
insurance observed that "the potential for losses to the taxpayers exists in
part because the deposit insurance funds were never intended to be funded
92. Such immediate benefits to the industry have the elements of a current rather than a
prospective bailout.
93. Pub. L. No. 430, 52 Stat. 31.
94. Id. § 502, 52 Stat. at 72.
95. The crop insurance program was also to "protect consumers against shortages of food
supplies and against extremes of prices." H.R. Doc. No. 150, PREsmENT's COMM. ON CROP
INSURANCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. III (1937).
96. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
97. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b). The annual assessment currently is based upon a flat rate that is
the same for all insured banks. Numerous proposals have forcefully argued that deposit
insurance should be converted to a risk-based premium structure in order to reduce moral
hazard problems. See, e.g., Scott & Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some Proposals
for Federal Deposit Insurance Reform, 23 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1971). In the aftermath of the
savings and loan crisis, Congress finally has directed the FDIC to establish a risk-based
assessment system. Comprehensive Deposit Insurance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of
1991, H.R. REP. No. 407, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(a) ("The Board of Directors shall, by
regulation, establish a risk-based assessment system for insured depository institutions.").
98. The farmer's premium is supplemented with a 30% premium subsidy "calculated ...
on any coverage under the ... policy of insurance up to a maximum of 65% of the recorded
or appraised average yield, as adjusted." 7 U.S.C. § 1508(e)(3) (Supp. 1991).
99. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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at a level that would create reserves sufficient to cover heavy losses from
large numbers of bank failures."'' 0
Perhaps an even better example of prospective bailout is the government
protection of the nuclear power industry through indemnity and special caps
upon potential liability for damages in the event of a nuclear accident. As
originally enacted, the Price-Anders6n Act'0' required private nuclear power
licensees to have and maintain the maximum amount of protection against
nuclear accidents available from private insurers, $60 million at the time. 02
In the event of an accident causing damages in excess of insured amounts,
the federal government agreed to indemnify the licensee or any other person
who might be liable up to a maximum of $500 million. 03 Thus, the Price-
Anderson Act limited liability to injured parties in the event of a nuclear
accident to a total of $560 million. Beyond this amount, the injured parties
themselves effectively bore the costs.'04 Although Congress explicitly men-
tioned protection of the public as one of the goals behind the Act, protection
of the industry appears to have been the primary goal.'0 A majority in
Congress in 1957 was committed to the private development of nuclear
power technology, and the industry had made it clear to Congress that it
could not proceed without protection against potentially bankrupting liabilities
100. DEPOSIT INSURANCE REFORM, supra note 90, at 27.
101. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (adding § 170 to Atomic Energy Act of 1954).
102. Id. § 4.
103. Id.
104. Later, in a rare legislative assurance to the public, Congress promised that
[i]n the event of a nuclear incident involving damages in excess of the amount
of aggregate public liability under paragraph (1), the Congress will thoroughly
review the particular incident ... and will ... take whatever action is determined
to be necessary (including approval of appropriate compensation plans and
appropriation of funds) to provide full and prompt compensation to the public
for all public liability claims resulting from a disaster of such magnitude.
42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(2) (1988).
105. Id. § 2210. The definition of bailout developed earlier explicitly excludes forms of
government assistance designed to encourage particular activity such as Small Business Ad-
ministration assistance. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. Although one of the
Price-Anderson Act's stated purposes is to encourage private development of nuclear power,
the specific relief in the form of liability limitation was driven by a concern for potentially
bankrupting liabilities.
Professor Harold Green made this argument rather forcefully in Nuclear Power: Risk,
Liability, and Indemnity, 71 MIcH. L. REv. 479, 498-504 (1973). He argued that Congress did
not act prospectively in many other cases of potential catastrophes.
The fact that atomic energy has been singled out for this unique form of
government beneficence must, therefore, be attributable to something more than
a general policy of compensating the public for losses sustained in catastrophes
for which adequate insurance protection is not available. This suggests that ...
protection of the nuclear industry against bankrupting public liability ... is the
primary consideration underlying the Price-Anderson Act.
Id. at 499-500.
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in the event of a catastrophic accident.106 Effectively, then, the Price-
Anderson limitations on liability and provisions for government indemnifi-
cation against loss provided a prospective bailout of private industry. The
original provisions providing government indemnification assured the in-
dustry that government resources in the amount of $500 million funded
from general revenues would be available in the event of nuclear catastrophe.
The Price-Anderson Act protections were designed to be temporary, and its
provisions have been extended and amended on numerous instances since
1957. Although liability limitations remain,10 7 the government no longer
explicitly agrees to indemnify. Instead, current provisions provide for ret-
roactive premiums to be assessed against the industry in the event of a
nuclear incident, not to exceed $63 million overall per licensee and not to
exceed $10 million for any given year.108 As a result, the program has been
converted from a prospective general revenue bailout to a prospective special
fund bailout.
3. Generic v. Specific Bailouts
Bailouts may provide firm-specific, industry-wide, or generic assistance
to failing enterprises. Modern examples of government financial assistance
to specific firms or municipalities include the bailouts of Chrysler and New
York City. The savings and loan industry rescue is an illustration of an
industry-wide rescue. 109 Bailout assistance also might be provided generically
to any enterprise meeting specified eligibility requirements, regardless of the
106. During hearings on the Price-Anderson Act, utility company officials testified that they
'would not enter the nuclear power business without government protections. Governmental
Indemnity and Reactor Safety: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 156-61 (1957) (testimony of Francis K. McCune, Vice President, General
Electric Corp6ration). Later, in a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson
liability limitations, the plaintiffs overcame a standing challenge. The district court found that
there was a substantial likelihood that the defendant power company would not have completed
or maintained the power plants but for the protection provided by the Price-Anderson Act.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 203, 220 (W.D.N.C. 1977). The
Supreme Court agreed with the district court on the standing issue but nevertheless upheld the
constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act liability limitations. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
107. Given the private insurance currently available, the retroactive premiums that may be
assessed against the industry, and inflation adjustments legislatively provided for those prem-
iums, the cap on liability now exceeds $7 billion. For a description of recent changes to the
Price-Anderson Act and its limitations on liability, see Berkovitz, Price-Anderson Act: Model
Compensation Legislation?-The Sixty-Three Million Dollar Question, 13 HARv. ENv-n. L.
REv. 1 (1989).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(1).
109. It should be noted that many savings and loan institutions remain perfectly healthy
and need no bailout assistance. By industry-wide rescue, I mean simply that all members of
the industry are eligible for assistance should it become necessary; the bailout was not designed
to assist specific firms or enterprises.
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industry. One would expect such generic bailouts to be extremely rare and
few examples come immediately to mind." 0 The Emergency Loan Guarantee
Act appears on its face to be a generic bill authorizing federal loan
guarantees to all enterprises "that meet the requirements of this chapter.""'
Despite its generic language, the bill was specifically designed as a bailout
of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. After extensive discussion of Lock-
heed's troubles, the House Report on the bill noted that
the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation would be the first applicant for a
guaranteed loan under the legislation.... It will be argued by some
that this bill is for the sole purpose of helping Lockheed. To the
contrary, it sets up an orderly and systematic means of providing
guaranteed loans to private enterprises that require such loans and meet
eligibility requirements provided in the bill."'
Two details conspired against the availability of loan guarantees to
enterprises other than Lockheed. First, the maximum amount of loan
guarantees that could be outstanding at any given time was $250 million." 3
This was precisely the amount that Lockheed was looking for. Moreover,
authority of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board to enter into any
guarantee or commitment to guarantee terminated just two years after
enactment of the legislation. 1 4 In fact, no enterprises other than Lockheed
ever received assistance under the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act.
4. Regulatory Bailouts
While bailouts may be arranged by Congress through legislative action,
bailouts also may be accomplished by action of government regulators under
110. The closest example might be assistance under the Small Business Act (SBA), but, as
noted earlier, such assistance is not limited to enterprises facing financial distress. See supra
notes 17-18 and accompanying text. The SBA will not extend financial assistance, however, if
the applicant can obtain credit elsewhere. See, e.g. 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(1) (Supp. 1991).
111. Emergency Loan Guarantee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-70, § 3, 85 Stat. 178 (1971). The Act
created an "Emergency Loan Guarantee Board" authorized to guarantee loans if
(1) the Board finds that (A) the loan is needed to enable the borrower to continue
to furnish goods or services and failure to meet this need would adversely and
seriously affect the economy of or employment in the Nation or any region
thereof, (B) credit is not otherwise available to the borrower under reasonable
terms or conditions, and (C) the prospective earning power of the borrower,
together with the character and value of the security pledged, furnish reasonable
assurance that it will be able to repay the loan within the time fixed, and afford
reasonable protection to the United States; and (2) the lender certifies that it
would not make the loan without such guarantee.
Id. § 4.
112. H.R. REP. No. 379, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1971 U.S. Cops CoNG. &
ADmN. NEws 1270, 1272.
113. Emergency Loan Guarantee Act § 8.
114. Id. § 13.
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their regulatory authority. Like the congressional variety, these bailouts may
be overt or covert.
a. Overt Regulatory Bailouts
Modern banking regulation provides an excellent example of overt regu-
latory bailout authority. The FDIC insures all depositors in "insured de-
pository institutions" up to a maximum deposit of $100,000.'- In the case
of a liquidation or closing of an insured bank, the FDIC is directed by
Congress to pay insured depositors "as soon as possible.""16 Arguably, no
bailout is involved if the FDIC simply liquidates the bank and pays insured
depositors, except to the extent that the bank is relieved of obligations that
it would otherwise incur.17 Beyond this mandate to pay off depositors, the
FDIC has discretionary power to provide assistance to insured depository
institutions. The FDIC may make loans, deposits, or contributions; purchase
assets; or assume liabilities of an insured depository institution."' In addi-
tion, the FDIC may facilitate the merger, consolidation, or sale of a failing
depository institution by guaranteeing the purchasing institution against
losses."19
These forms of discretionary assistance are subject to some limitations,
however. The FDIC is authorized to take such action only to prevent
default, to restore a bank already in default, or to lessen risks posed to the
FDIC from "severe financial conditions" that might "threaten the stability
of a significant number of insured banks." ' 2 Moreover, under a new
standard recently enacted by Congress, the FDIC generally cannot provide
discretionary assistance unless assistance "is necessary to meet the obligation
of the Corporation to provide insurance coverage" and "the total amount
of expenditures ... and obligations ... is the least costly to the deposit
insurance fund of all possible methods for meeting the Corporation's
obligation under this section." 1 2' In other words, discretionary assistance
generally can be provided only when such assistance would be cheaper than
closing the bank and paying off depositors.
Congress has left the FDIC with broader discretion in special cases,
however. Prior to recently enacted deposit insurance reforms, the FDIC was
115. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. II 1989-1991).
116. Id. § 1821(f)(1).
117. Corporations generally are protected by limited liability. One might argue, then, that
stock banks are not "bailed out" as a result of FDIC payments to depositors. In the case of
mutual banks, FDIC payments might be regarded as bailout-like payments to the depositors,
who are themselves the investors in the bank.
118. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(1)-(2).
119. Id. § 1823(c)(2).
120. Id. § 1823(c)(1)(C), (c)(2)(B)(iii).
121. Comprehensive Deposit Insurance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991, supra
note 97, § 141, at 86 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (1950)).
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free of the cost restriction and had virtually complete discretion to provide
assistance to a troubled depository institution if it determined that continued
operation of the institution was "essential to provide adequate depository
services in its community."
Although the power to make an "essentiality finding" had been available
to the FDIC for twenty-one years, the power was not used until the bailout
of the minority-owned Unity Bank of Boston in 1971. Irvine Sprague, who
served as director or chairman of the FDIC Board during four major bank
bailouts, described the agonizing decision to provide the first discretionary
bailout under the essentiality doctrine, as a "radical departure" that pro-
vided an unintended reprieve for stockholders.' 3 Once unleashed, the power
to make the "essentiality finding" proved difficult to resist in subsequent
cases where much larger banks were threatened with collapse. 24 With the
rescue of the Continental Bank of Illinois, the FDIC provided protection
for deposits of $30 billion, 90% of which reflected uninsured foreign
depositors or large certificates in excess of the $100,000 insured amount1 25
Congress recently revised the circumstances under which the FDIC will
be free of the "lowest cost restriction." Under the new provision, upon a
two-thirds vote of both the FDIC Board and the Federal Reserve Board,
an emergency recommendation can be forwarded to the Secretary of the
Treasury. If the Secretary, in consultation with the President, determines
that compliance with the lowest cost restriction "would have serious adverse
effects on economic conditions or financial stability and ... any action or
122. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A). The FDIC's use of its discretion to protect large banks
under this essentiality finding was sometimes referred to as the "too-big-to-fail" doctrine.
Assistance provided by the FDIC under any of its discretionary powers was determined by a
vote of the FDIC Board and required no further congressional action. No formal hearings or
other proceedings were required. When assistance was provided to save failing banks, even
deposits in excess of the $100,000 insured amount generally were fully protected. More
significant from the bailout perspective, the FDIC decision to save rather than close the bank
and pay off depositors inevitably provided protection to shareholders or investors as well.
123. I. SPRAGUE, BAILOUT: AN INSIDER's AccouNT OF BANK FAMUREs AND REscuEs 42
(1986). Sprague describes himself as casting the deciding vote in a 2-1 decision of the FDIC.
He voted as he did out of fear of riots that might result from a decision not to assist the
minority-owned Boston bank. He has stated that
my vote to make the 'essentiality' finding and thus save the little bank was
probably foreordained, an inevitable legacy of Watts. And since mine was the
deciding vote, it may not be too much to say that the Watts riots ultimately
triggered the essentiality doctrine.
Id. at 48.
124. An "essentiality finding" was later used to justify the bailouts of the Bank of the
Commonwealth of Detroit in 1972, the First Pennsylvania Bank of Philadelphia in 1980, and
the Continental Bank of Illinois in 1984. For a description of the Unity Bank case as precedent
for an essentiality finding for these later bailouts, see id. at 48.
125. I. SPRAGUE, supra note 123, at 190. A detailed description of the terms of the bailout
can be found in Office of Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
and Federal Reserve Board, Permanent Assistance Program for Continental Illinois National
Bank and Trust Co., News Release (July 26, 1984) [hereinafter News Release].
1992]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
assistance ... would avoid or mitigate such adverse effects, the Corporation
may take other action or provide assistance ... as necessary to avoid or
mitigate such effects.' 26 Although these changes will make bank bailouts
slightly more difficult, Congress still provides an emergency mechanism
under which banks may be assisted even when the costs of such assistance
exceed those necessary to comply with government insurance obligations to
depositors. Such assistance to failing banks surely represents a bailout above
and beyond the initial provision of federal insurance.
b. Covert Regulatory Bailouts
Government regulators may also provide covert bailouts in the form of
regulatory relief. 27 These bailouts generally are provided on an industry-
wide basis. A particular statute governing agency action may provide suf-
ficient discretion to the agency to provide firm-specific waivers or delay in
the implementation of regulations.' Even in the case where Congress has
worked out most of the details, substantial discretion may be left to
government agencies to structure the bailout. In the Chrysler case, for
example, Congress specified the concession amounts to come from each
group of interested parties to the bailout, but the Chrysler Loan Guarantee
Board had authority to and did modify the terms of the bailout. 129
5. The Mixed-Motive Bailout
The definition of bailout distinguishes government assistance specifically
designed to assist troubled enterprises from other types of "incentive assis-
tance" designed to encourage or promote particular activity. 30 Many bail-
outs, however, will not be designed solely to prevent enterprise failure but
instead will have a complex mix of designs or motives. For example,
international trade quotas and tariffs may rescue or protect a troubled
126. Comprehensive Deposit Insurance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991, supra
note 97, § 141(a)(1)(C) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)).
127. For example, the Reagan Administration in 1981 modified its earlier automobile industry
"passive occupant restraint system" standards in part "due to changed economic circumstances
and, in particular, the difficulties of the automobile industry." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 34, 38 (1983) (holding that rescission of the passive
restraint requirement was arbitrary and capricious).
128. The prospect of regulatory relief to a single enterprise raises a host of administrative
law and due process issues that will not be discussed here. For purposes of discussion, it is
assumed that the agency in question has complied with the Administrative Procedure Act or
the specific authorizing statute and that the firm-specific waiver can withstand any due process
challenges raised by competitors.
129. See supra note 65.
130. See supra notes 17-18, 29-30 and accompanying text.
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domestic industry or enterprise. 131 At the same time, the quota or tariff
may be designed to implement specific foreign trade policies unrelated to
rescue or protection of domestic industry. Although originally instituted to
prevent more immediate enterprise failure and provide continuous protection
against future failures, crop insurance is part of an overall policy designed
to regulate agricultural markets. The Newspaper Preservation Act is designed
to assist troubled newspapers and, at the same time, encourage competition
among newspapers and protect fundamental free speech interests. 32
Mixed-motive bailouts raise special concerns and challenges. Focus on
other policy objectives can obscure the bailout aspects of the federal
program. Special interests seeking bailout assistance may successfully influ-
ence the drafting of legislation or regulation so as to hide the potential
bailout agenda. The extent to which any federal program is motivated by
bailout considerations should therefore be clearly articulated. 3 3
II. THE PuBLIC PoLIcY DEBATE:
To BAm OUT OR NOT To BAIL OUT?
A. Alternative Methods for Allocating Risk of Loss
Bailout decisions involve allocating risk of economic loss. General revenue
bailouts, for example, allocate losses to the general taxpaying public. Special
fund bailouts allocate losses more narrowly to those contributing to the
bailout fund. 134 Before turning to bailout policy, one must consider whether
bailout is in fact the appropriate response to the threat of loss. Accordingly,
one should consider the available alternative loss allocation possibilities.
1. No Shifting of Loss
One obvious alternative response to threatened enterprise failure is simply
to let firms fail. The burden or cost of enterprise failure will then be
imposed upon the investors, managers, employees, and others with
131. For a more detailed discussion of quotas and tariffs as a form of bailout, see supra
notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
132. The Newspaper Preservation Act as a bailout is discussed more fully supra notes 82-
83 and accompanying text.
133. Further discussion of the concerns and challenges appears at infra notes 311-12 and
accompanying text.
134. Not all bailout efforts will be successful. Thus, the enterprise itself continues to bear
risk throughout the bailout process. Even after a rescue attempt, the enterprise may fail,
resulting in loss to investors, employees, creditors, and others. The loss to the taxpaying public
or special fund is limited to the amount committed to the bailout effort. If the government
takes an equity interest in the enterprise as part of the bailout, it may gain or lose along with
other investors.
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relationships to the firm or industry. 3 ' Losses are left to fall where they
may without any shifting of costs. In a capitalist, free-market economy
such as ours, this approach to loss is the general rule.
2. Allocation of Loss Through the Tort Regime
An alternative mechanism for imposing costs from losses is through the
common law tort system, under which losses resulting from wrongful acts
are borne by the wrongdoer. To the extent that wrongdoers can be identified,
they should bear the burden of losses. Forcing wrongdoers to internalize
such costs is thought to have a positive general deterrence effect.
36
a. Private Tortfeasors
When the wrongdoer in the tort setting is a private party, injured
individuals typically sue privately to recover losses in a civil lawsuit. Where
enterprise failure results from fraud or corruption and the class of injured
parties is large, it may be appropriate to provide government agencies with
authority to prosecute and collect reimbursement for losses on behalf of
the consumer. Banking regulators, for example, have authority to prosecute
for bank fraud and impose civil and criminal penalties.'37 In such cases, the
government's role is limited and does not involve direct or indirect bailout
of the failing enterprise itself.
The savings and loan crisis presents a prime example. While the crisis is
attributed to numerous events, one substantial cause was "outright fraud
and insider abuse."' 3s Under a tort approach to loss, which imposes costs
135. Loss of a firm from the market may burden consumers as well. Bankruptcy of a price-
cutting firm, for example, may cause consumer prices to rise. See Ayres and Braithwaite,
Partial Industry Regulation: A Monopsony Standard for Consumer Protection, 80 CAL. L.
R-v. 13 (1992).
136. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., The Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer
Recovery Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4859 (codified in scattered sections of
U.S.C.). The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.), established the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a). The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and
the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration in the Department of Labor have regulatory
and enforcement authority to prosecute for fraud and corruption in pension fund management.
29 U.S.C. § 1303(e) (1988).
138. The House Report on FIRREA identified several causes of the savings and loan crisis,
including
poorly timed deregulation; the dismal performance of some thrift managements;
inadequate oversight, supervision and regulation by government regulatory agen-
cies and the Reagan Administration; a regional economic collapse; radical dereg-
ulation by several large States; and outright fraud and insider abuse. What
emerges all too clearly is that when the savings and loan industry was deregulated,
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on the wrongdoer, several cases have been brought against bank owners
and managers and others whose fraud contributed to the thrift crisis.' To
the extent possible, costs attributable to fraud and corruption should be
imposed on such wrongdoers. Such an approach prohibits the wrongdoer
from externalizing costs imposed by fraud. A vigorous enforcement effort
presumably will have a general deterrence effect on those considering future
fraudulent activity. More important, it avoids the inequities resulting from
imposition of such costs on innocent parties, to the extent possible.
b. Government Tortfeasors
When the government itself allegedly is the wrongdoer, a different set of
policy issues emerges.140 Individuals suffering losses might make direct claims
the Reagan Administration, the Congress, several State legislatures, the govern-
ment agencies assigned to supervise and examine these institutions, and the thrifts
themselves badly misjudged the extent of the underlying problems.
H.R. RaP. No. 54, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 294, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 86, 90. Kenneth Scott, on the other hand, takes the position that fraud was not a
substantial factor. Scott, Never Again: The S & L Bailout Bill, 45 Bus. L. 1883, 1892-93
(1990) ("[T]he losses were exacerbated to some extent by fraud and theft. Both the industry
and supervisory authorities have found it convenient to try to create the impression that much
of the enormous aggregate loss is due to fraud .... It seems probable that only rarely was
fraud a deliberate strategy .... ).
139. Among the most notorious cases is the indictment and conviction of Charles H. Keating
on bank fraud charges in connection with the Lincoln Savings and Loan failure. See Stevenson,
Keating Indicted in Savings Fraud and Goes to Jail, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1990, § 1, at 1,
col. 1; Stevenson, Keating Convicted of Securities Fraud in S & L's Collapse, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 5, 1991, § 1, at 1, col. 1. Ironically, prior to his indictment, Keating himself tried to pin
the blame elsewhere, writing that "[tihe inability of both the Reagan and Bush administrations,
as well as Congress, to provide competent leadership for the savings and loan industry has
been a cataclysmic failure of the political process." Keating, Quest for Truth: A Search for
Sanity in a $500 Billion Tragedy, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 147 (1990). The Resolution Trust
Corporation also filed a civil suit in December, 1991 against Arizona Governor Fife Symington
for his alleged involvement in the collapse of Southwest Savings and Loan of Phoenix.
Labaton, Governor of Arizona Challenges S & L Case, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1991, at D2,
col. 5; see also FDIC v. Milken, No. 91-0433 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 15, 1991) (FDIC and RTC
class action seeking damages for injuries suffered by named savings and loans from defendant's
misrepresentations, manipulation of junk bond market, and racketeering activity).
Some believe that the government has not been vigorous enough in its enforcement. A recent
bill to provide direct funding to attack fraud in the savings and loan industry found that
"[o]nly a minute percentage of bailout costs attributed to criminal activity have been recov-
ered." H.R. 5499, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(5) (1990). The bill further charged in its findings
that the Attorney General has not been vigorously pursuing referrals and complaints relating
to savings and loan misconduct. See id. §§ 2(6)-(11).
140. Many contend, for example, that the savings and loan crisis is largely attributable to
poor or even negligent government regulation. H.R. REP. No. 54, supra note 138, at 2. The
Chairman of the House Committee on Banking Task Force on Urgent Fiscal Issues stated at
hearings that regulators "were slow to detect unsafe or unsound practices and were even
slower to act to stop such activities. The regulators encouraged weakened thrifts to invest in
exceptionally risky ventures designed to enable them to grow their way out of their difficulties."
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R.
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against the government. Successful claims of this sort would not result in
a bailout as defined previously but simply the payment of damages by a
government tortfeasor. In any event, plaintiffs alleging direct loss as a result
of government negligence will have limited success unless their claim fits
within the limited waiver of sovereign immunity under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA).141 Potential claimants have little cause for hope after
United States v. Gaubert.'42
Mr. Gaubert, as chairman of the board and largest shareholder of the
Independent American Savings Association in Texas, filed claims against
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Home Loan Bank-
Dallas for regulatory negligence in selecting new officers and directors and
in involvement in the day-to-day management of the thrift. The issue before
the Court was whether the government was exempt from liability under the
"discretionary function" exemption of the FTCA.' 43 This exception is
designed to 'prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and adminis-
trative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through
the medium of an action in tort ... [and] protects only governmental
actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.'" Even
though the bank regulators were actively involved in the operation of the
thrift, the Gaubert Court concluded that the "regulatory actions in question
involved the kind of policy judgment that the discretionary function excep-
tion was designed to shield" and that the "day-to-day 'operational' decisions
were undertaken for policy reasons of primary concern to regulatory agen-
cies." 145
After Gaubert, it appears unlikely that individual claims against the
government for regulatory negligence will have much success. Accordingly,
tort actions against the government are unlikely to be a viable alternative
to bailout. In fact, the absence of a tort remedy in such cases will increase
pressures on the legislature to provide bailout relief.
3. The Insurance Alternative
A third alternativ.e risk-of-loss approach is the insurance model. Under
insurance principles, the allocation of financial loss is determined by private
1278 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of
the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 547 (1989)
(report of Rep. Charles E. Schumer). Numerous similar statements are scattered throughout
the above cited hearings. See also Scott, supra note 138, at 1888-89 (discussing techniques
employed by Reagan administration to avoid recognition of the S & L crisis).
141. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
142. 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991), rev'g 885 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1989).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2680.
144. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct., at 1273-74 (quoting United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao
Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984) and Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531,
537 (1988)).
145. Id. at 1278.
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contract. The private insurer acts as an administrator, managing a resource
pool contributed by the many insured. This fund is used to reimburse those
among the group who suffer losses. Those with lower than average losses
will bear some of the cost of those with higher than average losses.' 46 Thus,
the insurance alternative permits loss spreading.
To assure profitability, private insurance companies limit insurance cov-
erage to "insurable risks." Under standard insurance principles, "insurable
risks" are those in which the following elements are present:
(1) a large group of homogeneous exposure units must be involved, (2)
the loss produced by the risk must be definite, (3) the occurrence of the
loss in the individual cases must be accidental or fortuitous, (4) the
potential loss must be large enough to cause hardship, (5) the cost of
the insurance must be economically feasible, (6) the chance of loss must
be calculable and (7) the peril must be unlikely to produce loss to a
great many insured units at one time. "
By definition though, most cases of enterprise failure considered for
bailout relief by government decision makers involve uninsurable losses. For
example, when considering federal crop insurance, the President's Commit-
tee on Crop Insurance reported that "[p]rivate companies have tried all-
risk crop insurance, but after repeated losses have practically retired from
the field. Crop insurance on a large scale would probably be a larger
enterprise than any one company or group of companies would now desire
to underwrite. '1 48 Similarly, Congress adopted deposit insurance after
numerous early failures of private industry co-insurance clearing houses and
state insurance plans. 149 Private deposit insurance simply was not considered
viable.
Most federal insurance programs involve risks that meet some, but not
all, of the "insurable risk" elements. Nevertheless, most bailouts in the
form of government insurance have been tailored to satisfy a greater number
of the "insurable risk" elements listed above than is possible in the case
of more ad hoc after-the-fact bailouts. For example, by focusing insurance
programs upon a particular group or industry, the government programs
come closer to satisfying the requirement that there be a large group of
homogeneous exposure units.
In contrast to prospective bailouts through federal insurance funds, ret-
rospective bailout legislation is a form of federal backup insurance that
meets few, if any, of the "insurable risk" elements. Because the types of
146. These aspects of private insurance are considered in G. CALABRasi, supra note 25, at
47-50.
147. R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 34 (1976).
148. H.R. Doc. No. 150, supra note 95, at 11.
149. See Calomiris, Success and Failure in Pre-Depression Bank Liability Insurance, in
BANKING SYsTmM RISK: CHArERING A NEW COURSE 198-220 (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
25th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition 1989).
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industries and firms that might fail or require assistance is quite diverse,
the large homogeneous exposure unit requirement will rarely be met. Given
this diversity, predicting the extent of loss will be difficult, if not impossible.
Thus, backup insurance in the form of after-the-fact bailout legislation also
violates the second test of insurable risk-the risk is not definite. 150
The third element of accidental or unexpected loss may be missing in the
typical bailout case as well. The industry or firm failure may not be
accidental but instead result from poor management decisions made along
the way or failed efforts at government regulation. When a firm's or
industry's failure can be attributed to its own errors in judgment, serious
questions arise as to whether federal bailout is appropriate. Costs of
wrongdoing generally should be internalized to take advantage of general
deterrence effects.'' At some point, however, the consequences of enterprise
failure may be so extreme that bailout is necessary regardless of blame. 52
In most bailout cases, there should be no problem with the fourth
"insurable risk" factor, which requires that the peril "must be capable of
producing a loss so large that the insured could not bear it without economic
distress."' On the other hand, to meet the economically feasible cost
factor, the chance of loss must be reasonably small. This certainly will not
be the case if the government bailout possibility is used as a fallback
insurance policy for many different industries. The sixth insurable risk
element is missing from the government-as-insurer model since chance of
loss is not readily calculable. Finally, the risk must be "unlikely to produce
loss to a great many insured units at the same time."' 5 4 If nothing else, the
savings and loan crisis illustrates that no assurances can be provided to the
government as insurer on this score. 5
While federal insurance programs can be designed to satisfy many of the
"insurable risk" elements, such programs have been controversial from their
inception. Numerous proposals for deposit insurance were rejected by Con-
150. By after-the-fact bailout, I mean both federal rescue efforts for which there was no
federal insurance program and backup bailouts to cover excess losses where federal insurance
was available but was inadequate to fully cover the loss.
151. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
152. This is a variation on the "too-big-to-fail" argument that has been heard recently with
regard to the banking industry. For further development of the presumption against bailout
and the circumstances under which it may be overcome, see infra notes 175-89 and accom-
panying text.
153. R. MEHm & E. CAMMACK, supra note 147, at 35.
154. Id. at 34.
155. This last element is perhaps the most significant reason for the absence of private bank
insurance. As one banking expert observed, "[the critical issue for full private insurance ...
has always been the problem of credibility in terms of its capacity to cover the whole banking
system in the event of some major failure of national macroeconomic policy as in a severe
depression or inflation." Scott, Deposit Insurance-The Appropriate Roles for State and
Federal Governments, 53 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 27, 35 (1987).
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gress between 1886 and 1933.156 The controversy in part stemmed from
concerns with enormous potential costs in the event of widespread bank
failures, loss of market discipline resulting from high levels of bank risk
taking,5 7 and interference with market interest rates that depositors would
demand without insurance protection.158 There appears, then, to be contro-
versy on several fronts. First, one minority view holds that deposit insurance
would be unnecessary for sufficiently "narrow banks" whose investments
were limited to certain safe and liquid assets. 15 9 Another minority view holds
that the market, left on its own, will provide sufficient protection for
depositors and the overall economy.16° Second, even if deposit insurance is
necessary, some economists and banking experts recently have argued that
privately capitalized insurance, or at least a partially private bank insurance
system, would not only be viable, but also would be preferable to federal
insurance in reducing the moral hazard problems and other distortions
generated by a federal insurance regime.' 6'
This Article will not attempt to address this particular debate in the
banking world except to suggest that possibilities for privatization of deposit
insurance should be seriously considered. In general where private insurance
is available and viable, enterprises should be expected to obtain adequate
coverage before any form of bailout should be considered. Private insurance
that is appropriately based on risk and otherwise designed to mitigate moral
hazard problems is preferable to public bailout.
4. The Bankruptcy Alternative
Modern bankruptcy law provides an opportunity to reorganize a troubled
enterprise rather than liquidate it.162 Successful reorganization in bankruptcy
156. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE HISTORY, supra note 91, at 3.
157. For a discussion of moral hazard in the banking context, see Lovett, Moral Hazard,
Bank Supervision and Risk-Related Capital Requirements, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1365 (1989). A
more general discussion of the problem of "moral hazard" as it applies to bailouts appears
supra notes 25-28 and infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
158. For a description of these concerns, see MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra
note 91, at 1-11 to 1-13.
159. See, e.g., R. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS Do? (1987).
160. See, e.g., Fama, Banking in the Theory of Finance, 1980 J. MONETARY ECON. 39.
161. B. ELY, MAKING DEPOSIT INSURANCE SAFE THROUGH 100% CROss-GUARANTEES (1990);
P. WALLISON, BACK FROM THE BRINK, A PRACTICAL PLAN FOR PRIVATIZING DEPOSIT INSURANCE
AND STRENGTHENING OUR BANKS AND THRIFTS (1990). These proposals are reviewed in MOD-
ERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 91, at VII-7 to VII-33.
The availability of insurance, however, may itself undermine the general deterrence effect
of the tort regime. Insurance permits the insured to externalize some of the costs of risky
behavior. If insurance is readily available at rates that are not risk-based and premiums are
not increased in response to claims on the fund, an individual or firm may have incentives to
engage in risky behavior. Rather than having a general deterrence effect, such insurance will
increase the moral hazard problem.
162. See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
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eliminates the need for a public bailout. Thus, any well-considered bailout
policy must address the bankruptcy alternative.
The purpose and use of bankruptcy laws has been the focus of much
recent controversy. 163 One side of the debate argues that bankruptcy law
serves only a narrow debt collection function. Dean Thomas Jackson argues
that bankruptcy law has the distinct purpose of allocating a debtor's limited
common pool of resources among its creditors. He notes that there is
no correlation between whether firms should stay in business and solving
a common pool problem. If it is important for firms to stay in business
because of the jobs they save or because of their importance to their
communities, that policy should be implemented as a matter of general
law .... It is wrong to think that there should be an independent
substantive policy of reorganization law to give firms breathing space
or to reorganize them to preserve jobs.'"
Thus, while "[b]ankruptcy law can and should help a firm stay in business
when it is worth more to its owners alive than dead[,J ... [n]ot all businesses
are worth more to their owners-or to society-alive than dead.' 1 65
The other side of the debate suggests that bankruptcy law can play a
more expansive role. Professor Warren, for example, points out that
[c]ongressional comments on the Bankruptcy Code are liberally sprinkled
with discussions of policies to "protect the investing public, protect
jobs, and help save troubled businesses," of concern about the com-
munity impact of bankruptcy, and of the "public interest" beyond the
interests of the disputing parties. These comments serve as reminders
that Congress intended bankruptcy law to address concerns broader than
the immediate problems of debtors and their identified creditors; they
indicate clear recognition of the larger implications of a debtor's wide-
spread default and the consequences of permitting a few creditors to
force a business to close.'"
In a -more recent article, Professor Korobkin challenges Dean Jackson's
"economic account" suggesting a competing "value-based account" of
bankruptcy law. He argues that:
Bankruptcy law provides a forum in which competing and various
interests and values accompanying financial distress may be expressed
and sometimes recognized. Through the bankruptcy process, these com-
163. Professors Elizabeth Warren and Douglas Baird provide a useful and entertaining
"Point-Counterpoint" in a pair of articles. Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cm. L. REv.
775 (1987); Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren,
54 U. Cm. L. REv. 815 (1987).
164. T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND Lnns OF BANKRUPTCY 210 (1986). Professor Douglas
Baird's arguments are similar. See, e.g., Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganization,
15 J. LEGAL STuD. 127 (1986); Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment
of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 97 (1974).
165. T. JACKSON, supra note 164, at 210.
166. Warren, supra note 163, at 788 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 67:951
PUBLIC BAILOUTS
peting interests are transformed, over time, into a renewed vision of the
corporation as a moral, political, social, and economic actor. Bankruptcy
law creates the conditions for a special kind of discourse, one that is
fundamentally rehabilitative in character. No other legal system responds
to the crisis of human values arising in financial distress, or provides
for a discourse for rehabilitating these values into an informed and
coherent vision of the corporation as personality. 67
Under this value-based account, bankruptcy law can be viewed as democ-
ratizing decision-making authority 6 and permitting a discourse among
interested parties to address the problems of financial distress in a private
enterprise. To be sure, the Bankruptcy Code provides various protections
to assure equitable treatment of all creditors and that no dissenting creditor
be required to accept less than it would have received upon liquidation of
the enterprise. 69 Nevertheless, the bankruptcy process provides an oppor-
tunity for dialogue, negotiation, and compromise among interested parties.
Even one who follows the narrow view that bankruptcy law simply is a
means of allocating a common pool of resources must concede that chapter
11 reorganization sometimes results in survival of the firm. Better yet, under
the broader value-based account, this process may be accompanied by
discourse and negotiation among parties most interested in survival of the
enterprise. Thus, except in extraordinary circumstance, where a chapter 11
reorganization proceeding is impossible, firms in financial distress should
be required to pursue chapter 11 reorganization as a precondition to a
public rescue. 70
In connection with the Chrysler bailout, Congress at least considered the
bankruptcy alternative but concluded for several reasons that bankruptcy
was not viable. The House report noted that automobiles, unlike goods
such as shoes or appliances, constitute
a typical consumer's second largest investment after a home. Not only
must the consumer be conscious of the future reliability of parts and
service but also, equally important, he or she is highly sensitive to the
future resale or trade-in value of the car. The very word "bankruptcy"
could cause a psychological impact of incalculable proportions.' 7 '
167. Korobkin, supra note 40, at 766.
168. Id. at 771.
169. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
171. H.R. REP. No. 690, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 14 (1979). This, of course, was the argument
put forward by Chrysler itself. Some of the expert testimony supported Chrysler's concerns.
The Chrsyler Corporation Financial Situation: Hearings on H.R. 5805 Before the Subcomm.
on Econ. Stabilization of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 861 (1979) (testimony of Benjamin Weintraub conceding that "there is much
that merits consideration in Mr. Iacocca's aforementioned conclusion since no company of its
size has been in a chapter XI case"). Other experts suggested that the chapter 11 reorganization
route offered advantages, including the opportunity to examine Chrysler's past management
practices, to supervise Chrysler's future operations, to reject unfavorable executory contracts,
and to negotiate restructuring of Chrysler's financial situation. Id. at 857 (testimony of Dean
David Epstein). Chapter 11 also offered the possible advantage of "a more pervasive restruc-
turing, the creation of a long-term solution." Id. at 881.
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The House report further noted with respect to Chrysler's "enormous,
unavoidable investment program to convert its entire product line... [that]
[b]ankruptcy helps in dealing with old debts, but by itself, it cannot raise
huge amounts of new cash."'' 72 Several witnesses at the hearings testified
that a chapter 11 reorganization of Chrysler would have caused such an
extreme confidence crisis that the process would quickly have disintegrated
into a liquidation of the corporation. 73
Congressional consideration of the bankruptcy alternative before under-
taking the Chrysler bailout was a step in the right direction but did not go
far enough. The House report accompanying the bailout legislation first
assumed that an attempt to reorganize Chrysler under chapter 11 would
inevitably fail, resulting in collapse of the firm. It also concluded that
Chrysler's collapse would be unacceptable. This second judgment represents
a dramatic policy choice. Why was collapse unacceptable? The House report
mentions concern with the psychological impact of bankruptcy and on
preserving trade-in values for customers. The passages quoted previously
suggest that bailout was preferable to collapse because bailout would help
Chrysler to convert its entire product line.
This reasoning strikes one as rather lame. Increased levels of unemploy-
ment in and around Detroit as well as the resulting impact on the regional
economy were obviously more serious concerns. Whatever the rationale,
such a bailout of private industry deserves more thoughtful analysis. Later
Parts of this Article will develop a framework for determining when collapse
of a firm or industry is unacceptable, and government intervention is
required. 174 At a minimum, where reorganization offers some hope for
enterprise rehabilitation, attempts to reorganize should be made before
resorting to a public rescue.
B. The Free Market Presumption Against Bailout
Fundamental to any public policy toward bailouts should be a clear
presumption against intervention that may be overcome only in certain
specialized situations. As a general rule, the government should not intervene
to bail out private enterprise. Alternative mechanisms for loss allocation
generally should be attempted first, with bailout policy only as a last
resort. 175
172. H.R. REP. No. 690, supra note 171.
173. Apparently, this is not an unusual outcome. Empirical evidence suggests that many
firms that go through chapter 11 reorganization fail shortly thereafter. LoPucki, The Debtor
in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? 57 AM. BtaNKR.
L.J. 99 (1983).
174. See infra notes 257-323 and accompanying text.
175. For a discussion of these alternatives, see supra notes 134-74 and accompanying text.
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In the minds of many, such a presumption probably exists already. Many
policy makers undoubtedly view bailout as a solution for only the most
extreme cases. 76 At the same time, however, early bailouts set a stage that
makes subsequent requests for assistance more difficult to resist. When
Congress authorized loan guarantees to the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
in 1971, it set a precedent for later similar guarantees to Chrysler and New
York City.1 77 The first "essentiality finding" made by the FDIC to save the
Unity Bank of Boston 7 1 set the precedent for subsequent bank bailouts
under the discretionary essentiality doctrine. 7 9 In addition, government
reports such as the U.S. Comptroller General Report,8 0 imply that further
rescues are anticipated. While such forethought and development of guide-
lines is wise, a formal bailout policy should not leave the impression that
bailouts will be easy to come by. To the contrary, a presumption against
bailouts should be the first principle in any formal enterprise failure policy.
The first justification for the presumption against bailout is that govern-
ment intervention to protect private industry violates the free-market prin-
ciples that generally govern our economy. According to these principles,
economic markets operate reasonably efficiently without government inter-
vention. Under ideal competitive conditions, voluntary exchanges of goods
and services will achieve efficient outcomes, s'8 and prices will reach equilib-
rium. 82 Conditions are rarely ideal, however. Markets may fail for numerous
reasons, including inadequate flow of information, nonexistence of a market
for certain goods, concentration of power in the form of monopolies, high
transaction costs for certain exchanges, and spillover or externality effects
176. The" Bush administration formally takes this general view. For example, in a recent
report, the Executive Office stated that "[according to economic theory, competitive markets
generally perform well in supplying the economic goods and services people want .... Thus
there is a strong presumption that government intervention should only be undertaken when
markets are not working, that is, where there is a so-called 'market failure."' OFFIcE OF
MGMT. AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: APRI, 1988-MARCH
31, 1989, at 32-33 (1988) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The need for bailout does not
always stem from market failure. Nevertheless, one suspects that the presumption suggested
in these comments would apply even more forcefully when the market has not failed.
177. The House report accompanying the Chrysler bailout was careful to state that it did
not wish to set a precedent for rescuing falling companies. Nevertheless, the report refers back
to both the New York City and Lockheed bailouts. These too were unique according to the
report. H.R. REP. No. 690, supra note 171, at 13.
178. See supra note 123-24 and accompanying text.
179. See I. SFRAGUE, supra note 123.
180. Supra note 11.
181. For these economic market purposes, efficiency is generally thought to be "Pareto
efficiency." See infra notes 216-27 and accompanying text. The notion of Pareto efficiency
suggests that voluntary trades will take place as long as one person can be made better off
and no one worse off.
182. A complete discussion of traditional laissez-faire economic analysis is beyond the scope
of this Article. For a general discussion of basic principles, see P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS
(13th ed. 1989).
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of individual behavior that the market does not take into account., 3
Government regulation or intervention is frequently necessary to correct for
these structural market failures.
In a bailout, government intervention generally is not a response to a
structural market failure, but rather a response to the economic failure of
the enterprise. From a market perspective, leaving the enterprise to fail may
well be the most efficient outcome. If there is no market failure justifying
government intervention, another rationale for intervention must be artic-
ulated. In proposing a general presumption against bailouts, I do not mean
to suggest that bailout will never be appropriate. At the same time, there
is reason to be especially cautious before making the policy decision to
bailout private enterprise.
One reason for caution is the moral hazard problem discussed earlier.'
A policy of freely provided bailouts would encourage greater levels of risk
taking by management than would be societally optimal. Investors in the
business enterprise who harbor expectations of a bailout in the event of
business failure will have little incentive to monitor risky management
activities. Rescue of a failed firm protects these investors at the expense of
the larger community bearing the bailout costs. 85
Another reason to be especially cautious with bailouts is the risk of rent-
seeking behavior on the part of firms seeking assistance. 86 A general revenue
bailout involves expenditures of tax revenues that are reasonably concen-
trated and inure to the benefit of management, employees, investors, and
others with some relationship to the firm being rescued. These groups will
have greater incentives to organize and lobby for the bailout. The tax-
paying public that will incur the costs is more dispersed and will have
difficulty organizing to oppose the bailout. 8 7 Although a majority may
183. For a more complete discussion of the causes of market failure, see S. BREYER,
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-35 (1982); E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR
POLICY ANALYSIS 297-308 (1978).
184. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
185. A carefully structured bailout can limit the benefit flowing to investors by demanding
substantial investor contribution toward the bailout cost. This possibility will be discussed
further in Part IV on structuring bailouts.
186. Although "rent seeking" is a term economists first used, it is increasingly finding its
way into legal literature. As economist Dennis Mueller describes it:
The government can ... help create, increase, or protect a group's monopoly
position. In so doing, the government increases the monopoly rents of the favored
groups, at the expense of the buyers of the group's products or services. The
monopoly rents that the government can help provide are a prize worth pursuing,
and the pursuit of these rents has been given the name rent seeking.
D.C. MUELLER, PuBuc CHOICE II 229 (1989). More broadly, a concentrated group seeking
favorable treatment such that it would extract benefits (rents) at the expense of other taxpayers
is engaged in rent seeking for my purposes. A more detailed discussion of pluralist theories
and rent seeking appears at infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
187. Economist George Stigler, in his classic article on economic regulation, offers several
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oppose particular legislation, free-rider problems will make it more difficult
for the majority to mobilize into action to oppose legislation demanded by
a smaller, more concentrated special interest.' 8 Although such rent-seeking
behavior can be found elsewhere, the concentrated nature of the benefits
and diffuse distribution of the costs in the bailout scenario make it partic-
ularly ripe for rent-seeking behavior.8 9 Creating a presumption against
bailout will increase the cost to private industry of seeking bailout relief
and, thus, reduce the number of bailout requests.
While there should be a presumption against bailout, 190 there may be special
circumstances under which a bailout is appropriate. In rare cases, it may even
be appropriate to resort to bailout before some of the alternative loss allocation
regimes. The difficult public policy task is to determine those circumstances
in which the presumption may be rebutted. Regardless of the theoretical
approach one takes to legislation, most would probably agree with a general
presumption against bailout. Disagreements will arise over the conditions under
which the presumption should be overcome. The following sections address
the different responses that emerge from different theoretical perspectives.
C. Overcoming the Presumption Against Bailout
1. The Public Interest v. Pluralist Approaches
a. The Public Interest Approach
Several political scientists and theorists subscribe to the view that there
exists a public interest distinct from the aggregated interests of individuals.' 9'
explanations for why a majority votes to impose costs upon themselves in order to provide
benefits to others. First of all, voters must "employ representatives with wide discretion and
must eschew direct expressions of marginal changes in preferences. This characteristic also
implies that the political decision does not predict voter desires and make preparations to
fulfill them in advance of their realization." Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. oF ECON. & Moarr. Sci. 3, 10 (1971). In other words, legislators' votes do not and
cannot always reflect the preferences of the majority of the voters themselves. In addition,
many or most voters are uninterested in particular issues before the legislature. As Stigler
points out, "the expressions of preferences in voting will be less precise than the expressions
of preferences in the marketplace because many uninformed people will be voting and affecting
the decision." Id. at 11-12.
188. A theory of "latent groups" and the free-rider difficulties they face in mobilizing to
oppose smaller, more powerful special interests is developed in M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
CoLLEcTivE AcTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
189. For an analysis of legislative markets distinguishing the supply and demand for
legislation based upon the distribution of anticipated costs and benefits, see M. HAYES,
LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITcAL MARKETS 98-127 (1981). Professors
Eskridge and Frickey build on this Hayesian model to develop a "taxonomy of supply of
legislation based on benefits and costs." W. ESKRmGE & P. FRicKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC PoucY 55, 611 (1988).
190. There are practical as well as principled reasons for a presumption against bailouts.
The cost of bailouts can be large and difficult to estimate. The savings and loan bailout comes
to mind as the most obvious example. Factoring bailout costs into the budget will add
tremendous complexity and uncertainty to an already complex and uncertain process.
191. In Federalist 10, where James Madison expressed his concern with the dangers of
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In the philosophical and legal literature, a group sometimes known as the
"civic virtue" school contends that although self-interest often motivates
political behavior, citizens can, and sometimes do, act out of a concern for
the greater good. Several civic virtue writers take the position that, with a
little prodding, the legislative process itself can be made more public-
regarding. Cass Sunstein, for example, suggests a return to Madisonian
republicanism, which seeks to reach an idealist common good through a
process of deliberation. 192 Sunstein argues for a strengthened judicial review
that arguably would cause policymakers to deliberate more fully and would
result in more public interest legislation. 193 Although he might not label
himself a "civic virtuist," Professor Frank Michelman expresses his faith
in "jurisgenerative politics" by which political persons can reach normative
consensus through "effectively persuasive, dialogic relation with each
other." 1 He envisions a process whereby genuine shifts in understanding
are possible without coercion, invasion, or violation of individual freedom. 9
In addition to the public interest political scientists and theorists, the
early welfare economists also can be placed within the "public interest"
factions, he wrote that a majority faction might "sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest
both the public good and the rights of other citizens," thus suggesting that there is such a
thing as the "public interest." Tm FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 (J. Madison) (E. Earle ed. 1976).
Political scientist Glendon Schubert describes Madison as an idealist or one who sees the
legislator's role as finding a direct channel to "Wisdom, Truth and the Public Good" by
referring to natural law. G. SCHUBERT, THE PtmuBc INTEREST: A CRTIQUE OF THE THEORY OF
A POLITICAL CONCEPT 79 (1960). This view of Madison is not uniformly accepted. See, e.g.,
R. DAYm, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 4-33 (1956) (viewing Madison as a pluralist
whose primary concern was tyranny of the majority). Viewed slightly differently, the public
interest is a set of values or interests that citizens hold in common. This notion can be traced
to Rousseau's Social Contract. Although private interests will inevitably clash, there are some
interests that we all have in common. According to Rousseau, "It is what is common in these
different interests that forms the social bond; and if there was not some point in which they
all unanimously centered, no society could exist. It is on the basis of this common interest
alone that society must be governed." J. RoUssEAu, BOOK II in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 23.
192. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985). In a
variation on the civic virtue approach, Professor Fitts recommends increasing powers of
political parties and the presidency, which attract support for larger groups of otherwise
powerless groups in the legislative process. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party
Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1567
(1988).
193. Sunstein, supra note 192, at 69-72. In an earlier article, Professor Mashaw made similar
arguments for strengthened judicial review in constitutional cases to ensure that public legis-
lation provides for the public welfare. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a
Public, Public Law, 54 TuL. L. REv. 849 (1980).
194. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1513 (1988). Michelman himself
describes his notion of "republican or jurisgenerative politics" as parallel to Professor Ack-
erman's notion of "constitutional politics." Id. at 1520. Professor Ackerman describes a
"dualist conception" of political life made up of both "normal" self-interested politics and
extraordinary "constitutional moments" when citizens rise above self-interest and act out of
concern for the common good. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution,
93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1038 (1984).
195. Michelman, supra note 194, at 1526-27.
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camp. These economists were suspicious of laissez-faire philosophy as the
answer to all questions of public economic policy and believed in more
substantial government intervention than the laissez-faire approach would
support. Early welfare economists, such as Pigou, are credited with devel-
oping the justification for substantial government intervention in the mar-
ketplace.196 Pigou went further than simply suggesting government intervention
to correct for market failures, arguing that "[i]n any industry, where there
is reason to believe that the free play of self-interest will cause an amount
of resources to be invested different from the amount that is required in
the best interest of the national dividend, there is a prima facie case for
public intervention."' 197
Virtually all legislative histories include some discussion of the public
interest or general welfare. Bailout legislation is no exception. For example,
the history of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act expresses concern for
the economy and the potential costs "in terms of jobs destroyed, confidence
impaired, income lost, and goods not produced."'198 Similarly, the House
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee reported in connection
with the Chrysler bailout that "a Chrysler failure would create consequences
of an entirely different order of magnitude from the normal experience.
There is, therefore, a presumption that such widespread human suffering
should be avoided if that is reasonably possible."' 99 In its Declaration of
Policy for the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Congress declared
that "public convenience and necessity require adequate and efficient rail
service in this region and throughout the Nation to meet the needs of
commerce, the national defense, the environment, and the service require-
ments of passengers, United States mail, shippers, States and their political
subdivisions, and consumers." 200 The declaration also concluded the
196. A.C. Piaou, TE EcoNoMics OF WELFARE ch. XX (4th ed. 1938); see also W.J. BAUMOL,
WELFARE EcoNoMIcs AND TE THEORY OF STATE (1952).
197. A.C. Psaou, supra note 196, at 331. Professor Herbert Hovenkamp chronicles the early
development of such economic philosophy in Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics
Movement, 42 STAN. L. REv. 993 (1990). With regard to the utilitarian approach used by the
early welfare economists, he observes that
[t]his concept of welfare helps to explain the high degree of statism among the
economists of the material welfare school, who comprised the first great law &
economics movement. They were Progressives, who believed that social welfare
could be increased by minimum wage laws, graduated income taxes, subsidized
public education, welfare payments to the poor, taxes upon monopoly profits,
and other devices by which the relatively wealthy were required to finance the
provision of goods and services to the relatively impoverished ... The benefi-
ciaries of these forced transfers were perceived to gain more utility than the
involuntary grantors lost.
Id. at 1002.
198. H.R. RaP. No. 379, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
199. H.R. REP. No. 690, supra note 168, at 10.
200. Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, § 101, 87 Stat. 985,
986 (1974) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 701 (1988)).
1992]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
"preservation and maintenance of adequate and efficient rail service is in
the national interest."120'
Followers of the public interest or civic virtue political school undoubtedly
would agree that, despite the general presumption against it, there will be
circumstances in which bailout will serve the public interest. The difficulty,
of course, will be to identify those special cases where public interest
concerns trump the presumption against bailout. Statements of the sort
found in the bailout legislative histories have significant rhetorical force.
At the same time, we are all aware that legislators and their staffs are quite
adept at composing such "public interest" language for political purposes.
Some substantive and procedural standards will be necessary to more
genuinely identify the public interest to be served by any bailout. 20 2
b. The Pluralist Approach
Many political scientists, economists, and legal scholars have argued that
there is no such thing as a "social will" or "public interest." 20 a These
pluralists, or "interest group" theorists, 204 view politics as the clash and
ultimate compromise among individuals or interest groups, each seeking his
or her own presumably rational self-interest. Occasionally, individual inter-
ests will converge and consensus may emerge. More often, however, differing
201. Id.
202. Subsequent sections of this Article develop such standards. See infra notes 265-323 and
accompanying text.
203. For example:
The use of the phrase "social will" gives us, in exchange for all the little
tautologies which we found in feelings and ideas, one huge tautology. But if we
believe it carries us to the explanation of social happenings, we are simply lulling
ourselves to sleep with a huge draught of the "psychic" opiate.
A. BENTLY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1908); see also J.A. SCHUMPTER, CAPrrALISM,
SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 251 (1942) ("There is ... no such thing as a uniquely determined
common good that all people could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational
argument."); Downs, The Public Interest: Its Meaning in a Democracy, 29 Soc. REsp. 1-2
(1962):
[Tihe term public interest is constantly used by politicians, lobbyists, political
theorists, and voters, but any detailed inquiry about its exact meaning plunges
the inquirer into a welter of platitudes, generalities, and philosophic arguments.
It soon becomes apparent that no general agreement exists about whether the
term has any meaning at all, or if it has, what the meaning is ....
204. Political scientist Arthur Bently is one of the early parents of pluralism. A. BENTLY,
supra note 203. Buchanan" and Tullock acknowledge their debt to the school of pluralists
following Bently. J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, TBE CALCULUS OF CoNsEr: LOGICAL FOUN-
DATIONS OF CONSTITUrIONAL DEMOCRACY 9 (1965). Although economically oriented writers
acknowledge their debt to the early pluralists in the political science field, there is a sense of
rivalry between the two disciplines. Posner, for example, says that economic theory involves
more "than merely a recasting of the work of political scientists. The economic theory is more
precise and hard-edged-easier to confront and test with a body of data-than the political
theory (which, as I pointed out, is not really a theory at all)." Posner, Theories of Economic
Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335, 343 (1974).
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interest groups will clash, and compromise will be necessary to resolve
disputes. Pluralist or public choice theory °0 thus rejects the notion of a
general public interest and assumes that the state and the market are similar
devices through which individuals cooperate in order to further their own
interests. 20 Just as self-interested economic players enter into agreements in
the economic marketplace, political players enter into similar kinds of
agreements and compromises in the political marketplace. 207
Public choice theorists would argue that the real explanation for bailout
legislation lies in the economic bargain struck by the relevant players. In
the case of a bailout, the individual firm or industry and its customers,
creditors, and employees usually benefit. Public interest rhetoric may be
scattered throughout the Chrysler bailout legislative history, but a public
choice analysis would conclude that the bailout simply was a deal struck
between the Chrysler Corporation and Congress. Although one of the major
205. Public choice theory, which has become so popular in the legal literature, is simply an
outgrowth of pluralism. Public choice theory also goes by the names social choice and collective
choice. The terms appear to be used interchangeably, except that social choice and collective
choice seem to be used more frequently in the literature dealing with procedures for aggregating
individual preferences. A recent article described the "theory of choice" as the latest legal
fad. Nagel & Nagel, Theory of Choice, NEw RmuBuc, July 23, 1990, at 15. For a general
description of the public choice theory of legislation, see D. FARBER & P. FiucKEY, LAW AND
PuBac CHOICE (1991); R. McCoRMICK & R. ToIUsoN, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE
EcoNoMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTERFsT-GRouP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT (1981); McChesney,
Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD.
101 (1987) Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339 (1988) (describing the
economic supply and demand of legislation). A substantial body of literature uses this public
choice theory to explain particular pieces of legislation or regulation. See, e.g. Doernberg &
McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62
N.Y.U. L. REv. 891 (1987); Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest
Model With an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311 (1987); Miller,
Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine,
77 CALIF. L. REV. 83 (1989) (Oleomargarine Act of 1886). A good, but critical, review of the
literature is provided in Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tax. L.
REV. 873 (1987).
206. Public choice theory presents a rather pessimistic view of the traditional democratic
process through which decisions are made by majority vote. This pessimism can, in part, be
attributed to the work of economist Kenneth Arrow. K. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL
VAL Es (2d ed. 1963). Arrow explored the processes by which individuals, each with an
outcome preference, aggregate those individual preferences to arrive at a social preference. In
his famous "impossibility theorem," Arrow established that there is no mechanism through
which the rational preferences of individuals can be converted into a rational collective choice
or preference. Arrow's impossibility theorem was a devastating blow to democratic theory. He
established that legislative outcomes will vary depending upon the order in which legislative
options are presented for voting. Those who control the legislative agenda will have tremendous
influence over legislative outcomes. For an "Arrow-based" discussion of agenda control theory
and some illustrations of the ways in which outcomes can be affected, see, for example, W.
RJKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION (1986).
207. The market analogy is ever-present in pluralist theory. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G.
TiLaoCK, supra note 204; R. DAHL & C. LINDBLOM, POTICS, ECONOMICS AND WELFARE
(1963); C. LINDBLOM, PoLmCs AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
(1977).
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"public interest" arguments for the Chrysler bailout was preservation of
jobs, the number of employees at Chrysler was reduced dramatically as a
result of plant closings and other cost-cutting measures imposed as condi-
tions for the bailout assistance. The shareholders were the true beneficiaries
of the efforts of Chrysler's powerful lobbyists.
c. Contrasting Public Interest and Pluralism
Behind the debate between public interest and pluralist theorists lie some
fundamental differences in assumptions about human nature and behavior.
The pluralists assume that political behavior is almost entirely self-interested,
whereas public interest adherents believe that political behavior can be
public-spirited or altruistic. 28 Recent critics bemoan the separation of mo-
rality and ethics from economics and challenge the assumption that rational
individuals always seek to promote their self-interest. 209
Given the fundamental differences in underlying assumptions between
public interest and pluralist thinking, one suspects that agreement between
the two camps would be rare. There may be some common ground, however.
Even under a pluralist view, society might arrive at a list of preferences
that each of its members shares in common. 210 In addition, if individuals
are provided with more information and an opportunity for deliberation,
they may find that their self-interest as originally perceived will change and
208. Pluralists have encountered difficulty in explaining certain kinds of behavior under
their rational self-interest assumption. For example, those ascribing to the pure rational self-
interest view of political behavior have trouble explaining the paradox of voting. Why do
voters go to the polls at all given the low probability that their votes will affect the outcome?
For a good discussion of the literature on this paradox of voting, see D.C. MUELLER, supra
note 186, at 348-69.
209. See, e.g., A. SEN, ON ETmcs AND EcoNomcs (1987).
The self-interest view of rationality involves inter alia a firm rejection of the
"ethics-related" view of motivation. Trying to do one's best to achieve what one
would like to achieve can be part of rationality, and this can include the promotion
of non-self-interested goals which we may value and wish to aim at. To see any
departure from self-interest maximization as evidence of irrationality must imply
a rejection of the role of ethics in actual decision making.
Id. at 15. A number of others have similarly argued that altruistic motives sometimes may
drive political behavior. See, e.g., T. NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM (1970); THE POWER
OF PUBLIC IDEAS 1-4 (R. Reich ed. 1988); T. SCHELLING, MICROMOTrWS AND MACROBEHAVIOR
(1978). For a more recent treatment, see A. ETZIONO, THE MORAL DimENsION: TOWARD A NEW
ECONOWCS (1988). See also a recent series of essays in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST (J. Mansbridge
ed. 1990).
210. As Judge Posner has pointed out, "there is no necessary incompatibility between the
public interest and interest group theories .... The interest group theory does not deny the
possibility that a large group-perhaps the whole society-occasionally might procure legislation
on its own behalf." Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 263, 269 (1982).
[Vol. 67:951
PUBLIC BAILOUTS
that greater consensus may emerge. 2 " Moreover, one can accept the public
choice description of legislature as marketplace and still object that the
market is unfair. Where benefits are concentrated and costs diffuse, small
rent-seeking groups will evolve to lobby for such benefits. The larger
community that will bear the costs has little incentive to organize. Bargaining
power in the legislative market ideally should be made more equal. Proce-
dures to provide a greater voice to the disempowered groups should be
devised.
From this perspective, implications of the public interest and public choice
models begin to merge to some extent. Deliberative reforms called for by
the public interest approach would also serve to provide greater voice to
the larger community left out of the political market. In the bailout context,
the industry requiring assistance and its employees are likely to be reasonably
organized and concentrated in their efforts. The larger, more diffuse group
that will be called upon to pay the expenses is not likely to be as well
organized. Efforts to provide a greater voice for consumer groups likely to
bear the bulk of these expenses would be useful.
212
2. The Distributive Justice Approach
a. Allocative v. Redistributive Choices
Distributive justice analysis is a third theoretical approach that will prove
useful in analyzing bailout policy. Legislation, particularly economic legis-
lation such as a bailout, allocates or redistributes wealth. However, the two
concepts are distinguishable. Redistribution assumes a transfer of existing
wealth from some members of the group to others. Legislation may be
designed deliberately to redistribute wealth so as to alleviate existing income
inequalitiesl 3 or it may be unintentionally redistributive. Legislators may be
aware of the redistributive quality of legislation but unaware of the direction
or extent of the redistribution. Allocation, on the other hand, assumes new
wealth that is to be distributed (as opposed to redistributed) to members of
the group.
Both redistribution and allocation raise distributive concerns. Any redis-
tributive choice will result in winners and losers; some will gain at the
211. A distinction can be made between an individual's actual preferences and those ideal
preferences that she might come to if she were ideally informed. For a discussion of these
ideas, see Gibbard, Interpersonal Comparisons: Preference, Good and the Intrinsic Reward of
a Life, in FOUNDATONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 165 (J. Elster & A. Hylland eds. 1986).
212. Recommendations for reform are developed more fully at infra notes 311-23 and
accompanying text.
213. The progressive income tax is often justified on this basis, for example. See, e.g., W.
BLUM & H. KALWE, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSrvE TAXATiON 70-100 (1953); H. SIMONS,
PERSONAL INCOME TAxATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 18-
19 (1938).
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expense of others. Since allocation simply involves the distribution of new
wealth, there should be no losers, but allocative decisions involve distributive
elements as well. If the entire community wins from a legislative decision,
a second-level decision must be made regarding the appropriate sharing of
the gains; some may gain more than others.
The first and perhaps most obvious basis for making allocative or
redistributive decisions is overall wealth. In the case of redistributive choices,
wealth may be taken from the well-to-do and distribtited to the less wealthy.
In allocative decisions, the choice might be to provide those at the lower
end of the wealth scale with a greater share of the newly created benefits.
In the case of successful rent-seeking activity, wealth may be redistributed
from diffuse disinterested groups to concentrated interest groups.
Distributive decisions may also be based on other needs-based criteria.
Wealth may be redistributed from the healthy to the sick, from those
without disabilities to those suffering from disabilities, and the like. Allo-
cations of newly-found wealth may similarly be distributed disproportion-
ately to those in need. Distributive decisions may also be based upon
demographic considerations, for example, the age of the population.21 4 More
broadly, legislation might result in redistribution from living to future
generations. 25 Another demographically based distribution criterion is ge-
ography.
b. Economic Analysis of Distributive Decisions
Economists study distributions in terms of efficiency. Pareto efficiency is
one such common economic measure. A change is Pareto efficient if it
makes one person better off and no one worse off. In other words, the pie
is enlarged and no one suffers. In contrast, a situation is Pareto optimal if
no such changes can be made; that is, 'there is no way to make one person
better ofg without causing some other person to be worse off.216 Under this
view, only allocative distributions will be efficient. Some are made better
off and none are made worse off. To say that a situation is Pareto optimal,
however, is not to say much, for by definition a redistribution cannot be a
Pareto improvement. Imagine a two-person world of finite resources in
which one person has one million dollars and the other has nothing. Giving
one of the millionaire's dollars to the pauper will make the pauper better
214. Some have charged that the savings and loan bailout distributes wealth from younger
to older citizens. See, e.g., Hill, The S & L Bailout: Some States Gain, Many More Lose, 33
Challenge, MAO. OF EcON. AFF. 37, 39 (1990).
215. For a theoretical discussion of justice between generations, see J. RAwis, A THEORY
OF JusncE 284-93 (1971).
216. The notion of Pareto efficiency was developed by French economist Vilfredo Pareto
in V. PARETO, CoURs D'EcONOMIE PoIrrIQE (1896). A good discussion of the Pareto criterion
can be found in chapter 2 of A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 21-27 (1979).
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off and simultaneously make the millionaire worse off. A statute that
required the millionaire to transfer one dollar to the pauper, thus, would
not be considered efficient. 217
An alternative measure of economic efficiency developed by British econ-
omists Nicholas Kaldor and Sir John Hicks responds to some of the Pareto
concept's limitations. 218 Kaldor-Hicks efficiency requires only that the win-
ners could theoretically compensate the losers so that no one would be
worse off. It does not require that compensation actually be paid. Under
this approach, some redistributive transfers will be considered economically
efficient. Thus, Kaldor-Hicks analysis is described as the "maximize-net-
benefits approach to social policy. Gains and losses in welfare are added
up for all of society and whichever policy produces the largest net increase
in total effective income is chosen." 219
Bailouts surely involve distributions of wealth. Whether these distributions
represent allocations or redistributions may be subject to debate, however.
Federal deposit insurance arguably redistributes wealth among participating
banks. Given current flat-rate premiums imposed upon depository institu-
tions, banks with higher risk investments benefit at the expense of those
with lower risk investments. 0 Bank rescues that go beyond the government's
insurance obligation benefit customers who otherwise would have lost their
deposits and employees who otherwise would have lost their jobs. Investors
or shareholders may also benefit. In addition, the community may receive
spillover economic benefits or positive externalities from the rescue effort. 22'
If the benefits to the community are such that everyone either benefits or
remains neutral, the bailout is an allocative distribution. 2 It will be Pareto
efficient.
More likely, a general revenue bailout will reflect redistribution, as
opposed to allocation, of income from the general tax-paying public to the
direct beneficiaries of the legislation, without any increase in net welfare.
217. Given a finite set of resources, there will be many possible Pareto efficient distributions.
As one economist noted, "If preventing the burning of Rome would have made Emperor Nero
feel worse off, then letting him bum Rome would have been Pareto-optimal. In short, a
society or an economy can be Pareto-optimal and still be perfectly disgusting." A. SEN, supra
note 209, at 22.
218. The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency concept was developed in two early articles. Hicks, The
Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of
Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939).
219. E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, supra note 186, at 279.
220. See supra notes 97-98 and infra notes 337-38 and accompanying text.
221. A sound and healthy banking system and public confidence in it arguably are funda-
mental to the national economy. Even accepting this assertion, the banking crisis that led to
FIRREA, at least initially, was limited to the thrift industry. Other commercial banks remained
sound.
222. If this is an accurate description, the bailout might be described as pie-enlarging or
"public-regarding" in Judge Easterbrook's terminology. See infra notes 252-53 and accom-
panying text.
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The public interest rhetoric may simply be disguising a bargain struck by
and for the exclusive benefit of special interest groups. Such a bailout surely
should not be undertaken. On the other hand, if benefits to the community
overall exceed costs to the community overall, and those that receive benefits
could compensate the losers, there will be an increase in net welfare and
the bailout will be Kaldor-Hicks efficient. It does not necessarily follow,
however, that the bailout should be undertaken under those circumstances.
As philosopher John Rawls and others have pointed out, "the principle
of efficiency cannot serve alone as a conception of justice."22 Pareto and
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency notions ignore important equitable considerations.
A bailout may be Kaldor-Hicks efficient, but if beneficiaries fall dispro-
portionately in the upper income categories, it may well be regressive.
Although there may be some increase in overall welfare, this increase may
be borne on the backs of the less well-to-do who are not directly sharing
in the benefit.
c. Assessing the Redistributional Effects of Bailouts
Much empirical work regarding the distributional effects of bailouts
remains to be done. The outcome of this analysis of course will vary
depending upon the industry and the structure of the bailout plan. In any
given bailout, it may be difficult to measure the amount, and perhaps even
the direction, of redistribution. One suspects, however, that most bailouts
are redistributive rather than allocative. Because a bailout should not be
measured by efficiency alone, a closer look will be necessary to determine
who the winners and losers from redistribution are or how gains from
allocations are distributed.
The recent savings and loan bailout has been criticized by some as a
regressive redistribution of wealthfrom the poor to the rich. n 4 An important
consideration must be kept in mind when examining redistributive conse-
223. J. RAwLs, supra note 215, at 71. His discussion of efficiency can be found at id. at
67-75; see also A. SEN, supra note 216; Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78
CALIF. L. Rav. 815 (1990); Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U.
CHI. L. REv. 63 (1990). Even the Bush administration concedes that "a strict regulatory
decision framework designed to maximize net benefits does not take such distributional effects
into account." ExEcuTrvE OFFIcE OF THE PRES., REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT: APRIL 1, 1990-MARcH 31, 1991 39 (1990) [hereinafter REGULATORY PROGRAM:
APRIL 1, 1990-MARcH 31, 1991]. For further discussion of this problem, see infra notes 295-
304 and accompanying text.
224. Professor Edward Hill recently prepared an analysis focusing primarily on regional
redistribution involved in the savings and loan bailout. As an aside in this study, he also
observed that "money will be coming directly and indirectly from taxpayers and being awarded
to savers. Savers, on the average, tend to be better-off than the average taxpayer. This means
that the less wealthy will be subsidizing the wealthier through the bailout." Hill, supra note
214, at 44.
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quences, though. To the extent that current payments are simply satisfying
prior government insurance obligations, the redistributive consequences may
be unavoidable. Ideally, policymakers should consider the potential future
redistributive consequences when initially undertaking insurance obligations.
Realistically, however, this will be difficult, to say the least. With respect
to discretionary bank bailouts beyond the government's formal insurance
obligation, on the other hand, redistributive consequences should be care-
fully considered.
Another redistributive critique of the savings and loan payout is that it
will involve a dramatic geographic redistribution of wealth. Using data from
the Congressional Budget Office, Professor Edward Hill first determined
the distribution of bailout costs among different regions of the country. He
then traced the flow of funds to the same regions, identifying winners and
losers. He concluded that
the benefits and costs of the bailout will not be spread evenly throughout
the nation. Those states and regions with large numbers of problem
thrifts will be receiving infusions of cash to support their assets and
secure their liabilities. This injection of money will help hold off regional
recessions, while other states and regions will be footing the bill.25
Professor Hill's data suggest that benefits from the bailout went dispro-
portionately to thirteen states, predominantly in the south, southwest, and
west, where most of the failed thrifts are located. 226
This geographical redistribution study is somewhat flawed, however, and
it is in these flaws that the analytical difficulties arise. Professor Hill traces
the flow of bailout funds based upon the location of the failed thrifts
themselves. He acknowledges, however, that many of the depositors who
benefitted from the bailout of these thrifts may have been from other
locations.227 In addition, a given thrift's assets were not necessarily located
in-state. Failed thrifts in the northeast, for example, may have received
bailout funds related to assets in the south or southwest. 228 Another problem
with Professor Hill's analysis is its focus on the flow of funds. Let us
assume, for the moment, that a greater proportion of bailout money in the
savings and loan crisis in fact went to thirteen states. To focus on the flow
225. Id. at 37.
226. Id. at 42. (Table 5 identifies thirteen states that are net beneficiaries of the bailout:
Texas, New Mexico, Arkansas, Arizona, Alaska, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, Minnesota,
Colorado, Utah, Mississippi, and Missouri.) At least one recent bill was introduced in Congress
to require those states receiving disproportionate benefits from the savings and loan bailout
to pay a "State thrift deposit insurance premium." S. 995, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG.
REc. S5167 (1991).
227. Hill, supra note 214, at 42 ("Many of the thrifts that are bankrupt depend heavily on
brokered deposits. These are large denomination certificates of deposit that pay high rates and
are purchased nationally. The depositors could be out-of-state insurance companies, investment
firms, or wealthy personal depositors.").
228. Id.
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of funds is too narrow. Rather, one must focus upon the flow of benefits
more generally identified. The savings and loan bailout might be justified
despite the geographic redistribution of funds if one can make a case that
the nation as a whole benefits from making these particular regions stronger.
The discretion provided to banking regulators in addressing bank failures
is another more subtle example of redistribution and thus of more subtle
analytical problems. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is obligated
only to insure depositors up to the amount of $100,000. Nevertheless, the
FDIC, Federal Reserve Board, and Office of Comptroller of the Currency
have protected depositors beyond this insurance obligation and, in the cases
of certain large banks, also protected bank investors along the way. In a
recent controversial set of cases, federal regulators followed a too-big-to-
fail policy in deciding to bail out some banks and not others. 229 When the
Bank of New England failed in January, 1991, federal regulators "protected
all depositors because it was the judgment of [the FDIC] board that financial
conditions in the area required stabilization and one of the ways to stabilize
them was to provide insurance for all depositors, not only depositors insured
to $100,000. ' '210 The FDIC solicited bids from buyers and arranged to keep
the bank in operation.? In contrast, when the Freedom National Bank of
Harlem failed in November, 1990, the same regulators allowed the bank to
close its doors and did not protect uninsured depositors. "In the case of
Freedom Bank," FDIC Chairman Seidman testified, "we had no basis to
make a finding that the conditions in New York where that bank was
located were such that it required us to protect uninsured depositors in that
small bank. ' 232
Choices such as those made in the Bank of New England and Freedom
National Bank episodes involve redistributions of wealth. Wealth is distrib-
uted to depositors and indirectly to others connected with large banks and
away from depositors in smaller banks. Assessing the redistributional effects
229. For a discussioft of the too-big-to-fail policy, see, for example, Kaufman, Implications
of Large Bank Problems and Insolvencies for the Banking System and Economic Policy, SM-
85-3 (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Series of Occasional Papers in Draft Form by Members
of the Research Department). For a more thorough and recent discussion, see Wilmarth, Too
Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IowA L. REv.
(1992) (forthcoming).
230. Failure of the Bank of New England: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1991) [hereinafter Bank of New England
Hearings] (testimony of William L. Seidman, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion).
231. The FDIC accepted a bid from the Fleet/Norstar Financial Group to purchase the
Bank of New England. The purchaser received substantial funding assistance from Kohlberg,
Kravis, Roberts & Co., a nonbanking investment company. FDIC Selects Fleet/Norstar
Financial Group as Winning Bidder for Bank of New England, (PR Newswire, Apr. 22, 1991)
(LEXIS, Nexis library, Wire file); Fleet/Norstar, Aided by KKR, Wins Bidding Battle for
Bank of New England, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1991, at A3, col. 1.
232. Bank of New England Hearings, supra note 230, at 7.
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of these decisions will require further exploration. First, information about
those with deposits in excess of $100,000 will be necessary. One's initial
instincts may not be sympathetic to wealth transfers among depositors who
are so well-endowed that they have exceeded the $100,000 insurable amount.
Upon closer examination, though, serious redistributive issues emerge. In
the case of Freedom National Bank, for example, many of the large
uninsured depositors were nonprofit organizations providing services to the
community? 3 Uninsured depositors in smaller banks may also be small
businesses with lower income employees. In short, decisions to bail out in
some circumstances and not in others involve serious equitable and redis-
tributive issues. In the banking context, these choices are made by the FDIC
Board with little or no congressional oversight or other procedural safe-
guards . 34
Although the data may be controversial in any given case, the point is
that bailouts can involve geographical and wealth redistribution. Careful
attention must be given to such effects and to designing studies that avoid
the types of design flaws present in Professor Hill's research. To the extent
possible, Congress should be aware of the redistributional consequences of
its bailouts. In addition, agencies and regulators making significant bailout
decisions should be subject to greater congressional oversight or procedural
safeguards. 5
d. Procedural Approaches to Allocation and Redistribution
Some public choice commentators argue that different procedural rules
should apply to allocative, as opposed to redistributive, collective choices.
Dennis Mueller, attributing the initial insight to economist Knut Wicksell,
233. Goodstein, Nonprofit Groups Sue FDIC over N.Y. Bank Insurance; Double Standard
Cited at Freedom National, Washington Post, Mar. 6, 1991, at Cll. The Senate version of
the recent Comprehensive Deposit Insurance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991
contained a provision specifically declaring that deposits of charitable organizations with
Freedom National Bank of New York should be considered insured deposits. 137 CONG. Rc.
S17985-86 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1991). This provision does not appear in the bill ultimately
enacted. See supra note 97.
234. For a brief discussion of the bailout discretion provided to banking regulators, see
supra notes 115-27 and accompanying text. At least one recent article in connection with the
Bank of New England failure pointed out the tremendous FDIC discretion in banking cases.
Gerth, Unguarded Guardians: A Special Report, F.D.I.C. Wields Power in Deals with Few
Checks and Balances, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1991, at Al, col. 4 ("This case and others
illustrate how the FDIC has come to operate in a world with a range of discretionary powers
and exemptions from Federal checks and balances that is extraordinary in the United States
Government."). Recent changes to statutory provisions reduce to some extent the carte-blanche
discretion previously available to the FDIC. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
Even under the new provisions, there remains no congressional oversight of bank bailout
decisions.
235. Some general proposals for reform along these lines will be developed further. See
infra notes 311-23 and accompanying text.
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suggests that redistributional collective choices should be made unanimously
whereas allocative choices can appropriately be made through alternative
voting procedures. 16 According to this view, redistributive action-including
bailouts-should not be taken unless the losers unanimously agree to go
along. 2 7 Given the high decision-making costs of achieving unanimity,
something less than perfect unanimity is acceptable to such theorists as a
practical expedient, 2u 8 perhaps super majority rule. The theory behind super
majority voting requirements is that some decisions are so fundamental that
a majority vote should not suffice.
Even philosopher John Rawls, who can hardly be regarded as a public
choice theorist, would support the Wicksellian unanimity rule under certain
circumstances. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls indicates his support for a
unanimity or near-unanimity rule under certain conditions. He suggests the
possibility of an "exchange branch" of government that could decide to
make expenditures for public goods above and beyond the necessary mini-
mum. 239 Bailout might be thought of for these purposes as a public good.M
The exchange branch, according to Rawls, would be a
special representative body taking note of the various social interests
and their preferences for public goods. It is authorized by the constitution
to consider only such bills as provide for government activities inde-
pendent from what justice requires, and these are to be enacted only
when they satisfy Wicksell's unanimity criterion.2A'
Adopting super majority rule for redistributive decisions generally, and
bailout decisions in particular, would be a dangerous road to travel. First
236. D.C. MUELLER, supra note 186, at 459-65. Knut Wicksell proposed in 1896 that tax
matters should be decided by unanimous vote of affected taxpayers. Wicksell, A New Principle
of Just Taxation, in Ca.Assics in Tm THEoRY oF PuBLic F NANCE 72-118 (R.A. Musgrave &
A. Peacock eds. 1967) (translating and reprinting substantial portions of K. Wic.SF.L,
FINANZTmORETiSCHE UNTERSUCHUNOEN (1896)).
237. This reasoning seems to bring one full circle back into the public choice discussion of
Arrow's impossibility theorem. See supra note 206. Given the irrationality of most social
welfare functions, including majority rule, several public choice theorists suggest that unanimity
or near-unanimity ideally should be the norm. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TLJOCK, supra
note 204, at 96.
238. Buchanan and Tullock, for example, conclude that "[a]t best, majority rule should be
viewed as one among many practical expedients made necessary by the costs of securing
widespread agreement on political issues when individual and group interests diverge." J.
BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 204, at 96.
239. Rawls' proposal for this "exchange branch" assumes four "background institutions"
of government are necessary. First, an "allocation branch" is necessary to "keep the price
system workably competitive and to prevent the formation of unreasonable market power."
J. RAwLS, supra note 215, at 276-77. Second, a "stabilization branch" is required to "bring
about reasonably full employment." Id. Third, a "transfer branch" assures a certain "social
minimum" to each individual, and finally, a "distribution branch" to "preserve an approximate
justice in distributive shares by means of taxation and the necessary adjustments in the rights
of property." Id.
240. For further discussion of bailout as a public good, see infra notes 276-87 and
accompanying text.
241. J. RAwLs, supra note 215, at 282.
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of all, legislatures are called upon to make numerous important decisions,
not the least of which is determination of the overall budget, military
expenditures, and the like. Many of these decisions are likely to be redis-
tributive. As a logistical matter, one would need to decide which legislative
decisions are significant enough to require more than a simple majority
vote,27 2 but even for those, the decision-making costs of achieving super
majority agreement would be prohibitive. Much more importantly, however,
Rawls conditioned his support for such a rule on the assumption of "the
justice of the existing distribution of income and wealth, and of the current
definition of the rights of property."2 3 The unanimity principle is sound,
according to Rawls, only when the existing distribution of wealth is equitable
or just. If we are all on a reasonably level playing field, "[tihere is no
more justification for using the state apparatus to compel some citizens to
pay for unwanted benefits that others desire than there is to force them to
reimburse others for their private expenses." 2"
The real danger of moving to a super majority rule in the case of certain
significant policy decisions is the likely preservation of the status quo. The
greater the number of votes required to enact legislation, the more likely it
is that no legislation will be passed at all. Such a requirement would limit
opportunities for reform. Proposals for more than a simple majority vote
may simply be a reflection of sour grapes on the part of the minority or
simply a "convenient rationalization for every minority that, out of fear of
possible deprivations of some majority, has demanded a political system
providing it with an opportunity to veto such policies. ' 245 As Rawls points
out, unless and until the existing distribution of income and wealth and the
definition of property rights is "just," a unanimity rule is inappropriate.
Although adoption of a super majority rule for redistributive bailout
choices would be unwise as a policy matter, the focus on bailouts as a form
242. Interestingly, the Charter of the United Nations calls for just such a super majority
vote in the case of "important questions." L. GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OF TEM
UNrTED NATioNs-CommENrTARY Akm DocUMENTS 188 (2d rev. ed. 1949) ("Decisions of the
General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the
members present and voting."). In addition to specified categories of pre-ordained important
questions, the United Nations Charter permits additional categories of important questions to
be determined by majority vote. The United Nations Charter itself names several categories
of important questions including "recommendations with respect to the maintenance of
international peace and security, the election of non-permanent members of the Security
Council[,] ... the admission of new members to the United Nations, the suspension of the
rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of members[,] ... and budgetary questions."
Id. at 189. Paragraph 3 of article 18 provides that "[d]ecisions on other questions, including
the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority,
shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting." Id. at 190.
243. J. RAw~s, supra note 215, at 283.
244. Id.
245. R. Dma, supra note 191, at 30 (footnote omitted) (Dahl's description of Madisonian
ideology).
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of redistribution is useful. Congressional and administrative policymakers
should be cognizant of the redistribtive quality of bailouts and should be
aware of the winners and losers involved. The decision-making process
should involve careful consideration and deliberation, followed by majority
vote.
III. DEVELOPING A SUBSTANTIVE
AND PROCEDURAL BAILOUT POLICY
A. Enacting "'Public-Regarding" Bailout Legislation
Several legal scholars distinguish between "public-regarding" or "public
interest" and "private-regarding" or "interest group" legislation. Public
bailout of a private enterprise might well be private-regarding to the extent
that the benefits are bargained for by a small group of investors or employees
and provide little or no residual benefit to the public at large. Put another
way, a bailout simply may be a form of rent seeking by private enterprise.
One primary aspiration of the civic virtue school that I share is increasing
the prevalence of public-regarding legislation. Several proposals have been
made toward this end in general. My purpose is to suggest ways that bailouts
in particular can be made more public-regarding.
Some definition of terms will be necessary. Different scholars have used
very different meanings for the terms public- and private-regarding. Pro-
fessor Mashaw suggests that legislation that is public-regarding "can make
a coherent and plausible claim to serve some public, rather than a merely
private interest. ' 2 6 Private-regarding legislation, in contrast, "benefits some
group in ways that cannot convincingly be explained in terms of a broad
range of possible public purposes, or in terms of a well-functioning demo-
cratic process. "247
Although Jonathan Macey explicitly borrows the term "public-regarding"
from Mashaw 2 48 his concept appears to be slightly different. According to
Macey, legislation is public-regarding if it "serves some purpose other than
obtaining for particular legislators the pecuniary advantage of the political
support of some narrow interest group, even if this purpose is the transfer
of wealth from one group to another.''29 Such a definition of public-
regarding legislation appears more consistent with the pluralist view of
clashing interests than with the public interest view. Particular rent-seeking
interest groups may successfully lobby for and achieve wealth transfers in
246. Mashaw, supra note 193, at 867.
247. Id. at 875.
248. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An
Interest Group Model, 86 COLUm. L. REv. 223, 228, 229 n.29 (1986).
249. Id. at 229 n.29.
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their favor, and the result might still be considered public-regarding under
this definition. As long as the legislator himself or herself does not receive
pecuniary advantage, the legislation is public-regarding. Macey backs off
this point a bit, arguing that the distinction between public-regarding and
private-regarding should be considered as largely procedural. "If the statute
in question is the result of a reified, deliberative congressional process in
which conceptions of the public good were considered, then the statute is
public-regarding. If, however, the statute simply represents legislative ac-
quiescence to raw political power, it is not public regarding." ' z0 Using a
process-oriented approach, he concedes that an ad hoc distribution of wealth
to a well-organized interest group is unlikely to be public-regarding.Y 1 Judge
Easterbrook uses similar terminology to quite different effect. He too
distinguishes between interest group and public interest legislation. 2 2 In
Easterbrook's view, however, public interest legislation is simply pie-
enlarging or allocative as opposed to pie-slicing or redistributive legislation. 253
Most of the legal literature distinguishing public and private interest
legislation focuses on the proper scope of judicial review,254 but this Article
will focus instead on the legislative process itself. 2" Notions of what is
public-regarding for judicial review purposes will need to be retooled to fit
the needs of policymakers interested in the common good as they consider
proposed legislation. The policy maker seeking to enact public-regarding
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, 50 U. CHi. L. REv. 533, 541 (1983). He discusses the
distinction further in Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term. Forward: The Court and
the Economic System, 98 HAv. L. REv. 4, 18 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Supreme Court
Forward].
253. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, supra note 252, at 541. Even self-interested pluralists
might agree on pie-enlarging legislation from which everyone comes out a winner and the only
issue will be dividing the spoils. One suspects, however, that very little legislation would be
regarded as pie-enlarging as Easterbrook views it. The Easterbrook view of what is public-
regarding is reminiscent of the notion of Pareto efficiency. For a further discussion of Pareto
efficiency and allocation as distinguished from redistribution, see supra notes 213-23 and
accompanying text.
254. Mashaw, for example, concludes that the "citizen has a constitutional right to demand
that public law be public-regarding." Mashaw, supra note 193, at 876. He argues that courts
reviewing cases on constitutional grounds should question whether legislation was enacted for
a "coherent and plausible" public purpose. Id. at 870-71. Easterbrook, on the other hand,
argues that courts should simply distinguish between public and private interest legislation and
use different styles of review for each category. With regard to the latter, Easterbrook concludes
that "[i]f statutes are bargains among special interests, they should be enforced like contracts."
Easterbrook, Supreme Court Forward, supra note 252, at 18. With regard to public-regarding
statutes, Judge Easterbrook suggests that application of the maxim "remedial statutes are to
be liberally construed" is more appropriate. Id. at 14-15.
255. To be sure, the proper scope of judicial review is relevant here. Knowledge that
legislation will later be subject to strengthened review may result in more public-regarding
legislation. Cass Sunstein explicitly makes this point. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying
text. Mashaw makes the same point more implicitly. See Mashaw, supra note 193.
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bailout legislation surely should be concerned about the process by which
bailout decisions are made. Several process-oriented reforms are suggested
in the sections that follow, 2 6 but one yearns for a more normative standard
by which to measure legislation. Easterbrook's meaning of public-regarding
legislation for purposes of judicial review is extremely narrow, effectively
encompassing only allocative distributions. Mashaw's suggested requirement
also offers insufficient guidance to the policy maker finding her way. The
concept of public-regarding should have greater aspirational content in the
ex ante stages of the process. From the policy maker's point of view,
bailout decisions should not simply have a coherent and plausible claim but
in fact should serve a public, rather than merely a private, interest.
The sections that follow develop substantive and procedural proposals
that may increase the prospects of public-regarding bailout decisions. My
development of these proposals draws on concepts from public interest,
pluralist, and distributive justice schools of thought discussed prbviously.
Identifying the public interest served by bailout or any other legislation will
not be easy. In developing the proposals that follow, I was mindful of two
important realities. First, even legislators who in good faith have only the
public interest at heart will have honest differences of opinion as to which
policies best serve that interest. Second, the pluralist view of legislation as
evolving from the clash of interest groups is an accurate description of the
political world in which we live. The challenge is to channel this pluralist
reality into more public-regarding legislation that takes into account the
larger community that has been silent or left out of the policy debate.
B. Developing a Substantive Standard
1. Preconditions to Bailout
Earlier sections of this Article developed the argument that we should
begin as a policy matter with a presumption against bailout.2 7 Bailouts are
extraordinary events and should not be lightly undertaken. Four basic
preconditions should be met as a first step toward overcoming the pre-
sumption.
First, any firm seeking bailout relief should be required to attempt an
informal workout or a chapter 11 reorganization in bankruptcy or at least
establish that such an effort would not be viable. 28 In other words, "private
256. See infra notes 289-323 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 175-90 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 162-74 and accompanying text. Banks may not be debtors in bankruptcy,
11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2), and thus may not reorganize under chapter 11. Consequently, this
precondition could not be applied in the bank setting. Nonetheless, some evidence of an
attempt at private bailout should be required.
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bailout" should be attempted before resorting to "public bailout." From a
public policy perspective, one advantage of the reorganization in bankruptcy
is that it distributes bailout costs among those more intimately connected
with the enterprise and those who have the most to gain from the success
of the enterprise. Such an approach appears most equitable in the interest
of distributive justice. It should also satisfy pluralists in that the parties
most interested in the transaction will privately negotiate a solution in their
own economic interest. A similar precondition is required by the Justice
Department Merger Guidelines for the "failing company" defense to anti-
trust violations.29 Formal extension of this bankruptcy precondition to
general bailout policy thus would not represent a dramatic departure in
public policy.
Second, except in extreme circumstances, an enterprise seeking bailout
assistance should be required to establish that the threat of collapse is due
to circumstances beyond its control. Sometimes, the cause of failure will be
economic or other extreme conditions outside the control of the enterprise
seeking assistance. At other times, however, threatened failure may be due
to fraud, mismanagement, or other internal reasons. Freely provided bailout
under the latter circumstances may increase the moral hazard problem.
Permitting firms responsible for their own demise to obtain bailout relief
just as easily as those whose demise is outside of their control might
encourage more careless and risky behavior. It should be clear as a matter
of public policy that, except in extraordinary circumstances, bailout relief
requests will be considered only from those whose threatened failure results
from circumstances they could not have controlled. This second requirement
might be referred to as the "no-fault" precondition.
The no-fault requirement is merely a precondition, not an argument in
favor of bailout. Chrysler, for example, argued that a significant part of
its financial trouble could be attributed to costs imposed by environmental
and safety regulations imposed on the automobile manufacturing industry-
circumstances beyond its control. As the smallest of the "Big Three"
automobile manufacturers, Chrysler argued that it was most vulnerable to
financial distress resulting from compliance with burdensome regulations.
Even if all of Chrysler's problems could have been attributed to the burdens
of environmental regulation, it is not clear that bailout relief should have
been provided. Such regulation is promulgated to protect consumers and
the environment. Firms that are unable to meet such burdens perhaps should
collapse. Nevertheless, establishing that the threatened collapse is due to
outside factors should be an important precondition to serious consideration
of bailout relief.26
259. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
260. In some cases, threatened collapse may be due to negligent actions of government
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As a third precondition, the firm seeking relief should establish that
private insurance was unavailable to distribute costs among those in the
industry. Although others in the same industry are not as intimately con-
nected with the enterprise as parties to a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding,
they have a strong interest in survival of the industry. 26' Before broadly
distributing bailout costs to the general public, efforts should be made to
concentrate costs within a more appropriate group of beneficiaries.
Finally, before bailout relief can be considered, it should be reasonably
clear that the enterprise in fact would collapse without the relief. Although
the threatened collapse ordinarily should be clear and imminent, the fourth
precondition does not require that the threatened collapse be imminent. 262
As a practical matter, this precondition has the benefit of sparing unnec-
essary expenditure of government resources. Moreover, it is necessitated by
the operating definition of bailout itself-that bailout is a form of govern-
ment assistance or intervention designed to prevent enterprise failure. Gov-
ernment assistance in the absence of reasonable evidence that the firm would
fail without relief is not a bailout but a different form of government
subsidy.
Each of the four preconditions to bailout should apply except under
extraordinary circumstances. In extreme cases, the preconditions might be
relaxed to some extent. When the potential "community catastrophe" from
financial collapse is extreme, earlier bailout intervention may be necessary.
When Congress provided special merger relief for failing banks, for example,
the Supreme Court observed that
Congress was also concerned about banks in danger of collapse-banks
not so deeply in trouble as to call forth the traditional "failing company"
defense, but nonetheless in danger of becoming before long financially
unsound institutions. Congress seems to have felt that a bank failure is
a much greater community catastrophe than the failure of an industrial
or retail enterprise, and that a much smaller risk of failure than that
required by the failing company doctrine should be sufficient to justify
regulators in exercising their regulatory authority. Evidence of regulatory negligence may
provide a greater government obligation to bailout. As noted earlier, individual damage claims
will be limited under principles of sovereign immunity. See supra notes 141-45 and accompa-
nying text. For example, evidence suggests that negligent actions of bank regulators contributed
significantly to the savings and loan crisis. A substantial government regulatory presence gives
rise to a greater public expectation of protection. If the government is negligent in its exercise
of regulatory authority, it will be more difficult for Congress to refuse to intervene with some
form of public assistance.
261. Thus, for example, the bank industry in the pre-Depression years protected itself
through private clearing houses and co-insurance. For a description of early bank insurance,
see Calomiris, supra note 149. More recently, the insurance industry got together privately to
provide assistance to customers of the Executive Life Insurance Company of California. See
supra note 9.
262. Of course, evidence that the firm would collapse absent relief will be more persuasive
as bankruptcy is closer at hand.
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the rather radical preventive step of an anticompetitive merger.26 3
Early intervention of this type may well preclude requirement of the fourth
condition that collapse of the enterprise absent intervention be reasonably
clear.
Similarly, the no-fault precondition may be relaxed under extreme circum-
stances. Ordinarily, an enterprise seeking bailout assistance should establish
that the threatened failure is due to circumstances beyond its control.
Nonetheless, there may be cases where, despite the fault of the enterprise,
the public interest is so great as to require bailout in any event. Certain
bank bailouts arguably fall into this category.2 4 These should be rare and
extraordinary cases.
2. Substantive Policy Assessment
a. Assessing the Impact of a Failure to Intervene
Even after the preconditions are met, the presumption against bailout
should continue. A strong public interest should be established to overcome
this presumption. Too often, however, the public interest is described in
vague, ambiguous, and flowery terms. No doubt, this is what has led some
pluralists to claim that there is no such thing as the "public interest. ' 265
Despite these protestations, the "public interest" may be just slightly more
identifiable in the bailout setting.
One mechanism for deciding when to intervene is to consider the cost to
the government of nonintervention. Failure of an enterprise or industry will
result in lost tax revenues, as well as increased government costs for
unemployment coverage, welfare, and other programs. In his report on
guidelines for rescuing large failing firms, the Comptroller General suggested
that "Congress should compare the costs, benefits, and consequences ex-
pected to occur if assistance is offered with expectations of what would
occur if market forces and established legal procedures are allowed to
operate. ' ' 26 Where the government cost of a decision not to intervene
exceeds the cost of government assistance that would be necessary to rescue
the troubled enterprise, bailout would appear the financially prudent2 67 and-
at least in the short-run-the wise thing to do.
263. United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 187 (1968) (footnote omitted). For
further discussion of the special defenses to antitrust laws as a form of bailout, see supra
notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
264. For further discussion, see infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
266. COMPTROLLER GENRAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 25.
267. In fact, FDIC discretion to provide certain types of assistance to depository institutions
is limited by statute to the amount reasonably necessary to save the cost of liquidating a
failing bank. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, Congress also must consider the long-run implications.
Even if the anticipated costs of nonintervention are higher than anticipated
bailout costs, concern for equity or legislative integrity may caution against
the bailout. Assume, for example, that one of several major competing
industries in a large metropolitan area was threatened with collapse without
government assistance. Absent special circumstances, providing ad hoc as-
sistance to one of the competing firms would interfere with operation of
the competitive market and be inequitable to the firms that managed to
struggle against similar economic odds more efficiently and successfully.M
Special circumstances that might support a more sympathetic hearing are
those where the threatened failure was caused by circumstances, such as a
disaster, beyond the enterprise's control. Even here, however, regular dis-
aster relief programs available to all eligible applicants would be preferable.
Another similar measure of the public interest is the economic impact
that would result from allowing the enterprise to fail. Economists can assist
in designing tests to measure the impact or ripple effects of market failures.
One model that might be useful in this regard is the interindustry or input-
output analysis developed by economist Wassily Leontief. 2 9 The input-
output technique involves identifying economic sectors and placing them in
a matrix. Read horizontally, the numbers in the matrix show the outputs
shipped from one sector to other sectors. Read vertically, the matrix shows
inputs received by one sector from other sectors. 270
Interindustry analysis performs two useful functions. First, it describes
the interrelationship between sectors of the economy. Input-output analysis
explores the impact of an enterprise failure within one industry, on other
industries, and on the overall economy. Within the same industry, failure
of one firm may impose ripple effects on other firms. Banking regulators
have long been concerned that, given interrelationships among some mem-
bers of the banking community, the collapse of a large bank would cause
ripple effects among many other banks and lead to a banking crisis. 27' Thus,
the FDIC adopted a too-big-to-fail policy.272
268. The "moral hazard" problem thus is implicated, even when nonintervention costs are
higher than bailout costs.
269. W. LEONTIEF, INPUT-OUTPUT ECONOMCS (2d ed. 1986). Leontief won the Nobel Prize
for his work on input-output analysis. For his 1973 Nobel Lecture, see id. at 321-37.
270. This process and an illustrative matrix appear id. at 5-9. Such analysis already is being
used extensively in government studies. See, e.g., BUnEAU op EcoN. ANALYsis, U.S. DEP'T oF
COMMRCE, THE INPUT-OUTPUT STRucTURE OF THE U.S. EcoNoMY: 1967 (1974).
271. Interindustry analysis would then show that collapse of the banking industry would
have rather dramatic effects upon other industries and the economy generally.
272. The FDIC's authority to determine that a bank is too big to fail is thought to be
derived from its power to declare that a depository institution is "essential to provide adequate
depository services in its community." 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A). Congress recently revised
this standard but continues to provide authority for emergency bank assistance. The too-big-
to-fail policy has come under attack in recent years. See, e.g., Lovett, supra note 157, at
1014 [Vol. 67:951
PUBLIC BAILOUTS
Second, and more important in the bailout context, input-output analysis
"is an analytical tool for measuring the impact of autonomous disturbances
on an economy's output and income. ' 27 3 Once one develops an appropriate
matrix, the ripple effects resulting from a firm or industry failure can
probably be examined by deleting that firm or industry's input-output figures
and rerunning the matrix.2 4
This discussion of input-output theory does not suggest that interindustry
analysis is the only appropriate measure. One concern with major financial
failures, from the public interest perspective, is the extent to which poverty
levels would increase if government intervention is rejected. Input-output
analysis may not be the best measure of such poverty levels. Nevertheless,
it should be possible to develop some objective measures to determine the
impact of a failure to provide government assistance. 27
b. Public Goods Analysis
Economists often use the concept of "public goods" to distinguish those
goods that should be publically, as opposed to privately, provided. The
economic notion of public good may be useful in distinguishing those cases
1367; Note, Garrett, The Modified Payoff of Failed Banks: A Settlement Practice to Inject
Market Discipline into the Commercial Banking System, 73 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1375-78 (1987).
For a more supportive view of the too-big-to-fail policy, see Wilmarth, supra note 229.
273. H. RICHARDSON, INPUT-OUTPUT AND REGIONAL EcoNoiacs 14 (1972).
274. As described by Leontief himself, sophisticated use of interindustry analysis
has had to await the modem high-speed computing machine as well as the present
propensity of government and private agencies to accumulate mountains of data.
It is now advancing from the phase of academic investigation and experimental
trial to a broadening application in grand-scale problems of national economic
policy.
W. LEONTIEF, supra note 269, at 4. Application of input-output analysis, or any other
comparable economic models, will require collection of extensive data. The Department of
Commerce and other agencies have collected and are collecting such data and have developed
input-output tables. This data may need to be reworked to be most useful in the bailout
setting. Nevertheless, most of the difficult collection work may already have been done.
275. Another public interest argument for overcoming the presumption against bailout might
be protection of consumers. Elimination of a price-cutting firm from the marketplace may
increase consumer prices dramatically. In draft, one article argues that
[p]rice cutting is a risky business and it may be socially desirable to provide some
insurance for this strategy from which consumers are bound to benefit....
While we do not argue that the government should frequently bail out failing
firms, competitive bailouts deserve reassessment. In the end, one might conclude
that it is administratively too difficult for government actors to identify the
worthy recipients of an "efficiency" bailout. But the fact that down stream
consumers are often willing to buy or subsidize falling upstream suppliers is at
least sufficient evidence to shift the burden to those who would dismiss such
interventions out of hand.
Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 135.
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in which bailout will serve the public interest. 276 If a bailout can be classified
as a public good, a stronger case for overcoming the presumption against
bailout is possible.
Two important characteristics generally are common to the economic
notion of a public good. The first is nonexclusivity. Professor Mancur
Olson describes a public good as any good that cannot feasibly be withheld
from others in the group if one person consumes it; 277 if one person can
consume the good, all are able to consume it and none can be excluded.
The lighthouse is a common illustration of this nonexclusivity phenomenon
in the economic literature. If a lighthouse is built in a fiarbor, it would be
nearly impossible to exclude some boats from using it. 271
The exclusivity element does not require that there be no method of
exclusion but simply that exclusion not be feasible. As two other economists
pointed out, "price-exclusion is seldom, if ever, literally impossible. Except
in extreme cases, such as that of national defen[s]e, the problem in practice
is to decide when exclusion is economic. ' 279 Since individuals cannot feasibly
be excluded from using a public good, providing such goods in the private
marketplace becomes inefficient. A price mechanism for selling such a good
privately simply will not work because individual consumers will be tempted
to free-ride upon the contributions of others. As one economist put it,
"Those who enjoy the public good without paying for it never signal their
desire for it. Consequently, not enough of the public good is provided.
This is why public goods ought to be, in some way, publicly financed. ' 20
276. The notion of a public good is attributed to two short, but seminal, articles published
by Professor Paul Samuelson in 1954 and 1955. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public
Expenditure, 36 Rav. EcON. & SrTAhsncs 387 (1954) [hereinafter Samuelson, Pure Theory];
Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REv. EcoN. &
STATsnics 350 (1955). Professor Samuelson further developed the idea in Aspects of Public
Expenditure Theories, 40 REv. ECON. & STAnsncs 332 (1958).
277. M. OLSON,.supra note 188, at 14.
278. See R.H. CoAsE, supra note 26, at 187-213.
279. Head & Shoup, Public Goods, Private Goods, and Ambiguous Goods, 79 EcoN. J.
567 (1969) (footnote omitted). Head and Shoup pose the question, "If a lighthouse beam can
be scrambled so that only ships that purchase an unscrambler can receive the beam, how shall
the service rendered by the lighthouse be classified?" Id. at 567.
280. A. FELDmAN, WELFARE ECONOMCS AND Soc.L CHOICE THEoRY 114 (1980). As Sa-
muelson succinctly put it in his first article, "no decentralized pricing system can serve to
determine optimally ... levels of collective consumption. Other kinds of 'voting' or 'signalling'
would have to be tried." Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 276, at 388. Professor Buchanan
adds that the term public good,
in its current technical and professionally used sense, tends to be reserved for
those goods and services that are financed and provided through the governmental-
political process, through the so-called public sector.... The subdiscipline of
economic theory that is now sometimes called the modern theory of public goods
is largely devoted to an analysis of why governmental provision of these goods
and services may be required, and of how such provision should and does take
1016 [Vol. 67:951
PUBLIC BAILOUTS
The second major characteristic of a public good is jointness of supply.
A good whose production costs are fixed is considered to be jointly supplied.
The lighthouse illustrates this characteristic as well. The cost of a lighthouse
is fixed regardless of the number of consumers. Similarly, the cost of a
national defense system is largely fixed independently of the number of
consumers.
When the bailout of a firm or industry is considered a "public good,"
the free-rider problem will prevent the private sector from creating a
workable price mechanism through which the good might be purchased.
Therefore, if the good is to be provided at all, it will have to be provided
publicly.28' Bailouts, like most goods, cannot be classified as purely public
or purely private. In fact, it is more useful to view all goods on a continuum
with pure public goods at one extreme and pure private goods at the other.
The closer on the continuum that a good comes to the public extreme, the
larger the size of optimal group membership. At some point, the group
becomes sufficiently large that the good should be provided through the
governmental process.
A developing literature known as the "economic theory of clubs" attempts
to fill in the missing points on this continuum by covering "the whole
spectrum of ownership-consumption possibilities, ranging from the purely
private or individualized activity on the one hand to purely public or
collectivized activity on the other."' 2 2 The closer a good comes to the private
extreme, the smaller the size of the group. If it is possible to identify private
interested parties who would suffer sufficiently from the failure that they
would be willing to privately provide a bailout, the good should be privately
purchased.
Bailouts falling close to the pure public extreme on the continuum should
be provided, if at all, through the governmental process as general revenue
bailouts. Even if one accepts the possibility of altruistic behavior, 283 it is
place.
Buchanan, Public Goods and Public Bads, in FINANCING THE METROPOLIS: PUBLIC PoLIcY IN
URBAN EcoNowCs 51, 53 (I. Crecine ed. 1970). Buchanan also points out in this article that
public goods and public bads are reciprocal notions. The presence of pollution can be viewed
as a public bad whereas the elimination of pollution might be regarded as a public good. Id.
281. In contrast to public interest conceptions, however, the moral component is missing
from public goods analysis. The public good theorist does not ask whether government provision
of the public good is morally correct or satisfies some notion of the common good. The
semantic overlap here is unfortunate. "Public good" from the economists' viewpoint is quite
different from something for the public good from the public interest perspective. Despite
jointness of supply and nonexclusivity, a public good may not be important enough to be
provided at all. In other words, it may not serve the public interest. To avoid this semantic
overlap, all references to public good are to the economists' conception described in this
section.
282. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMCA 1, 1 (1965).
283. See supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
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asking too much of altruism to suggest that uninterested parties will voluntarily
agree to a private bailout. Most requests for public bailout arise because
the good cannot be provided privately. Even if the bailout benefits a broad
community, fear of free-riders prevents private groups from contributing.
As one moves away from the pure public good end of the spectrum, bailouts
in the middle ranges should be special fund bailouts and those at the lower
end should have no government intervention at all.
What is the good provided through bailout legislation? The public good
can be seen as preventing the public bad of economic collapse of a particular
industry, firm, or municipality. Under the Samuelson approach to public
goods, whether this good should be provided by government, depends upon
the level of exclusivity and jointness of supply of the good. Saving a firm
or industry involves fixed costs regardless of the number of people that
benefit directly or indirectly. There may be uncertainty at the outset as to
the final cost, but it will not fluctuate based on the number of consumers. 214
Thus, the jointness of supply element will be satisfied.
The degree of exclusivity involved in any particular bailout depends, in
part, on the scope of the bailout. One is tempted to argue that bailout of
an entire industry is likely to have a higher degree of nonexclusivity and is
thus more likely to be a public good than bailout of an individual firm.
But even in the case of failure or threatened failure of an entire industry,
the degree of nonexclusivity may be so low that government intervention
will not be considered. For example, if the kite-manufacturing industry were
to disappear altogether, few would consider government intervention to
assist the industry appropriate. On the other hand, if the entire airline
industry were threatened with economic collapse, government intervention
would be considered quite seriously. This is because the good of preventing
collapse of the kite-manufacturing industry is not substantially a public
good. Although the community might suffer the loss of pleasure from flying
a kite or watching others do so, widespread suffering from collapse of the
economy is unlikely to result from failure of this industry. Nor is it an
industry that is fundamental to our economic or social fabric. The airline
industry, on the other hand, plays a much more significant role in the
economy, and the ability to travel quickly from place to place is an important
component of our social and cultural fabric. The good provided through
protection of the industry would be widely available to all, and few could
be excluded. Even those who did not use the airlines benefit from the
availability of the service to others.
Failures in other industries will present much closer questions. The textile
and electronics industries are examples. If market failure arises largely from
284. For example, estimating the ultimate cost of the savings and loan bailout has been
quite difficult. The difficulties stem largely from anticipating inflation, market conditions, and
the like and not from variability of costs based on the number of beneficiaries. See Hearings
supra note 2, at 10 (statement of Charles Bowsher, U.S. Comptroller General).
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foreign competition, is bailout a public good? What should the response be
to a failure of the private university system? It will be a useful exercise to
develop a list and rank of those industries the strength of which is an
indivisible public good. To determine whether the collapse of a particular
industry would be a public bad calling for the corrective public good bailout,
one must examine the degree of exclusivity. How integral is the industry to
the overall economy? How many customers, employees, and other partici-
pants does the industry affect, directly or indirectly? Input-output analysis
might also be useful in developing this list.211
Once those industries most critical to the overall economy and thus more
likely candidates for bailout in the event of a business failure are identified,
one must be mindful of the impact of such an assessment on industry
behavior. Here again, moral hazard issues arise. Industries on the list may
feel free to engage in more reckless behavior. Given this danger, the number
of industries on the list should be very short. Second, industries in this
category should be more heavily regulated and monitored. Some might
argue that, much like the presumption against bailouts, this approach already
exists informally. Many regard the banking industry as one that society
cannot allow to collapse. It is among the more heavily regulated industries,
yet the regulation was not rigorous enough to prevent the savings and loan
crisis. An earlier bailout of sorts was provided through federal deposit
insurance funded with premiums that were not based on risk. In a sense,
the so-called current savings and loan bailout is simply the outcome of
failed efforts to protect banks and customers through a combination of
insurance and regulation. Savings and loan owners and managers arguably
engaged in risky or reckless behavior knowing that deposit insurance pro-
tected most customers in any event.
The industry-wide effort involved in the savings and loan story is rather
unique. Few industries are as central to the economy as the banking
industry.us More generally, the issues involved in industry-wide failures
differ from those involved in firm-specific failures. For one thing, the causes
of industry-wide failure may be different from those resulting in specific
firm failures. For example, much of the steam engine business failed years
ago, presumably because new technology made the steam engine obsolete.
It would be foolish for Congress to force attempts at reorganization or to
rescue such an industry. On the other hand, assistance to assure an orderly
retooling of industrial assets and employees may be appropriate. 2U 7
285. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
286. However, thrift institutions make up only a small part of the banking industry. In
addition, many customers are using other financial institutions to meet needs that were
traditionally met only by banks.
287. The Japanese arguably have done a better job of shifting and retooling workers to
gain a competitive edge as new technologies make old technologies obsolete. For a general
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Where the threatered collapse results from causes other than obsolescence,
industry-wide failure raises public bailout policy issues that differ largely as
a matter of degree. Even in the case of industry-wide failure, the rebuttable
presumption against bailout should remain. For certain industries, rebutting
the presumption may be simpler than for others, however. Some industries
simply are more important to overall economic health and stability than
others.
c. Noneconomic Considerations
One should recognize the limits of public goods and other forms of
economic analysis as public policy tools. A conclusion that a bailout meets
the public good requirements of nonexclusivity and jointness of supply does
not necessarily require that the good be provided publicly. To illustrate,
suppose that a local community wished to build a monument. The monument
has fixed costs regardless of the number of people who enjoy it, and it is
not feasible to exclude individuals from this pleasure. Individuals may not
voluntarily agree to fund the monument, however, for fear of free-riders.
The monument will only be built if it is provided publicly, using tax
revenues. The monument is a public good. This does not mean that the
good should necessarily be provided. The local governing body will need to
examine legislative priorities and determine whether or not, given those
priorities, it can afford to provide the good. It is entirely possible that the
good will not be provided at all. The same will be true in the public bailout
context.
Even if the impact of collapse of an enterprise would be extreme and
bailout relief appears appropriate on economic grounds, equitable consid-
erations must be taken into account. For example, the too-big-to-fail policy
in connection with bank bailouts protects investors and uninsured depositors
in large banks but does not provide similar protection to investors in smaller
banks and to depositors who happen to have accounts in smaller banks.
Assuming that the bailout is necessary, should the government, in the
interest of equity, go further and provide similar relief to small bank
investors and uninsured depositors as well?
Other cases may involve lower levels of potential economic harm that
would ordinarily not be sufficient to overcome the presumption against
bailout. Nonetheless, there may be other compelling policy considerations.
For example, the Newspaper Preservation Act provides bailout relief of a
sort to failing newspapers. 218 Here the overriding policy concern was for an
discussion of these issues, see M.E. PORTER, THE ComPETrTIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990).
See also Reich, Bailout: A Comparative Study in Law and Industrial Structure, 2 YALE J. ON
REG. 163 (1985).
288. For a discussion of the Newspaper Preservation Act as a form of bailout, see supra
notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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independent free press that would strengthen and support the first amend-
ment free speech rights so fundamental to our constitutional framework.
As another illustration, even though failure of a particular enterprise would
have a reasonably small economic impact, it might be appropriate to provide
relief in the interest of community diversity. Thus, assistance to the sole
minority-owned business in a community may be considered to be in the
"public interest."
A word of caution is important here, however. If other policy consider-
ations are the primary driving force behind a direct or indirect bailout, one
should critically examine whether or not other alternatives might be a more
appropriate way to effectuate the policy. If first amendment concerns are
indeed paramount, careful consideration of alternatives to promote such
freedoms should be undertaken before resorting to bailout.
The point here is that economic principles can provide only a threshold
level of analysis in connection with bailouts. One cannot escape the onto-
logical question: What is in the public interest? Although some substantive
standards for reviewing requests for bailout relief can be identified, the
policy choices remain difficult, and there is no obvious bright-line substan-
tive test by which to measure the wisdom of any given bailout.
C. Developing Procedural Standards
Given the lack of a substantive bright-line test for deciding when bailout
serves the public interest, the procedures used to make that decision become
all the more important. While process-oriented reforms to improve the
extent and quality of deliberation prior to enactment of legislation may be
a good idea generally, the call for bailout often arises when time for
deliberation is short. This setting, as well as the fact that bailout decisions
require a reasonably unique form of economic analysis, implicate the need
for special bailout procedures. The suggestions that follow are designed to
increase the deliberativeness of the decision-making process while at the
same time recognizing the need for speedy action in many bailout scenarios.
They are also designed to increase the number of participants in the process
so that the voice, or at least the interest, of more diffuse groups can be
heard along with the voices of well-organized interests.
1. Need for a Central Monitoring Agency
Detailed economic information is critical in making any decision regarding
bailouts. To wait to gather this information until a firm or industry is on
the brink of collapse is unwise, however. In the bailout setting, firms or
industries in potential distress should be monitored. On the eve of its
bankruptcy, the Drexel Burnham Lambert Group withdrew substantial
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amounts of cash from its broker-dealer and government securities subsidiaries
without notifying the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The SEC, working with other federal
government regulators, was able to stave off disaster in the securities markets
by "facilitat[ing] an orderly liquidation of the broker-dealer's positions and
a speedy transfer of customer accounts to other financial institutions. ' 289
At the same time, SEC Chairman Breeden argued that "[t]he events sur-
rounding the Drexel insolvency underscore the need for the SEC to have
regular and unquestioned access to information regarding the financial
position of a broker-dealer's holding company and its other affiliates." 29°
In his testimony, Chairman Breeden urged passage of the Market Reform
Act to provide for SEC access to such data. 29'
Financial problems needing government attention are not limited to those
industries subject to securities regulation; early monitoring should be more
generally available. Such monitoring could be done through a nonprogram-
matic agency with authority to monitor the financial situation of industries
in trouble and to make recommendations to Congress or the appropriate
regulatory agency at a stage prior to crisis. Such an agency might be called
upon to provide revenue estimates and other economic information. Unlike
most agencies that are established to administer already existing legislation,
such an agency would not have enforcement authority.
Perhaps one lesson of the savings and loan crisis is that it may be difficult
for an agency responsible for industry regulation to admit its defeat at an
early enough stage to take proper corrective action. Insolvent banks were
permitted to operate long after evidence of their insolvency was apparent.
Some have argued that moral hazards caused banking regulators to pursue
this policy of forbearance rather than close insolvent banks. 292 Closing a
significant number of banks would have severely strained the deposit insur-
ance system. "When confronted with a correlated wave of insolvencies and
the prospect of putting numerous institutions out of business, it often seems
to be expedient to forego immediate action and hope that things may get
better. ' 29 Regulators knew that if the bank failures became extreme enough
Congress would provide a bailout. Some of this problem might be eliminated
if the financial monitoring function was performed by a nonprogrammatic
agency. Moreover, a nonprogrammatic agency would be less susceptible to
"capture" by a regulated industry.
The possibility of more widespread financial monitoring raises a number
of issues. First, the prospect may conjure up images of "big brother" and
289. The Issues Surrounding the Collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1990)
(statement of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
290. Id. at 9.
291. S. 207, H.R. 707, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
292. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 138, at 1900.
293. Id.
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raise significant privacy issues. Individual firms in trouble may be willing
to consent to such monitoring, given the prospect of later assistance should
the situation reach crisis proportions, but entire industries may not be able
to reach such a consensus. Protections and safeguards would be necessary
to allay fears regarding leaks and misuse of information. For example, a
firm might be entitled to opt out of the monitoring program but at a cost
of being estopped from requesting assistance at a later date.
Second, it would be impractical to monitor all firms and industries. Some
initial assessments will be necessary to determine those industries that should
be subject to monitoring. Heavily regulated industries, such as banks, are
already monitored, and the information learned as a result should be shared
with the agency established to consider bailouts. In addition to the heavily
regulated industries, other major industries with significant economic impact
might be designated for automatic monitoring. Input-output analysis would
assist in identifying likely candidates. 294 Finally, some industries would be
monitored only after some triggering event suggesting economic problems
in the industry.
In addition to collecting information and monitoring financial conditions
in various industries, a separate division of the agency that I envision would
be asked to provide sophisticated economic cost-benefit assessment and
analysis of redistributive implications of proposed bailouts. In other words,
the agency would assess not only the net benefits in a Kaldor-Hicks sense,
but would also review the distribution of the costs and benefits to identify
winners and losers. 295
One existing prototype for this type of analysis is the Regulatory Impact
Analysis (RIA) required for every major rule proposed by executive agen-
cies.296 In an effort to maximize aggregate net benefits of regulatory action, 297
executive agencies must submit this analysis to the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB), who can require the agency to refrain
from publishing the analysis or proposed regulations until the agency
294. See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text for discussion on identifying those
industries that are likely candidates for bailout in the event of extreme financial failure.
295. For an earlier discussion of redistributive theory, see supra notes 209-32 and accom-
panying text.
296. The RIA requirement was established by President Reagan in Exec. Order No. 12,291,
3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). A rule is considered major if it will result in
(1) [a]n annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; (2) [a] major
increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State or
local government agencies, or geographic regions; or (3) [s]ignificant adverse
effects on competition, employment, investment productivity, innovation, or on
the ability of United States based enterprises to compete with foreign-based
enterprises in domestic or export markets.
Id. § 1(b). One of the earliest models of this type of regulatory cost-benefit analysis is the
Environmental Impact Statement requirement enacted by the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-43709(a) (1971).
297. Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 296, at § 2(b)-(e).
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responds to and incorporates the Director's views in the rulemaking f'le.298
A regulatory action that is Kaldor-Hicks efficient generally will pass muster
under RIA review, but analysis of distributional effects is not technically
required. 299 In providing guidance to executive agencies preparing regulatory
impact analyses, OMB did address the issue of distributional effects, stating:
There is no generally accepted way to monetize (and thus incorporate
directly into the benefit-cost analysis) potential distributional effects.
However, policymakers may wish to take these effects into account.
Therefore, in situations where there are potentially important differences
between those who stand to gain and those who stand to lose under
alternative regulatory options, the RIA should identify these groups and
indicate the nature of the different effects.N
Although my view is that greater emphasis should be placed on distri-
butional effects, the regulatory impact analysis required of executive agencies
by Executive Order 12,291 is a sophisticated approach to public policy that
should be extended to independent agency actions and to legislative pro-
posals. While recommending that such analysis should be applied to legis-
lative bailout proposals, I am mindful of the limitations of cost-benefit
analysis.
First, the obligation to perform such analysis can be burdensome and
those responsible may do a perfunctory job. Second, cost-benefit analysis
is far from a precise science and information can be manipulated to engineer
a particular outcome.30' Cost-benefit analysis was an important component
of conservative deregulation efforts and has been correctly criticized for
"compressing the issue of social regulation into an artificial set of restrictive
guidelines."302 Because benefits such as life, good health, and clean air were
difficult to value, they were often trivialized or ignored. Cost factors that
298. Id. § 3(f)(1). The Executive Order has come under attack for giving too much power
to the OMB add enabling the President to control public policy without sufficient public
debate. See infra notes 301, 312-15 and accompanying text.
299. The OMB concedes that "[a] strict regulatory decision framework designed to maximize
net benefits does not take such distributional effects into account. Rather, it is based on the
Kaldor-Hicks criterion." REGULATORY PROORAM: APR1 1, 1990-MAscH 31, 1991, supra note
223, at 39. For a critique of this aspect of Executive Order 12,291, see Grubb, Whittington,
and Humphries, The Ambiguities of Benefit-Cost Analysis: An Evaluation of Regulatory
Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12,291, in ENVIRoNmENTAL PoLicy UNDER REAGAN'S
ExaEUTIVE ORDER: THE ROLE OF BENEFIT-CosT ANALYsIs 124-25 (V. Smith ed. 1984); Sunstein,
Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23 AIz. L. REV. 1267, 1272-73 (1981).
300. REGULATORY PROGRAM: APRI 1, 1990-MAgcH 31, 1991, supra note 223, at 39. Despite
this suggestion of sensitivity to distributional effects, Reagan-era regulatory policy has been
criticized by many for its redistributive policies. See, e.g., G. EADs & M. FIx, RELIEF OR
REFORM? REAGAN'S REGULATORY DIEMMA (1984).
301. For an in-depth analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of cost-benefit regulatory
analysis, see McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEx. L. REv. 1243
(1987).
302. S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHiN, DisM ANTLNG AMERICA: THE RUSH TO REGULATE 125 (1983).
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were easier to quantify often won out in the balance. 303 The use of economics
in public policy decisions arguably has a dehumanizing effect.
While I am mindful of these concerns, they are less troublesome as
applied to bailouts. Although the line between economic and social regu-
lation is a fine one, bailout is more clearly in the nature of economic
regulation. Consequently, bailouts have serious economic and distributional
implications, and whatever the merits of a broader legislative adoption of
cost-benefit and distributional analysis, such analysis should be applied to
bailout proposals. 3°0
2. Structure and Location of a Monitoring Agency
A second issue crucial to the central monitoring and analysis function is
the proper structure and location of the monitoring entity or agency. One
possibility would be an agency within the Executive branch. 05 If the mon-
itoring agency suggested here is established as a genuinely nonprogrammatic
agency without regulatory authority, the risk of agency capture by particular
industries should be low. On the other hand, industry awareness of the
agency's policy recommendation authority may inspire lobbying efforts and
some small risk of agency capture.: 6 Although an executive agency is
unlikely to be a captive of industry, it might be captive of a particular
presidential administration if appointees served at the pleasure of the
303. Id. at 131-37.
304. Cost-benefit analysis may not be possible in emergency bailout situations. Early
monitoring of the type suggested should minimize this problem and provide greater time in
which to perform necessary economic analysis.
305. One existing example of such a largely nonprogrammatic executive agency is the Council
of Economic Advisors (CEA). The CEA was initially established in the Executive Office by
the Employment Act of 1946. Pub. L. No. 304, § 4, 60 Stat. 23 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1023). Its purposes are "to gather timely and authoritative information concerning economic
developments and economic trends, both current and prospective, to analyze and interpret
such information[,] ... to appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal
Government[,] ... and to make recommendations to the President." 15 U.S.C. § 1023(c)(2)-
(3). Each of these duties is to be performed in light of statutory policy to "promote full
employment and production, increased real income, balanced growth, a balanced Federal
budget, adequate productivity growth, proper attention to national priorities, achievement of
an improved trade balance ... and reasonable price stability." 15 U.S.C. § 1021 (as amended
by the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-523, 92 Stat.
1887). Another illustration is the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) established by the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 202, 83 Stat. 852 (1970)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4342). Both the CEA and the CEQ perform oversight functions in
connection with existing legislative programs and, in this respect, go beyond what I envision
as a crisis financial monitoring agency. Arguably, the jurisdiction of the CEA is already broad
enough to permit such monitoring.
306. For example, the Council of Economic Advisors is empowered to "constitute such
advisory committees and may consult with such representatives of industry, agriculture, labor,
consumers, State and local governments, and other groups, as it deems advisable." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1023(e)(1) (1991). The CEQ has similar authority. 42 U.S.C. § 4345 (1991).
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President. Information could be manipulated so as to tell the story the
President would like to have told, frustrating the agency's fundamental
purpose.3 0°
If the goal behind such a monitoring agency is to increase deliberativeness
and hence public-regarding legislation, it may be more sensible to locate
the agency in the legislative branch. 08 One advantage to this approach would
be to clearly limit the functions of the agency to gathering information and
perhaps to making policy recommendations. Constitutional separation-of-
power constraints would prevent the agency from getting involved in much
more. 309 Such an entity would be at lower risk of agency capture. However,
it would be subject to the vagaries of Congress. As noted previously,
information and statistics can easily be manipulated. As power shifted from
one party to another, a congressional monitoring agency may well be subject
to changing political pressures.
A third, and preferred, alternative would be to set up an independent
monitoring agency that would report to Congress.3 1 0 An independent agency
would not be subject to changing political pressures resulting from power
307. In fact, OMB's strict control over regulatory impact analysis review under Executive
Order 12,291 has come under severe attack for just this reason. See, e.g., Note, Executive
Orders 12,291 and 12,498: Usurpation of Legislative Power or Blueprint for Legislative Reform?
54 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 512 (1987) ("[T]he administration has empowered the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) to run a secretive and authoritarian regulatory program
founded upon Executive Order 12,291."). The presidential order gives OMB the power to
quash proposed regulations before they are exposed to public review or comment. See also
ToLcIN4 & TOLCHIN, supra note 302.
308. Several legislative proposals for regulatory reform along these lines have been proposed,
apparently with little success. For a discussion of several proposals, see Note, supra note 307,
at 516-21, 535-40. However, Congress did pass the Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No.
96-354, § 3(a), 94 Stat. 1165 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-611), requiring analysis of
the impact of regulation upon small business.
One example of a congressional agency is the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), established
by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88
Stat. 297. The CBO was established with "a specific mandate to assist House and Senate
Budget Committees, [and] ... serves as a principal source of information on the budget and
on taxing and spending legislation." House Comm. ON THE BUDGET, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
THE CONGREssIoNAL BUDGET PROCESS: A GENERAL EXPLANATION 7 (Comm. Print 1982).
Another illustration is the Congressional Research Service (CRS), established to provide
information and analysis on policy issues upon request from congressional members and staff.
The CRS was originally established as the Legislative Reference Service. Its name was changed
and it functions greatly expanded by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-510, § 321, 84 Stat. 1140. Another possible congressional home for the proposed monitoring
function would be the Joint Economic Committee.
309. Under the appointments clause of article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution,
Congress has the power to appoint officers to perform internal legislative functions but cannot
appoint officers to perform external enforcement or other functions. The landmark case on
point is Buckley v. Vaeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
310. To some extent, the General Accounting Office (GAO) has already evolved into such
a role for Congress. For a good discussion of the evolution of the GAO from an auditing
agency to an agency actively involved in program review and policy studies for Congress, see
F. MOSHER, A TALE OF Two AGENCIES: A CoMPARATIvE ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE AND THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 136-63 (1984).
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shifts in Congress. Moreover, since the task of assessing distributional effects
of bailout proposals is complex; an independent agency may be the better
place for sophisticated economists and other professionals to work unhin-
dered by the day-to-day concerns of congressional politics. Under this
scheme, Congress would retain ultimate policy control over legislative bail-
outs; the independent agency would simply provide financial monitoring
and work with Congress to provide assessment of economic and distribu-
tional effects.
Whatever its location within the government, Congress should establish
a central agency responsible for monitoring threatened enterprise failure
and assessing bailout requests. The assessment function of this agency should
be minimal. If information is collected, policy options considered, and
corrective measures implemented before problems reach crisis stage, there
will be no need to consider bailout.
3. Congressional Committee Structure
One specific deliberative reform that would improve the quality of the
bailout debate involves a change in internal congressional structure. While
it is sensible for bailout legislation to be considered by the House or Senate
committee that has jurisdiction over the particular industry at risk, there
should also be a special enterprise failure committee that considers the
general redistributional and other economic effects of the bailout provided
by the agency described above. Given the massive public expenditures
involved, such legislation merits specialized treatment in the House and
Senate committee structure. At a minimum, the specialized committees
should have available to them a staff of experts on such redistributional
and economic implications. Jurisdiction of the enterprise failure committee
need not be limited to consideration of bailouts. It could be expanded to
include all measures designed to deal with economic failures, including
bankruptcy and other related matters.
4. Deliberative Reforms
a. Exposing Hidden Bailouts
When a bailout is achieved through indirect or covert means,"' oppor-
tunity for public awareness and debate is necessarily limited. At a minimum,
covert bailouts should be exposed to the light of public scrutiny. Agencies
that provide special breaks to particular firms or industries in order to
311. See supra notes 67-89 and accompanying text for numerous illustrations of hidden
bailouts.
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prevent economic hardship from threatening their viability should be re-
quired to report this information to Congress or otherwise provide an
opportunity for public dialogue. Agencies should be clear about the extent
to which enterprise failure concerns were involved in mixed-motive bailouts.
When hidden bailouts are granted, the record may not be explicit about
the intended beneficiary of the special relief. Sometimes the relief will be
drafted broadly in order to obscure the identity of the intended beneficiary.
These are dangerous tendencies for several reasons. First, when subsidies
are hidden and buried in larger pieces of complex legislation, opportunity
for debate is limited. Those who might be opposed to a bailout may not
even see the special provision as part of the larger bailout phenomenon.
Second, when legislators draft provisions so as to mask the identity of the
beneficiary, the special relief may be made broader than necessary to provide
the assistance intended, costing the taxpayers more than they would other-
wise spend. Third, the cost to the government of covert bailouts may be
hidden and thus not adequately considered.3 1 2 In addition, the costs of
certain types of covert bailouts will be difficult to estimate. These tendencies
suggest that covert forms of bailout should be used only rarely, if ever.
Covert bailouts are particularly inappropriate in the case of firm-specific
failures. Providing special relief from tax or other regulatory requirements
to specific firms raises serious issues of horizontal equity. Providing a
benefit to one entire industry and not to another can raise serious questions
of horizontal equity as well. This is particularly so with special tax breaks.
Providing a special tax break to one sector of the economy and not to
others is discriminatory.
When the covert bailout takes the form of relief from burdensome
regulation, some of the equity concerns are eliminated. For example, if the
entire automobile manufacturing industry was threatened with economic
failure, the government might respond by delaying the effective date of a
change in emissions standards that would be particularly costly to implement.
Since these regulations only applied to the auto industry, relief to the entire
industry in this form would not raise issues of discrimination. However,
many regulations, such as emissions standards and safety regulations, are
promulgated to protect the environment and the public; some may be too
312. Stanley Surrey, Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy from 1967 through 1969,
first pointed out that certain tax deductions and special breaks were actually government
expenditures that should be reflected in the budget and considered by appropriate congressional
budget committees. See, e.g., S. SuRREY, PATHWAYs TO TAx REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX
EXPENDIrS (1973). A tax expenditure budget is now routinely prepared by the Treasury
Department. The covert bailout provided through special tax breaks reflects a subset of the
broader tax expenditure issue. The tax expenditure budget includes many items that would not
be considered bailouts, however. Thus, covert bailouts risk being hidden within the tax
expenditure budget. Moreover, other forms of covert bailouts, such as relief from regulation
or trade restrictions, may not be included in the budget at all.
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important to compromise, even temporarily. Thus, if assistance to the
industry is necessary, it should take a more direct form.
b. Greater Oversight of Major Regulatory Bailouts
Many regulatory bailouts are provided overtly under explicit legislative
authority. Congress has given banking regulators discretionary authority to
bail out banks with no oversight, reporting requirements, or procedural
safeguards.313 Prior to recent statutory changes, the essentiality finding
necessary to free the FDIC of cost restrictions could be made by the FDIC
Board alone without any hearings or public dialogue. New provisions require
a joint recommendation of the FDIC Board and the Federal Reserve Board
with ultimate decision-making authority resting with the Treasury secretary
and the President, 3 4 but there is still no opportunity for hearings or public
dialogue. Serious tensions surely accompany issues of agency discretion and
congressional oversight. On the one hand, agencies are thought to be better
able to deal with complex policy problems given their high levels of
expertise. 315 Another argument in favor of delegating substantial authority
to agencies is the depolitization of the policy review process.316 On the other
hand, agencies insulated from legislative and judicial oversight arguably are
prone to capture by special interests and just as inclined to politics as other
government branches.317 Providing significant discretion to agencies insulated
from congressional and public review is antidemocratic and displays a serious
mistrust of the democratic process .31  A strong case can be made that
Congress should reassert its control and revive the nondelegation ap-
proach. 31 9 This is not to suggest that Congress needs to concern itself with
313. See supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
315. Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler describe this approach as the "New Deal" ideal.
The New Deal response to complex policy issues was to delegate to agencies. The three elements
to this New Deal answer identified by Ackerman and Hassler are: (1) the "affirmation of
expertise," (2) "agency insulation from central political control," and (3) agency insulation
from judicial review. B. AcKEmAN & W. HAssLER, CLEAN CoAL/DrY Ant 4-6 (1981). But
see Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REv.
1, 23-24 (1982) (critizing this explanation for delegation on the grounds that agency heads do
not necessarily have greater expertise and that the Constitution assigns determination of
normative standards to Congress).
316. For a description and critique of this argument, see Aronson, Gellhorn & Robinson,
supra note 315, at 24-26.
317. B. AcKERmcAN & W. HAssLER, supra note 315, at 7; Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson,
supra note 315, at 26.
318. Recent changes transferring ultimate bank bailout authority to the Executive branch
are arguably more democratic because the President (unlike the FDIC Board) is popularly
elected.
319. One of the most thoughtful and developed proposals for renewing the nondelegation
doctrine appears in Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 315. For another thorough
analysis of delegation issues, see Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 H~Av. L. REv. 1667 (1975).
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every detail of designing and implementing public policy.32 0 Congress should
be more involved, however, in making fundamental policy choices. Major
bailouts represent fundamental policy decisions in which Congress should
play a greater role.
In the bailout setting, I am mindful of the need for quick response to
emergency situations. Irvine Sprague, past Chairman and member of the
FDIC Board forcefully argues that banking regulators are the experts best
suited to deal with complex bank failures. The FDIC, he argues, needs
authority to act quickly under emergency circumstances, and greater con-
gressional involvement in the process would hinder effective responses to
bank failure.21 Even in emergency situations, however, there should be a
formal requirement for the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the Treasury
Department to report their actions and the reasons for those actions to the
appropriate congressional committees.
In other situations, advance reporting should be required. Congress should
be given a limited opportunity to state its objections. One possible model
for such a rule is the Bank Holding Company Act322 under which the FDIC
can approve emergency mergers to be consummated immediately. Other
mergers require a waiting period during which the Attorney General and
the other banking agencies are notified and presumably have an opportunity
to state their objections and negotiate a different solution.3 2
IV. STRUCTURING AND FUNDING THE BAILOUT
Given the presumption against bailouts and the high standard required
to overcome it, bailouts should be reasonably infrequent. However, once
other private assistance methods have failed and Congress or other govern-
ment officials decide to intervene, the bailout arrangement itself must be
structured. It should already be clear that many alternative methods for
achieving a bailout are available. As argued earlier, covert forms of bailout
pose special dangers and should be avoided.32 Once the decision is made
to provide a more overt bailout, numerous options still are available. Given
the different types of bailouts and the possible variations in terms within
320. In fact, Ackerman and Hassler use the congressional mandate to EPA requiring
scrubbing technology in the coal industry to illustrate the dangers of a congressional "agency-
forcing" statute that limits the terms of an important policy debate. B. AcrERmAN & W.
HASSLER-' supra note 315.
321. I. SPRAGE , supra note 123, at 264 ("Changing the law to bring the administration or
Congress into the picture would destroy its utility.").
322. 12 U.S.C. § 1828.
323. Id. § 1828(c)(6).
324. For a description of hidden bailouts, see supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the dangers of hidden bailouts, see supra notes 311-13 and accompanying
text.
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each of the types, difficult policy decisions remain at this next step in the
process. This Part will first consider the choice of the proper bailout
technique and, second, the proper method of funding and distributing
bailout costs in those cases where the decision is made to provide a public
bailout.
A. Structuring the Bailout
1. Government Involvement in Management
The most extreme form of overt bailout and government intervention in
management is creation of a public enterprise or nationalization. While such
extreme government intervention has been common elsewhere in the world,325
nationalization has not been used with great frequency in the United States.
Nevertheless, numerous examples of "public enterprise" can be found in
the United States. 326 The collapse of the Penn Central railroad and subse-
quent railroad reorganization forming Conrail can be viewed as a bailout
through nationalization or creation of a public enterprise. An earlier illus-
tration is the Tennessee Valley Authority established during the Depression.
In the bailout setting, government agencies may take over supervision and
management to such an extent that the operation can be viewed, at least
temporarily, as a public enterprise. For example, in the rescue of Continental
Bank of Illinois, the FDIC took an eighty percent ownership interest in the
bank and chose its new managers. 27 In the recent bailout of the savings
and loan industry, the Office of Thrift Supervision is so extensively involved
in the operation and closing of certain banks that the banks can be said to
be public enterprises as well. In addition, throughout the period that federal
loan guarantees on Chrysler debt remained outstanding, the corporation
325. In some countries, certain industries were nationalized as a matter of government policy
even in the absence of economic crisis. For a general discussion of nationalization in Scandi-
navian countries, see G. HEcKscHER, TnE WELFARE STATE AND BEYOND: SUCCESS AND PROBLEMS
iN ScANDmiAvI (1984). In others, nationalization has been used as a form of bailout response
to economic crisis. For example, in response to the threatened collapse of British Leyland, the
government of Great Britain purchased a majority interest in the company and appointed a
semi-independent government agency to manage the company. For a case study of the British
Leyland bailout, see Reich, supra note 287, at 170-74.
326. One commentator describes four different types of public enterprise: (1) the government
department funded through appropriations, (2) "the public corporation owned entirely by the
state" and financed "through borrowing or revenues from sale of products or services," (3)
the mixed-ownership corporation the stock of which is held both by government and privately,
and (4) an operating contract through which the government arranges with a private firm to
manage an enterprise. B. MrrNICK, THE PoInLIcAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: CREATING,
DESIONING AND REMOVING REGULATORY FORMS 400-01 (1980).
327. A full description of the FDIC's ownership interest and the government-appointed
managers can be found in the News Release, supra note 125. Irvine Sprague describes the
Continental bailout as, in effect, a nationalization of the bank. I. SPRAGUE, supra note 123,
at 182.
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was required to submit periodic reports on its activities and meet conditions
set by the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Board. Failure to meet
conditions set by the Board could have resulted in a declaration that the
debt was due and payable in full. As a result, the government was involved
in substantial oversight of Chrysler operations. Moreover, in order to protect
its interest, the government received an equity interest in Chrysler in the
form of warrants to acquire Chrysler stock.
While extreme forms of nationalization should be used only rarely,
government involvement in management appears wise. When a private firm
or industry seeks public bailout assistance and a policy decision is made to
grant such assistance, the government has a strong interest in the success
of the bailout. This is certainly true in the case of general revenue bailouts,
where the taxpaying public in effect becomes an investor in the private
enterprise. In a public bailout, the government in effect plays the role of
bankruptcy trustee and should be entitled to have the same substantial input
in overseeing management decisions that is provided in the private bailout
setting.
2. Structuring the Loan or Loan Guaranty
Many instances of past bailout activity took the form of direct federal
loans or guaranteed loans to particular firms or municipalities threatened
with failure.32 Concerned with the ad hoc response of Congress in each of
these instances, the Comptroller General's Office urged the President and
Congress to develop policies for federal assistance to failing firms and
municipalities. 29 Early in his report, the Comptroller argued that one of
the overriding considerations in any assistance package should be protection
of the government's financial interest. To this end "reliance on the principles
and practices followed by commercial lenders is not only possible but
crucial." 330 The parallels between private lenders and the government as
lender are not precise, however. As in the insurance model discussed
previously, the government is only asked to step in where private lenders
would not. Later in his report, the Comptroller concedes that
328. For example, the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-70, 85 Stat. 178
(1971), was enacted to provide emergency loan guarantees to the Lockheed Aircraft Corpo-
ration. In addition, Congress provided for short-term direct loans to New York City through
the New York City Seasonal Financing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-143, 89 Stat. 797, and
later loan guarantees through the New York City Loan Guarantee Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-339, 92 Stat. 460. Finally, loan guarantees were provided to the Chrysler Corporation in
the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324.
An earlier instance of direct lending is the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, established by
the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-304, 47 Stat. 725, to provide
loans to assist savings associations after the Great Depression.
329. See COMPTROLLER GENERA.L REPORT, supra note 11.
330. Id. at 7.
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[i]n deciding to provide aid, the government does not compare alternative
investments to see if superior combinations of expected return and risk
are available. Instead, the government assists a firm or municipality
with full knowledge that it is unable to compete effectively for funds in
commercial credit markets. Although government objectives differ from
those of commercial lenders, it can frequently use principles and practices
that commercial lenders follow.
33
'
The commercial principles to be applied here are not those used in day-
to-day lending practices. The borrower seeking government assistance gen-
erally finds itself in financial crisis. Thus, the commercial principles to be
applied are those that would be used in a commercial workout for a
borrower in financial trouble. Applying commercial workout lending notions
in the government assistance context involves four basic elements. First,
concessions may be required from the borrower in order to reduce the
amount of assistance needed. This may include concessions from creditors,
stockholders, bondholders, management, labor, suppliers, customers, state
and local governments, and foreign beneficiaries. 332 Second, the lender
should be empowered to exercise some management control over major
contracts and financial and operating plans. 333 Third, adequate collateral
should be required. 334 Finally, the lender should receive adequate risk
compensation. A commercial lender will charge higher rates of interest
depending upon the level of risk involved with the loan. Where the govern-
ment assistance is in the form of loan guarantees, as opposed to direct
loans, this option is not available. Thus, in loan guarantee settings, the
government's risk compensation should be in the form of guarantee fees or
equity participation in the firm requiring assistance.
3 5
3. Federal Insurance Programs
As noted earlier, federal insurance programs themselves reflect bailouts
of a sort. 336 Just as the government as lender or loan guarantor can rely to
a large extent on the principles and practices of commercial lenders, the
government as insurer can use many of the principles and practices of
commercial insurers. Some of these were discussed previously. 3
7 Most
important, the private insurance industry has developed numerous mechan-
isms to minimize the moral hazards to which insureds may fall prey. Among
331. Id. at 29.
332. Id. at 40-44.
333. Id. at 45-46.
334. Id. at 46-48.
335. Id. at 48-50.
336. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 330-35 and accompanying text.
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the most significant of these mechanisms is risk-based assessment of premiums.
Higher premiums imposed on high-risk activity will create disincentives to
engage in such activity and thus reduce moral hazard problems. Recent
statutory changes directing the FDIC to establish a risk-based assessment
system for insured depository institutions certainly reflect a step in the right
direction.3"' In addition, those insured through federal programs should be
required to meet rigid safety standards to be eligible for coverage.
B. Funding and Distributing Bailout Cost
Not all bailouts will ultimately involve cost to the government. Numerous
past instances of federal loans and loan guarantees ultimately cost little or
nothing because the loans were repaid and fees collected to cover adminis-
trative expenses. Other types of bailouts involve significant cost to the
government. As developed earlier, bailouts can be broken into at least five
different cost categories: (1) profitable bailouts, (2) no- or low-cost bailouts,
(3) special fund bailouts, (4) general revenue bailouts, and (5) combination
bailouts. 339 Ideally, of course, bailouts should be structured so that they fall
into one of the first two categories. This often will not be possible. Where
costs are involved, they may take the form of direct outlays or perhaps
revenue foregone. Cost also may be remote and difficult to calculate. For
example, delay in implementation of stricter emissions standards may result
in environmental and health costs that are difficult to measure. Presumably
these indirect costs would be taken into account in the deliberative process
and cost-benefit analysis discussed earlier.
Costs that take the form of direct outlays can be covered by special
funds, general revenues, or a combination of sources. Where possible, costs
for a bailout should be imposed more precisely on the group that benefits
from the bailout. Thus, special fund bailouts generally should be preferred
to general revenue bailouts. We have already seen one illustration of the
special fund approach in the case of bailouts in the form of insurance
funds. Most government insurance programs are funded through fees im-
posed upon those protected by or benefitting from the program. 340
Public goods theory and the theory of clubs provide support for this
approach to the distribution of bailout costs. Clearly, the costs of providing
a pure public good, such as the national defense, should be covered by
general revenue from all taxpayers. As one moves away from the pure
public good end of the continuum, one increasingly finds goods from which
some segment of the population is excluded. Nevertheless, the group of
beneficiaries of the good may have difficulty forming voluntary associations
338. See supra note 97.
339. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
340. For a more detailed discussion of federal insurance programs, see supra notes 90-100
and accompanying text.
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or clubs to provide the good privately. Reorganization in bankruptcy is an
illustration of a mechanism designed to bring together a group of potential
beneficiaries to negotiate an acceptable arrangement for the payment of
creditors and rehabilitation of the firm. Survival of the firm may be viewed
as a public good, at least with respect to those creditors with an ongoing
relationship to the firm. Although some government involvement may be
necessary to manage the bailout, the cost should be borne, to the extent
that it can be identified, by the beneficiaries. 34'
One practical problem with such an approach is that by designating an
identifiable group to bear the costs one has set up an interest group that
will lobby heavily against bearing the charge. The larger group that is not
bearing the charge will perhaps be too diffuse to organize on the other
side.3 42 Some early benefit-driven tax proposals avoided such problems by
having taxpayers reveal their preferences for public goods and setting tax
shares accordingly. One early version of such a linkage of tax cost to
benefit is attributable to Swedish economists Wicksell and Lindahl, who
wrote at the turn of the century. Under the Wicksell-Lindahl scheme, each
person will have a particular desired output for public goods based upon
her budget and the marginal utility she expects from such goods. A Public
Goods Board deciding upon the output and funding of such goods will seek
to "adjust the tax shares until every person agrees on the desired output
of the public good. ' 3 43 Each person's share of the cost will vary depending
upon her demand schedule as revealed to the Public Goods Board. One
major problem with such a scheme is that devious individuals will be
tempted to lie about their utility from the public good, thus free-riding on
the contributions of other, more truthful participants. 3" This problem of
demand-revelation led others to consider alternate tax schemes that might
tie tax cost to benefits without incentives to lie about true demand for
public goods. Under one demand-revealing scheme, an individual's tax share
is the entire cost of providing the public good less the aggregate utility
341. This idea of imposing costs according to benefits has been gaining force to some extent
in tax policy. In one recent ill-fated attempt at such an approach, Congress enacted a provision
imposing the costs of catastrophic health care for elderly taxpayers upon the elderly with
incomes above a specified level. Federal Hospital Insurance Catastrophic Coverage Reserve
Fund, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 112(a), 102 Stat. 698 (1988) (amending Act of Aug. 14, 1935,
ch. 531, § 1817), repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-234, § 102(a), 103 Stat. 1980 (1989). In fact,
much of the cost burden for the ill-fated catastrophic health insurance was imposed upon
wealthy elderly and thus arguably represented a redistribution among elderly taxpayers. For a
discussion of these implications, see Frolik & Barnes, An Aging Population: A Challenge to
the Law, 42 HASTINGs L.J. 683, 710 (1991).
342. The catastrophic health care bill was repealed shortly after its enactment for probably
just this reason. For an account of the repeal, see Frolik & Barnes, supra note 341.
343. A. FELDMAN, supra note 280, at 117.
344. "The critical problem with the Wicksell-Lindahl tax scheme is this problem of demand-
revelation. People will not want to reveal their true feelings to the Public Good Board. This
is why we must look elsewhere for an ideal public finance scheme." Id. at 119.
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accruing to others. 4 One major problem with such a demand-revealing
approach is the unavailability of accurate information. For any taxpayer to
provide a true revelation of her preferences for public goods, detailed and
accurate information must be available. The direct or indirect benefit to
any given taxpayer of a bailout of a major industry or firm will be difficult
to measure and assess, even with reasonably accurate information.
One should hesitate before taking this benefit theory too far, however.
A taxing regime that identified the beneficiaries of particular programs and
imposed costs accordingly would be even more complex than the existing
tax regime, if such a thing is possible. For the moment, I am suggesting
only that the benefit approach to distributing cost burdens be thoroughly
explored in the bailout setting. To the extent that one can identify a discrete
class of bailout beneficiaries, a strong case can be made for spreading costs
among that group through some form of special fund bailout.146 I do not
advocate using this approach for social programs. Many social programs
are designed to provide benefits to those most in need. It is counterpro-
ductive to impose the cost of the programs on their beneficiaries. The cost
for food stamp programs should not be borne by those receiving food
stamps.
CONCLUSION
One thing should be clear from this Article. There is no consistent public
policy regarding enterprise failure. An examination of the history of do-
mestic bailouts shows that Congress and government regulators respond to
threatened private industry failure, if at all, in ad hoc fashion. Once the
first bailout was accomplished, subsequent bailouts became easier to justify.
As a start toward a public bailout policy, the presumption against it should
be firmly established. In the case of threatened industry-wide failure, the
presumption may be more easily overcome upon a showing that survival of
the industry is crucial to the overall economy. Before such a conclusion can
be reached, careful economic study will be necessary. Input-output analysis
could be a very useful tool in this study. 47 In addition, early financial
monitoring on a uniform basis should be available so that crises might be
prevented before they occur.341
345. This scheme is attributed to Edward Clark and Theodore Groves and is described in
id. at 122-29. For further elaboration, see E. CtARK, DEMAND REVELATION AND THE PROVISION
OF PUBLIC GOODS (1980).
346. Representative Joseph Kennedy (D-Mass.) attempted something like this approach in
his proposed bill to fund the savings and loan bailout through a surtax upon taxpayers with
incomes over a certain level. H.R. 5499, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
347. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 289-94 and accompanying text.
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With regard to firm-specific bailouts, the standard required to overcome
the presumption should be more stringent. Before public bailout is consid-
ered, a failing individual firm should be required to attempt chapter 11
reorganization in bankruptcy. In the Chrysler case, Congress rejected the
chapter 11 alternative, fearing that the "very word 'bankruptcy' could cause
a psychological impact of incalculable proportions. 3 49 Perhaps some public
education and revision of the bankruptcy laws is necessary to eliminate the
tarnish to a firm's reputation from such a proceeding and to make reorg-
anization in bankruptcy a more respectable option for the private enterprise.
Such an approach has the advantage of imposing bailout costs on those
most directly affected by firm failure. Resolution of the controversy over
the proper role of bankruptcy law in favor of the value-based account will
be useful in achieving these results.350
In general, direct forms of bailout should be preferred over covert ones.
In all cases, when the target of the bailout is a specific firm, that firm
should be identified so that the true beneficiary is not hidden. Bailouts
should be subject to greater public scrutiny and review. When bailouts are
achieved through regulatory action, Congress should be systematically notified
of each such action. Deliberative reforms suggested by the public interest
approach also may be acceptable to the public choice adherent who is
willing to provide a greater voice to groups now left out of the political
marketplace. It is comforting that the implications of each of these per-
spectives for bailout policy are not as different as one might suspect.
Particularly in the case of covert regulatory bailouts, care must be exercised
to assure adequate deliberation and opportunity to be heard.
My theoretical excursion included a brief analysis of public interest, public
choice, and distributive justice principles as applied to a major modern
public policy problem. Each of these perspectives can provide insight into
the proper legislative response to bailout requests. Most important, the
prevailing focus of recent literature on public interest and public choice
approaches to legislative policy is unfortunate in that it fails to take equity
and distributive justice issues into account.
The recent contrast of the decision to bail out the Bank of New England
but not the Freedom Bank of Harlem underscores the distributive issues
that are involved in bailout decisions. Public interest analysis of bailouts
should include a consideration of distributive justice. Bailout decision makers
should be required to study the distributional consequences of bailout action
in a systematic way. To whom are the benefits flowing and from whom
will the costs be extracted? Many of these questions are not limited to
bailouts. Whenever firms engage in what economists refer to as rent-seeking
349. See supra note 171.
350. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
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activity, rents extracted from others are transferred to the rent seeker. Many
of the observations and suggestions made throughout this Article might be
used to achieve more general legislative reforms. One might even argue that
economically healthy rent-seeking enterprises that are simply lining their
pockets with economic surplus raise more serious public policy issues than
the private enterprise seeking assistance for survival. However difficult they
are to solve, these larger issues should continue to be addressed. In the
meantime, a consistent and systematic approach to the problem of enterprise
failure is needed. Substantial work remains to be done if this goal is to be
accomplished. This Article provides a preliminary sketch of the issues
surrounding the bailout phenomenon and a first step toward developing a
national bailout policy.
